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2019 Edition

Domestic Violence and Civil Protection Orders in Connecticut

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

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Domestic Violence Hotline:

1-888-774-2900 (English)

1-844-831-9200 (Spanish)

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Introduction

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- **Family violence:** “means an incident resulting in physical harm, bodily injury or assault, or an act of threatened violence that constitutes fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, including, but not limited to, stalking or a pattern of threatening, between family or household members. Verbal abuse or argument does not constitute family violence unless there is present danger and the likelihood that physical violence will occur.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-38a](#)(1) (2019).
- **Family or household member:** “means any of the following persons, regardless of the age of such person: (A) Spouses or former spouses; (B) parents or their children; (C) persons related by blood or marriage; (D) persons other than those persons described in subparagraph (C) of this subdivision presently residing together or who have resided together; (E) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they are or have been married or have lived together at any time; and (F) persons in, or who have recently been in, a dating relationship.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-38a](#)(2) (2019).
- **Family violence crime:** “means a crime as defined in section 53a-24, other than a delinquent act, as defined in section 46b-120, which, in addition to its other elements, contains as an element thereof an act of family violence to a family or household member. ‘Family violence crime’ does not include acts by parents or guardians disciplining minor children unless such acts constitute abuse.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-38a](#)(3) (2019).
- **Restraining orders vs. protective order:** “**Restraining orders** differ from protective orders in that the former are civil and can be issued without the accused person being arrested. **Protective orders** in a family violence situation are criminal and are issued after the accused has been arrested for committing a **family violence crime.**” [OLR Bill Analysis substitute Senate Bill 334](#) (October 1, 2002). [Emphasis added]
- **Civil Protection Order:** “Any person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section, provided such person has not obtained any other court order of protection arising out of such abuse, assault or stalking and does not qualify to seek relief under section 46b-15. **As used in this section, ‘stalking’** means two or more wilful acts, performed in a threatening, predatory or disturbing manner of: Harassing, following, lying in wait for, surveilling, monitoring or sending unwanted gifts or messages to another person directly, indirectly or through a third person, by any method, device or other means, that **causes such person to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.**” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a](#)(a) (2019).

Section 1: Family Violence Restraining Order

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE: Bibliographic resources relating to a family violence restraining order issued under Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-15](#) (2019).

- DEFINITIONS:**
- **Application for relief from abuse:** "(a) Any family or household member, as defined in section 46b-38a, who has been subjected to a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening, including, but not limited to, a pattern of threatening, as described in section 53a-62, by another family or household member may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-15](#)(a) (2019).
 - **Affidavit:** "The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath which includes a brief statement of the conditions from which relief is sought." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-15](#)(b) (2019).
 - **Relief:** "The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the court sees fit....Such orders may include temporary child custody or visitation rights, and such relief may include, but is not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from (1) imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the applicant; (2) threatening, harassing, assaulting, molesting, sexually assaulting or attacking the applicant; or (3) entering the family dwelling or the dwelling of the applicant. Such order may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the applicant including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from injuring or threatening to injure such animal." Ibid.
 - **Ex parte order:** "If an applicant alleges an immediate and present physical danger to the applicant, the court may issue an ex parte order granting such relief as it deems appropriate." Ibid.
 - **Time limitation:** "No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be extended by the court upon motion of the applicant for such additional time as the court deems necessary." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-15](#)(g) (2019).
 - **Other remedies:** "An action under this section shall not preclude the applicant from seeking any other civil or criminal relief." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-15](#)(k) (2019).

- **Nolle Prosequi:** "For any family violence case initiated on or after July 1, 2016, that is not referred to the local family violence intervention unit as provided in subsection (g) of section 46b-38c, the prosecuting authority shall not enter a nolle prosequi as to any charge of a family violence crime, as defined in section 46b-38a, unless the prosecuting authority states in open court his or her reasons for the nolle prosequi and, if the reasons include consideration of the defendant's participation in a counseling or treatment program, a representation that such counseling or treatment program complies with the program standards promulgated under section 46b-38l." **Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56o** (2019).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2019).
 - Chapter 815a. Orders of Protection and Relief
 - [§ 46b-15](#). Relief from physical abuse, stalking or pattern of threatening by family or household member. Application. Court orders. Duration. Service of application, affidavit, any ex parte order and notice of hearing. Copies. Expedited hearing for violation of order. Other remedies.
 - [§ 46b-15a](#). Foreign order of protection. Full faith and credit. Enforcement. Affirmative defense. Child custody provision. Registration.
 - [§ 46b-15b](#). Duties of Superior Court re applicants for restraining orders in domestic violence situations.
 - [§ 46b-15c](#). Powers of court in family relations matter re taking out-of-court testimony when one party is subject to a protective order, restraining order or standing criminal restraining order. Videoconference hearings permitted. Oaths. Cross-examination.
 - [§ 46b-15d](#). Courthouse space allocation for meeting between person seeking service of hearing notice and order and proper officer.
 - [§ 46b-15e](#). Chief Court Administrator's responsibilities re applications for restraining orders and collection of data relating to restraining orders and civil protection orders.
 - [§ 46b-16](#). Petition to Superior Court for ex parte order re temporary care and custody of child when parent arrested for custodial interference. Duration of order.
 - Chapter 952. Penal code: Offenses
 - [§ 53a-107](#). Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor.
 - [§ 53a-223b](#). Criminal violation of a restraining order: Class D Felony

PUBLIC ACT HISTORY:

- [2017 Conn. Acts 163](#) § 1 (Effective January 1, 2018)
- [2016 Conn. Acts 34](#) §§ 3-5 (Effective October 1, 2016)
- [2016 Conn. Acts 105](#), §§ 4-5 (Effective October 1, 2016)
- [2014 Conn. Acts 234](#), §§ 3-7,10-11 (Effective October 1,

- 2014)
- [2014 Conn. Acts 217](#), §§ 120-128,191 (Effective January 1, 2015.)
- [2013 Conn. Acts 194](#), § 2 (Effective October 1, 2013)
- [2013 Conn. Acts. 3](#), §§ 36-38 (Effective October 1, 2013)
- [2012 Conn. Acts 114](#) (Effective October 1, 2012)
- [2010 Conn. Acts 144](#) (Effective October 1, 2010)
- [2007 Conn. Acts 78](#) (Effective October 1, 2007)
- [2005 Conn. Acts 152 § 3](#) (Effective October 1, 2005)

FORMS:

- [Filing an Application for a Restraining Order](#)
- [JD-FM-137](#). Application for Relief from Abuse
- [JD-FM-138](#). Affidavit – Relief from Abuse

LEGISLATIVE:

[Office of Legislative Research](#) reports summarize and analyze the law in effect on the date of each report's publication. Current law may be different from what is discussed in the reports.

- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Restraining Orders and Gun Possession*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2017-R-0072](#) (February 24, 2017).
- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *2016 Domestic Violence Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2016-R-0243](#) (October 7, 2016)
- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Domestic Violence and Mental Health Provisions in Recent Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2016-R-0231](#) (October 5, 2016)
- Veronica Rose, Chief Analyst, *Firearm Possession and Domestic Violence Restraining or Protective Orders and Convictions*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2014-R-0181](#) (July 31, 2014)
- Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney, *Summary of Family Violence Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly. Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2009-R-0349](#) (October 2, 2009)
- Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney, *Restraining Orders*, Connecticut General Assembly. Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2005-R-0861](#) (December 8, 2005).

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your [local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Tala E. H. v. Syed L.](#), 183 Conn. App. 224, 247, 192 A.3d 494 (2018). "On the basis of our review of the record and the court's oral decision, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the protective order for six months. The court's decision indicates that it was predicated upon its findings that the defendant sent the plaintiff hundreds of obsessive text messages, went to the homes of her male companion and her family, visited her workplace, used security cameras to keep track of her, sent her text messages questioning her about the time she came and went, and placed a tracking device on the car he permitted her to use to find her location. Such acts constituted stalking under § 46b-15."

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can contact your [local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [State v. Elmer G.](#), 176 Conn. App. 343, 359–60, 170 A.3d 749 (2017). “To convict a defendant of criminal violation of a restraining order, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a restraining order was issued against the defendant and that the defendant, having knowledge of the terms of the order, contacted a person in violation of the order. General Statutes § 53a-223b(a)(2)(B); **State v. Carter**, 151 Conn. App. 527, 534–35, 95 A.3d 1201 (2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 564, 132 A.3d 729 (2016) (certification improvidently granted).
- [Jordan M. v. Darric M.](#), 168 Conn. App. 314, 319, 146 A.3d 1041 (2016). “A review of the evidence presented at the September 4 and September 15, 2015 hearings regarding the restraining order reveals that there was no evidence of a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of threatening.... ‘The plain language of § 46b-15 clearly requires a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury before a court can grant a domestic violence restraining order.’ **Krystyna W. v. Janusz W.**, 127 Conn. App. 586, 590, 14 A.3d 483 (2011).... The defendant’s behavior, although wrongfully and flagrantly in violation of the court’s August 21, 2015 orders, and not to be condoned, does not satisfy the elements of § 46b-15. Accordingly, we conclude that the court improperly granted the restraining order against the defendant.”
- [Wendy V. v. Santiago](#), 319 Conn. 540, 545, 125 A.3d 983, 986 (2015). “**The appeals here are moot because no practical relief can be afforded to the plaintiff.** Simply put, the relief the plaintiff is requesting is a hearing and she has already received that hearing. The plaintiff, however, claims that in the context of family violence restraining orders, the issue of the denial of an application without a hearing falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. See **State v. Boyle**, supra, 287 Conn. at 487 n. 3, 949 A.2d 460 (‘an otherwise moot question may qualify for [appellate] review under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception [to the mootness doctrine]’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted]); see also **Loisel v. Rowe**, 233 Conn. 370, 378–87, 660 A.2d 323 (1995) (mootness doctrine and capable of repetition, yet evading review exception, discussed). We disagree that the exception is applicable here.”
- [Princess O.H. v. Robert H.](#), 150 Conn. App. 105, 116, 89 A.3d 896 (2014) “[W]e conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding in the context of all the evidence presented to it that the defendant’s conduct in driving past her home, turning around, and immediately driving past her home a second time constituted an act of stalking.”

- [Rosemarie B.-F. v. Curtis P.](#), 133 Conn. App. 472, 477, 38 A.3d 138 (2012) **"In the defendant's view, the events that occurred on February 19, 2011, no matter how probative of his misconduct, were insufficient to support the court's judgment because the only other facts of record were protective orders that had been issued many years earlier. *Putman v. Kennedy*, 104 Conn App. 26, 34, 932 A.2d 434 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 909, 940 A.2d 809 (2008), clearly holds that one incident, combined with a finding that a respondent presently poses a continuous threat, is sufficient to satisfy § 46b-15."**
- [Krystyna v. Janusz](#), 127 Conn. App. 586, 592, 14 A.3d 483 (2011). **"The defendant's final claim is that the court exceeded its statutory authority under § 46b-15 by extending the protection of the restraining order to the adult daughter. The defendant argues that the daughter, because she was not a minor, was required to make her own application for a restraining order under the statute in order to be afforded such protection. We disagree. As previously noted, the express language of § 46b-15 (b) provides in relevant part that '[t]he court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the court sees fit. . . .' (Emphasis added.)"**
- [Putman v. Kennedy](#), 104 Conn. App. 20, 25, 932 A.2d 439 (2007). **"Although the court had a reasonable concern that the defendant's actions may have endangered the daughters that concern does not fall within the plain meaning of the statute. Section 46b-15 specifically requires a direct causal link between the defendant and the continuous threat of physical harm to the subject. See *Putman v. Kennedy*, supra, 279 Conn. 171 ('domestic violence restraining orders will not issue in the absence of the showing of a threat of violence'). The legislature promulgated § 46b-15 to provide an expeditious means of relief for abuse victims. See *id.*, 172. It is not a statute to provide a remedy in every custody and visitation dispute, however urgent."**
- [Putman v. Kennedy](#), 104 Conn. App. 26, 34, 932 A.2d 434 (2007). **"...neither a pattern of abuse nor the son's subjective fear of the defendant is a requirement for the finding of a continuous threat. Had the legislature intended these factors to be requirements, the statute would have stated so explicitly.' See *Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp.*, 282 Conn. 535, 546-47, 923 A.2d 673 (2007) ('[i]t is well settled that we decline to engraft additional requirements onto clear statutory language' [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also *Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission*, 278 Conn. 751, 770 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent)."**

- [Putman v. Kennedy](#), 279 Conn. 162, 172, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006). "...in the sensitive and often explosively litigated context of family dysfunction and dissolution, there is a reasonable possibility that a domestic violence restraining order will have prejudicial collateral legal consequences for its subject, even after its expiration. Accordingly, the subject of an improperly rendered domestic violence restraining order is likely to benefit from the vacatur of that order, and dismissal of his or her appeal as moot solely on the basis of that order's expiration is improper."
- [Klein v. City Of Stamford](#), 43 Conn. Sup. 441, 441-442, 658 A.2d 986 (1994).
- [Thurman v. City of Torrington](#), 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984).
- [DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services](#), 489 U.S. 189, 109 S., Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed 2d 249 (1989).

WEST KEY NUMBER:

- Protection of Endangered Persons
 - # 70 et seq. Protection orders in general
 - # 75 et seq. Domestic abuse orders in general
 - # 90 et seq. Enforcement in general
- Criminal Law
 - # 474.4(3) Battered or abused women or spouses

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 25 [Am. Jur. 2d Domestic Abuse and Violence](#) (2014).
 - I. In General
 - II. Persons Within the Scope of Statutes; Protected Persons
 - III. Authority and Jurisdiction of Courts to Grant Relief
 - IV. Scope of Relief
 - VI. Orders in General
 - VII. Appeal and Review of Orders of Protection
 - VIII. Violation of Order
- 24 [Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation](#) (2018).
 - §§ 39-42. Physical violence or threat of violence
- *Cause of Action for Modification of Child Custody or Visitation Arrangement Based on Abuse of Child*, 6 [COA 2d](#) 287 (1994).

PAMPHLETS:

- [How to Ask for a Restraining Order](#) – CT Network for Legal Aid
- [How to Extend a Restraining Order](#) – CT Network for Legal Aid
- [Domestic Violence and Temporary Family Assistance](#) – CT Network for Legal Aid

TREATISES:

- 7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, [Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms](#) (3rd Ed., 2010).
 - § 22.2 Family violence and relief from abuse
 - § 22.3 Application for relief from abuse—Procedure

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- § 22.4 Application for relief from abuse—Form
- § 22.5 Scope of relief available under C.G.S.A. §46b-15
- § 22.6 Enforcement of orders under C.G.S.A. §46b-15

- Nancy McKenna, [Domestic Violence Practice and Procedure](#) (2018 Ed.).
Chapter 4. Civil Protection Orders
- Leonard Karp and Cheryl Karp, [Domestic Torts: Family Violence, Conflict and Sexual Abuse](#), Revised Edition (2005).
Chapter 1. Spousal abuse
§ 1.22. Special statutes concerning domestic violence protective orders
- 1 [Arnold H. Rutkin, Family Law and Practice](#) (2016).
Chapter 6. Handling domestic violence cases
§ 6.02. Civil protection orders
 - [1]. Overview
 - [2]. When to seek a civil protection order
 - [3]. Obtaining a civil protection order; Procedural considerations
 - [4]. Obtaining emergency relief
 - [5]. Contested hearings
 - [6]. Enforcement of protective orders

LAW REVIEWS:

Public access to law review databases is available on-site at each of our [law libraries](#).

- Jane K. Stoeber, [Enjoining Abuse: the Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protection Orders](#), 67 Vanderbilt Law Review 1015 (May 2014).
- Carol A. Bruch, [The Unmet Needs Of Domestic Violence Victims And Their Children In Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases](#), 38 Family Law Quarterly 529 (Fall 2004).

Table 1: Selected Unreported Connecticut Decisions on 46b-15 Restraining Orders

Selected Unreported Connecticut Decisions: 46b-15 (2019) Restraining Orders	
<p><u>Angiollo v. Angiollo</u>, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, No. NNH-FA14-4061466, (Aug. 25, 2014) (2014 WL 4816874)</p>	<p>“In granting the restraining order application filed on behalf of Ava, the court also considered the fact that by Ava witnessing her father striking Luca, it caused Ava to be in fear of her father. The court also considered the fact that Ava would have concern that it might happen again, either to Luca or to Ava. The striking or hitting was with such force that the incident left bruising on Luca's buttocks. Ava's behavior after the incident, as described by Ms. Severino, is consistent with a child in fear. The court considered the fact that exposing a child to domestic violence, even if that child is not the victim of the violence, is sufficient to establish neglect. See <i>In Re Tayler F.</i>, 296 Conn. 524, 995 A.2d 611 (2010) (Hearsay statements which formed the basis of court's finding of neglect, including the fact that children had witnessed domestic violence, were properly admitted where the children were emotionally unavailable to testify.)”</p>
<p><u>Bainer v. Bainer</u>, No. FA 11-4049003S (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. New Haven at New Haven, Oct. 21, 2013)</p>	<p>“Regarding the restraining order, the plaintiff acknowledged more than once that she was not in physical fear of the defendant. However, the court found that after considering the most recent changes to Gen. Stat. sec. 46b-15, ‘this ongoing, and one could argue relentless exchanges . . . he is presenting as someone who poses a threat. He’s intimidating her.”</p>
<p><u>Angelia v. Timothy</u>, No. FA 07-4113654S (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. New London at Norwich, January 4, 2011)</p>	<p>“In <i>Rondeau v. Parenteau</i>, 2010 Conn. Super. Lexis 263 [49 Conn. L. Rptr. 287] (2010, dos Santos, J.), the court, permitted a permanent restraining order. The court in <i>Allshouse v. Farmer</i>, 1997 Ct. Sup. 2220 [19 Conn. L. Rptr. 4] (1997, Tierney, J.), likewise found that under certain circumstances, a court may enter a permanent civil restraining order. Finally, the court in <i>Toal v. Toal</i>, 2008 Ct. Sup. 3738 (2008, Gordon, J.), permanently extended a restraining order.”</p>
<p><u>Woods v. Berritieri</u>, No. TTD FA04 4000071 (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. Tolland at Rockville, Oct. 31, 2005)</p>	<p>“General Statutes § 46b-15 provides relief to any family member as defined in § 46b-38a who has been subjected to continuous threat of physical pain or physical injury by another family member. The statute provides the Court with the power to extend orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of the applicant and such dependent children or other persons as the Court sees fit.”</p>

<p><u>Lawlor v. Curry</u>, No. FA 05-4006931S (Conn. Super. Ct., J.D. New Haven at New Haven, Feb. 4, 2005)</p>	<p>"This court would not have entered an ex parte temporary restraining order if it had been aware of the pending New Hampshire proceeding; and it therefore vacates the temporary restraining order, effective upon notice to both parties."</p>
<p><u>Odom v. Odom</u>, No. FA 02-0097864S, 2002 Ct. Sup. 4896, 4900, 2002 WL 1042492 (Apr. 30, 2002).</p>	<p>"In extending the statute to encompass dating relationships, the legislature has thus shown that restraining orders are intended to apply to those in familial, or quasi-familial relationships, ones that have aspects of intimacy, or repeated contact, or personal familiarity in ways that differ from mere friendship: 'a relationship which is more than - certainly more than strangers or more than a casual friend, some type of personal relationship that goes beyond the run of the mill acquaintance-type situation.' ([H.R. Proceedings, 1999 Sess., May 28, 1999] Id. at 3554.) The entire legislative scheme is intended to offer legal protection to people where the threat or risk of violence derives from the powerful feelings that can occur in these intimate personal relationships."</p>
<p>Ibid.</p>	<p>"This court thus concludes that the restraining order statute is indeed applicable to protect one former sister-in-law against a former sister-in-law. Their relationship arose out of marriage, but though matrimony has ended, the 'affinity' of the parties survives." [Sister-in-law]</p>
<p><u>Carroll v. Carroll</u>, No. FA 99-104387, 1999 Ct. Sup. 9547 at 9548, 1999 WL 596382 (Judicial District, Hartford, July 26, 1999).</p>	<p>"Lastly, since this action began as a 46b-15 application, the court finds that the intent of this statute was to protect the citizens of Connecticut from conduct alleged in the application. The court may fashion any orders it deems appropriate under the statute. This may include the limitation or denial of custody and visitation for a minor child if the Court feels that there is a fear of immediate physical harm."</p>
<p><u>Kulak v. Grant</u>, No. FA 98 0103760S, 1999 Ct. Sup. 15459 at 15461, 1999 WL 1207152 (Judicial District, Hartford, Nov. 29, 1999).</p>	<p>"The statute authorizing the issuance of civil restraining orders provides that the court may impose such sanctions as it deems appropriate for contempt of the order. Connecticut General Statutes, Section 46b-15(g). These include, attorney's fees and costs. Connecticut General Statutes, Section 52-256b. To find a party in contempt, the court must find that a person has disobeyed an order of the court, <u>Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald</u>, 16 Conn. App. 548, 551 (1988)."</p>

Section 2: Family Violence Protective Order

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to family violence protective order under Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 46b-38b and 46b-38c and standing criminal protective orders.

DEFINITION:

- **Protective orders in a family violence situation:** “are criminal and are issued after the accused has been arrested for committing a family violence crime.” [OLR Bill Analysis substitute Senate Bill 334](#) (October 1, 2002).
- **Arrest:** “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, whenever a peace officer determines upon speedy information that a family violence crime has been committed within such officer's jurisdiction, such officer shall arrest the person suspected of its commission and charge such person with the appropriate crime. The decision to arrest and charge shall not (1) be dependent on the specific consent of the victim, (2) consider the relationship between persons suspected of committing a family violence crime, or (3) be based solely on a request by the victim.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-38b](#)(a) (2019).
- **Firearm at scene of domestic violence:** “Whenever a peace officer determines that a family violence crime has been committed, such officer may seize any firearm or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or ammunition at the location where the crime is alleged to have been committed that is in the possession of any person arrested for the commission of such crime or suspected of its commission or that is in plain view. Not later than seven days after any such seizure, the law enforcement agency shall return such firearm, electronic defense weapon or ammunition in its original condition to the rightful owner thereof unless such person is ineligible to possess such firearm, electronic defense weapon or ammunition or unless otherwise ordered by the court.” Ibid.
- **Dominant Aggressor:** “When complaints of family violence are made by two or more opposing persons, a peace officer is not required to arrest both persons. The peace officer shall evaluate each complaint separately to determine which person is the dominant aggressor. In determining which person is the dominant aggressor, the peace officer shall consider the need to protect victims of domestic violence, whether one person acted in defense of self or a third person, the relative degree of any injury, any threats creating fear of physical injury, and any history of family violence between such persons, if such history can reasonably be obtained by the peace officer. The peace officer shall arrest the person whom the officer believes to

be the dominant aggressor.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-38b](#)(b) (2019).

- **Operational Guidelines for Arrest:** “Each law enforcement agency shall develop, in conjunction with the Division of Criminal Justice, and implement specific operational guidelines for arrest policies in family violence incidents. Such guidelines shall include, but need not be limited to: (A) Procedures for the conduct of a criminal investigation; (B) procedures for arrest and for victim assistance by peace officers; (C) education as to what constitutes speedy information in a family violence incident; (D) procedures with respect to the provision of services to victims; and (E) such other criteria or guidelines as may be applicable to carry out the purposes of sections 46b-1, 46b-15, 46b-38a to 46b-38f, inclusive, and 54-1g. Such procedures shall be duly promulgated by such law enforcement agency. On and after October 1, 2012, each law enforcement agency shall develop and implement specific operational guidelines for arrest policies in family violence incidents which, at a minimum, meet the standards set forth in the model law enforcement policy on family violence established in subdivision (2) of this subsection.” Conn. Gen. Stats. § [46b-38b](#)(g)(1) (2019).

PUBLIC ACT:

- [2018 Conn. Acts 5](#), *An Act Concerning Dual Arrests and the Training Required of Law Enforcement Personnel with Respect to Domestic Violence*. ([OLR Summary](#)) (Also cited as Public Act No. 18-5)

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2019)
 - [§ 46b-15c](#). Powers of court in family relations matter re taking out-of-court testimony when one party is subject to a protective order, restraining order or standing criminal restraining order. Videoconference hearings permitted. Oaths. Cross-examination.
 - [§ 46b-38a](#). Family violence prevention and response: Definitions.
 - [§ 46b-38b](#). Investigation of family violence crime by peace officer. Arrest. Assistance to victim. Guidelines. Education and training program. Compliance with model law enforcement policy on family violence. Assistance and protocols for victims whose immigration status is questionable.
 - [§ 46b-38c](#). Family violence response and intervention units. Local units. Duties and functions. Protective orders. Electronic monitoring pilot program. Pretrial family violence education program.
 - [§ 46b-38d](#). Family violence offense report by peace officer. Compilation of statistics by

Commissioner of Public Safety. Report to Governor and General Assembly.

[§ 46b-38f](#). Statistical summary of family violence cases maintained by Family Division. Reports.

[§ 46b-38g](#). Programs for children impacted by domestic violence.

[§ 51-181e](#). Domestic violence dockets.

[§ 53a-40e](#). Standing criminal Protective orders.

[§ 53a-223a](#). Criminal violation of a standing criminal protective order: Class D Felony.

[§ 53a-223b](#). Criminal violation of a restraining order: Class D Felony.

[§ 54-63c](#). Release by law enforcement officer.

[§ 54-63d](#). Release by bail commissioner. Information, files and reports held by Court Support Services Division.

REGULATIONS:

You can visit your local law library or browse the [recently adopted regulations page](#) on the Secretary of the State website to check if a regulation has been updated.

- Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
Department of Public Safety
Duties of Peace Officers
 - § [54-222a-1 Responsibilities of peace officers](#)
 - § [54-222a-2 Victim suffering physical injury to receive victim assistance card](#)
 - § [54-222a-3 Other victims shall receive a victim assistance card](#)

OLR REPORTS:

[Office of Legislative Research](#) reports summarize and analyze the law in effect on the date of each **report's** publication. Current law may be different from what is discussed in the reports.

- Katherine Dwyer, Associate Attorney, *Address Confidentiality Program*, Office of Legislative Research, Report No. [2018-R-0188](#) (August 3, 2018).
- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Domestic Violence and Mental Health Provisions in Recent Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2016-R-0231](#) (October 5, 2016)
- Veronica Rose, Chief Analyst, *Firearm Possession and Domestic Violence Restraining or Protective Orders and Convictions*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2014-R-0181](#) (July 31, 2014)
- Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney, *Summary of Family Violence Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly. Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2009-R-0349](#) (October 2, 2009)
- Sandra Norman-Eady, Chief Attorney, *Protective Orders*. Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2007-R-0567](#) (2007).

CASES:

- [State v. Fernando A.](#) 294 Conn. 1, 4-8, 981 A.2d 427 (2009). "In this public interest appeal, we consider the nature of the hearing that a defendant must receive prior to the issuance of a criminal protective order in a family violence case (criminal protective order) pursuant to General Statutes § 54-63c(b). The defendant, Fernando A., appeals,

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

upon the grant of his application filed pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a, **from the trial court's denial of his** request for an evidentiary hearing prior to the issuance of a criminal protective order. We conclude that § 54-63c(b), and the cross-referenced General Statutes § 46b-38c, permit the trial court to issue a criminal protective order at the **defendant's arraignment after consideration of oral argument** and the family violence **intervention unit's report (family services report)**. We also conclude that the trial court is **required to hold, at the defendant's request made at the** initial hearing, a subsequent hearing within a reasonable period of time at which the state will be required to prove the continued necessity of that order by a fair preponderance **of the evidence, which may include reliable hearsay."**

- [State v. Calabrese](#), 279 Conn. 393, 398, 902 A.2d 1044 (2006). "In connection with the defendant's arraignment, the court, *Alexander, J.*, issued a family violence protective order on January 7, 2002 (protective order). The protective order directed the defendant, inter alia, to refrain from threatening, harassing or assaulting the complainant, and from entering the family dwelling or dwelling occupied by the complainant. According to the testimony of Tracy Genues-Johnson, a court clerk, the defendant was given a copy of and advised of his rights under the protective order. The protective order remained in effect and was not modified **while the case was pending."**
- [State v. Charles](#), 78 Conn. App. 125, 138-39, 826 A.2d 1172 (2003). "We conclude that the terms of the family violence protective order issued in this instance were adequate to give the defendant fair warning that the act of leaving two expletive and posturing laden messages on the victim's telephone answering machine would constitute a violation of the order prohibiting him from harassing or threatening her. Under those circumstances, the consequence of the court's charge was not impermissibly to curtail the defendant's constitutional right to speech, and the charge that outlined in detail the elements of behavior proscribed by the protective order was neither impermissibly vague nor **overbroad."**
- [State v. Doe](#), 46 Conn. Supp. 598, 598, 765 A.2d 518 (2000). "The defendant, John Doe, challenges the constitutionality of the laws and procedures used in Connecticut courts which provide for issuing protective orders that result in barring a person from their home as a result of an arrest for a family violence crime."
- [State v. Martino](#), 61 Conn. App. 118, 120-121, 762 A.2d 6 (2000). "In response, the victim called the police. Although the victim feared the defendant and did not want to press charges, the police arrested the defendant pursuant to the

state's family violence law, General Statutes § 46b-38b. He was charged with disorderly conduct and interfering with a police officer, and was released on bail. Later that same day, the Superior Court issued a family violence protective order that prohibited the defendant from contacting the victim in any manner. The defendant received a copy of the protective order, and a police officer reviewed the terms of the order with him."

- [State v. Taveras](#), 49 Conn. App. 639, 716 A.2d 120 (1998).
- [In re Alana S.](#), 44 Conn. Sup. 235, 683 A.2d 425 (1996).
- Protection of Persons
 - # 45 Domestic abuse and violence
 - # 70-83 Protection orders in general
 - # 90-108 Violations, contempt, and conviction

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

- 11 [C.J.S. Breach of the Peace](#) (2008).
§§ 32-38 Orders of protection

TREATISES:

You can click on the links provided to see which law libraries own the title you are interested in, or visit our [catalog](#) directly to search for more treatises.

- 1 Arnold H. Rutkin, [Family Law and Practice](#) (2016).
Chapter 6. Handling domestic violence cases
§ 6.03. Other types of protection orders
[1]. Criminal protection orders
- Carl J. Schuman, [Connecticut Criminal Procedure](#) (2017).
Chapter 4. Arraignment
§ 4-3: 2 Place of Arraignment
§ 4-3: 9 Family Violence
§ 4-4: 5 Release by Law Enforcement Officials
§ 4-4: 6 Release by Bail Commissioner
§ 4-4: 7 Release by Court
§ 4-4: 9 Modifications of Conditions of Release
Chapter 8. Pretrial Diversionary Programs
§ 8-4: 8 Pretrial Family Violence Education Program
- Nancy McKenna, [Domestic Violence Practice and Procedure](#) (2018 ed.).
Chapter 8. Defending Criminal Domestic Violence Cases
II. Criminal protection orders

LAW REVIEWS:

- Judith A. Smith, [Battered non-wives and unequal protection-order coverage: A call for reform](#), 23 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 93 (2005).
- Carol A. Bruch, [The Unmet Needs Of Domestic Violence Victims And Their Children In Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases](#), 38 Family Law Quarterly 529 (Fall 2004).
- Michael J. Voris, [The Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order And The Role Of The Court](#), 24 Akron Law Review 423 (1990).

Table 2: Modification of Standing Criminal Protective Order

<p><u>State v. Swoverland</u>, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Britain, No. CR-070234372T (Aug. 31, 2011) (2011 WL 4582819).</p>	
<p>Standard for Modification</p>	<p>The standard established for the Court to modify or revoke a standing criminal restraining order is explicitly stated within § 53a-40e(a). That standard is that “a standing criminal restraining order ... shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court for good cause shown.”</p>
<p>Definition of “Good Cause”</p>	<p>C.G.S. § 53a-40e does not define “good cause.” The term “good cause” is used in all areas of the law and the definition is usually left to its common understanding and usage. That common understanding and usage is articulated in Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) as “[a] legally sufficient reason.”</p>
<p>Review of Evidence</p>	<p>Therefore, it is with this understanding and standard that the Court reviews the evidence presented to determine whether good cause, “a legally sufficient reason,” has been established by the defendant to modify the standing criminal restraining order.</p>

Note: Public Act 10-144 substituted the term “standing criminal protective order” for “standing criminal restraining order.”

Section 3: Civil Protection Order

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to a civil protection order issued under Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a](#) (2019).

DEFINITIONS:

- **Eligibility:** "Any person who has been the victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section, provided such person has not obtained any other court order of protection arising out of such abuse, assault or stalking and does not qualify to seek relief under section 46b-15." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a](#)(a) (2019).
- **Stalking:** "As used in this section, 'stalking' means two or more wilful acts, performed in a threatening, predatory or disturbing manner of: Harassing, following, lying in wait for, surveilling, monitoring or sending unwanted gifts or messages to another person directly, indirectly or through a third person, by any method, device or other means, that causes such person to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a](#)(a) (2019).
 - **See Also:** [Summary for Public Act 17-99](#), which states that the "act makes . . . changes related to civil protection orders. It . . . creates a specific definition of 'stalking' for the purpose of civil protection orders [see above] that expands their availability to additional stalking victims To be eligible for a civil protection order **under prior law**, a stalking victim had to be a victim of 1st, 2nd, or 3rd degree stalking **as defined in the penal code.**" [Emphasis added.]
- **Extension:** "No order of the court shall exceed one year, except that an order may be extended by the court upon proper motion of the applicant, provided a copy of the motion has been served by a proper officer on the respondent, no other order of protection based on the same facts and circumstances is in place and the need for protection, consistent with subsection (a) of this section, still exists." Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a](#)(c) (2019).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2019).
 - Chapter 815a. Orders of Protection and Relief
 - § [46b-16a](#). Issuance of civil protection order on behalf of person who has been victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking. Application. Hearing. Court orders. Duration. Notice. Other remedies.
 - Chapter 952. Penal code: offenses
 - § [53a-181c](#). Stalking in the first degree: Class D felony.
 - § [53a-181d](#). Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor.

- § [53a-181e](#). Stalking in the third degree: Class B misdemeanor.
- § [53a-223c](#). Criminal violation of a civil protection order: Class D felony.

PUBLIC ACT HISTORY:

- [2017 Conn. Acts 163](#), § 2 (Effective January 1, 2018)
- [2017 Conn. Acts 99](#), § 1 (Effective October 1, 2017)
- [2017 Conn. Acts 71](#), §§ 1-2 (Effective October 1, 2017)
- [2016 Conn. Acts 105](#), § 6 (Effective October 1, 2016)
- [2016 Conn. Acts 34](#), § 6 (Effective October 1, 2016)
- [2014 Conn. Acts 217](#), § 186 (Effective January 1, 2015.)

FORMS:

- [Filing an Application for a Civil Protection Order](#)
- [JD-CV-143](#). Application for Civil Protection Order
- [JD-CV-144](#). Affidavit – Civil Protection Order
- [JD-CV-148](#). Civil Protection Order Information Form
- [JD-CV-155](#). Civil Protection Order Stalking Checklist
- [JD-CV-146](#). Motion for Extension of Civil Protection Order

LEGISLATIVE:

[Office of Legislative Research](#) reports summarize and analyze the law in effect on the date of each report's publication. Current law may be different from what is discussed in the reports.

- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Service of Civil Orders of Protection*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2016-R-0332](#) (December 27, 2016)
- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Domestic Violence and Mental Health Provisions in Recent Laws*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2016-R-0231](#) (October 5, 2016)
- Michelle Kirby, Senior Legislative Attorney, *Civil Orders of Protection*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2015-R-0172](#) (November 13, 2015)

CASES:

Once you have identified useful cases, it is important to update the cases before you rely on them. Updating case law means checking to see if the cases are still good law. You can [contact your local law librarian](#) to learn about the tools available to you to update cases.

- [Sabrina C. v. Fortin](#), 176 Conn. App. 730, 170 A.3d 100, (2017). "We first note that the motion filed by the self-represented defendant **on March 7, 2016, was titled 'motion to vacate civil protective order.'** The civil protection order had been granted by the court on November 24, 2015, which was more than twenty days prior to the filing of the defendant's motion. The defendant had not appealed from the court's judgment, and, therefore, the defendant was requesting that the court open the judgment and vacate or modify the order. Accordingly, we set forth the standard of review and legal principles that are applicable to a court's decision on a motion to open a judgment...."

"We conclude that the court could not properly grant a one year extension on the grounds that the plaintiff had been a victim of sexual assault and that the statute was designed to protect such victims. If that were the case, civil protection orders could be continued ad infinitum regardless of the current situation between the parties. There is nothing in the relevant legislation to suggest such an intent or result. In order to obtain an extension, the plaintiff was required to

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present evidence that her need for protection against the defendant still existed, and she failed to do so. In the absence of any evidence to meet that statutory requirement, the court erred in extending the civil protection order to November 24, 2017.”

- [Rose B. v. Dawson](#), 175 Conn. App. 800, 169 A.3d 346, (2017). “The defendant did not raise any issue with respect to a lack of specificity in the plaintiff’s application prior to the date of the full hearing, during the presentation of evidence at the hearing, or after the court heard the evidence but prior to the time that it rendered its decision in this matter. Instead, only after the court announced its ruling, which was adverse to the defendant, did the defendant’s counsel for the first time assert that the defendant was prejudiced by a lack of specificity in the plaintiffs application. In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the court’s decision reflects an abuse of discretion.”
- [Fiona C. v. Kevin L.](#), 166 Conn. App. 844, 852, 143 A.3d 604, 609 (2016). “Section 53a–181d (a) defines the phrase ‘course of conduct’ as requiring ‘two or more acts.’ A person violates this statute, inter alia, when he or she engages a course of conduct directed at a specific person. See General Statutes § 53a–181d(b)(1). Reading these two parts of the stalking in the second degree statute together, we conclude that the two or more acts must be directed at a specific person, in this case the plaintiff. The trial court employed a broader interpretation in its analysis. Specifically, it determined that the ‘course of conduct’ was met by the defendant’s past threat to slit the plaintiff’s throat and his later threats made toward other students.

“The court’s interpretation ignores the plain language of § 53a–181d(a)(1) that the course of conduct be directed at a specific person. We iterate that we are bound to interpret the statute as it is written and cannot ignore the words used by the legislature. ‘It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... Every word and phrase [in a statute] is presumed to have meaning, and we do not construe statutes so as to render certain words and phrases surplusage.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Pommer*, 110 Conn. App. 608, 614, 955 A.2d 637, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 951, 961 A.2d 418 (2008).” [Note: See new definition of stalking in Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a\(a\)](#)]

- [Stacy B. v. Robert S.](#), 165 Conn. App. 374, 388, 140 A.3d 1004, 1013 (2016). “The defendant argues regarding § 53a–181d (b)(1) that the court lacked sufficient evidence that the plaintiff had been placed in fear of his safety or that of a third person. The defendant asserts that the only finding related to this element was that the defendant complained to school

board members of the district in which the plaintiff's son attends school that the plaintiff was a danger to children. To the contrary, after specifically describing the school board incident, the court found that '[t]his incident, and other alarming and irrational conduct detailed herein, engaged in by [the defendant], has reasonably caused [the plaintiff] to fear that he was being "hunted" by [the defendant] and to take certain precautions, including obtaining a post office box, registering his new car in his wife's premarital name, and hiring an Internet company to delete any derogatory information about him **that was electronically posted.**' The defendant contends that there was 'not a scintilla of evidence presented to the court that the defendant is or ever has been physically dangerous to anyone.' Despite this assertion, we find the trial court possessed sufficient evidence, after listening to two days of testimony and examining a variety of exhibits, to conclude that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have cause to fear for his own or a third person's physical safety, even if the plaintiff did not produce evidence of past physical violence committed by the defendant. See *State v. Russell*, 101 Conn. App. 298, 321, 922 A.2d 191 (reasonable for obsessive behaviors to cause victim to fear for safety), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 934 (2007). [**Note:** See new definition of stalking in Conn. Gen. Stat. § [46b-16a\(a\)](#)]

- ENCYCLOPEDIAS:**
- 42 [Am. Jur. 2d](#) Injunctions (2010).
 - § 86. Harassment
 - § 95. Assault, battery, insult, or molestations

- PAMPHLETS:**
- [Civil Protection Order](#) – Office of the Victim Advocate

Section 4: Legal Protections for Victims of Family Violence

A Guide to Resources in the Law Library

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to additional legal protections for victims of domestic violence.

DEFINITION:

- **Address Confidentiality Program:** "There shall be an address confidentiality program established in the office of the Secretary of the State to provide a substitute mailing address for any person who has been a victim of family violence, injury or risk of injury to a child, sexual assault or stalking, and who wishes to keep such person's residential address confidential because of safety concerns." Conn. Gen. Stat. [§ 54-240a](#)(a) (2019).
- **Leave from employment for victims of family violence:** "If an employee is a victim of family violence, an employer shall permit the employee to take paid or unpaid leave during any calendar year in which such leave is reasonably necessary (1) to seek medical care or psychological or other counseling for physical or psychological injury or disability for the victim, (2) to obtain services from a victim services organization on behalf of the victim, (3) to relocate due to such family violence, or (4) to participate in any civil or criminal proceeding related to or resulting from such family violence. An employer may limit unpaid leave under this section to twelve days during any calendar year. Leave under this section shall not affect any other leave provided under state or federal law." Conn. Gen. Stat. [§ 31-51ss](#)(b) (2019).
- **Termination of rental agreement because of family violence:** "...any tenant who (1) is a victim of family violence, as defined in section 46b-38a, and (2) reasonably believes it is necessary to vacate the dwelling unit due to fear of imminent harm to the tenant or a dependent of the tenant because of family violence, may terminate his or her rental agreement with the landlord for the dwelling unit that the tenant occupies without penalty or liability for the remaining term of the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord at least thirty days prior to the date the tenant intends to terminate the rental agreement. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter and chapter 831, for rental agreements entered into or renewed on or after January 1, 2014, any tenant who (A) is a victim of sexual assault under any provision of section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-70b, 53a-71, 53a-72a, 53a-72b or 53a-73a, or is the parent or guardian with physical custody of a dependent who is the victim of sexual assault under section 53a-70c, and (B) reasonably believes it is necessary to vacate the

dwelling unit due to fear of imminent harm to the tenant or a dependent of the tenant because of such sexual assault, may terminate his or her rental agreement with the landlord for the dwelling unit that the tenant occupies without penalty or liability for the remaining term of the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord at least thirty days prior to the date the tenant intends to terminate the rental agreement.” Conn. Gen. Stat. [§ 47a-11e](#)(a) (2019).

STATUTES:

You can visit your local law library or search the most recent [statutes](#) and [public acts](#) on the Connecticut General Assembly website to confirm that you are using the most up-to-date statutes.

- Family Violence Prevention Services, [42 U.S.C. 10401](#) (2019).
- Conn. Gen. Stat. (2019).
 - [§ 17b-112a](#). Definitions. Notification of referrals to applicants and recipients of temporary family assistance who are victims of domestic violence. Domestic violence training program. Regulations
 - [§ 17b-112b](#). Exemptions and extensions for applicants and recipients of temporary family assistance who are victims of domestic violence. Standards and procedures. Regulations.
 - [§ 17b-808](#)(a)(2). Special needs benefit for emergency housing. Limitation.
 - [§ 31-51ss](#). Leave from employment for victims of family violence. Action for damages and reinstatement.
 - [§ 31-236](#)(a)(2)(A)(iv). Disqualifications. Exceptions.
 - [§ 38a-816](#)(18). Unfair practices defined.
 - [§ 46b-38g](#). Programs for children impacted by domestic violence.
 - [§ 47a-11e](#). Termination of rental agreement by tenant who is a victim of family violence or sexual assault.
 - [§ 54-85b](#). Employment protection for witnesses and victims of crime. Penalty. Action for damages and reinstatement.
 - [§ 54-86d](#). Disclosure of address and telephone number by victim of sexual assault not required.
 - [§ 54-86e](#). Confidentiality of identifying information pertaining to victim of sexual assault...

[Chapter 968a](#) - Address Confidentiality Program

PUBLIC ACT HISTORY:

- [2015 Conn. Acts 211](#) §§23-24 (Effective January 1, 2016)
- [2014 Conn. Acts 217](#), §120 (Effective January 1, 2015)
- [2011 Conn. Acts 52](#) (Effective January 1, 2012)
- [2010 Conn. Acts 37](#) (Effective October 1, 2010 and July 1, 2010)

REGULATIONS:

- Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
 Department of Public Safety
 Duties of Peace Officers
[§ 54-222a-1 Responsibilities of peace officers](#)
[§ 54-222a-2 Victim suffering physical injury to receive](#)

[victim assistance card](#)
§ [54-222a-3 Other victims shall receive a victim assistance card](#)

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- Katherine Dwyer, Associate Attorney, *Address Confidentiality Program*, Office of Legislative Research, Report No. [2018-R-0188](#) (August 3, 2018).
- Michelle Kirby, Associate Analyst, *Confidentiality of Information of Safe Houses*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2014-R-0011](#) (January 3, 2014).
- Soncia Coleman, Associate Legislative Attorney, *Housing and Employment Protections for Domestic Violence Victims*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [2009-R-0443](#) (December 11, 2009).
- Laura Jordan, *Domestic Abuse Victims' Ability to Collect Unemployment Compensation and Explanation of Non-Chargeable Claims*, Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research Report No. [99-R-0756](#) (July 27, 1999).

TREATISES:

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- Pamela J. Moore, [Connecticut Employment Law](#) (4th ed. 2018).
Chapter 7. Connecticut Leave Laws
7-8: 1 Leave for Victims of Family Violence
- Jeffrey L. Hirsch, [Labor and Employment in Connecticut](#), 2nd ed. (2018).
Chapter 16. Termination of Employment
16-5 Unemployment Compensation
(a) –Eligibility
- Stephen B. Harris, [Connecticut Employment Law](#) (2005).
Chapter 6. Leaves of Absence/Time Off
6: 5 Witnesses and victims of crime
- Nancy McKenna, [Domestic Violence Practice and Procedure](#) (2018 ed.).
Chapter 5. Federal Law
5: 19 Low-income housing
5: 20 Confidentiality of postal addresses
5: 24-27 Immigrant protections
Chapter 10. Domestic Violence and the Workplace
10: 22 Tort claims against employers-Wrongful Discharge-Public policy theory
10: 31 Family and medical leave
10: 44 Unpaid leave for victims of domestic violence

Table 3: Protection for Animals in Domestic Violence Cases

<p>An Act Concerning the Protection of Pets in Domestic Violence Cases</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>2007 Conn. Acts 78</u></p> <p>Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:</p> <p>Section 1. Subsection (b) of section 46b-15 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2007):</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.</p> <p>“ The court, in its discretion, may make such orders as it deems appropriate for the protection of any animal owned or kept by the applicant including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the respondent from injuring or threatening to injure such animal.” §1(b) (3).</p> <p>. . . . “A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the victim including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from injuring or threatening to injure such animal.” § 2(e)(3).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">.</p> <p>. . . . A protective order issued under this section may include provisions necessary to protect any animal owned or kept by the victim including, but not limited to, an order enjoining the defendant from injuring or threatening to injure such animal. § 3(e)(3).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Effective October 1, 2007)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Approved May 30, 2007</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SUMMARY</p> <p>This act permits courts to issue protective orders for animals owned or kept by victims of family violence, stalking, or harassment. The orders may, at a minimum, prohibit respondents or defendants from injuring or threatening to injure the animals. In family violence cases, the order may be in the form of a civil restraining, or criminal protective, order.</p>

Table 4: Firearms and Domestic Violence

<p>An Act Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence Conn. Public Act 16-34 (Effective October 1, 2016)</p>
<p><u>OLR SUMMARY</u></p>
<p><i>The act extends certain firearms and ammunition prohibitions to people subject to an ex parte civil restraining or protection order issued in a case involving physical force. It expressly prohibits the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP) commissioner from issuing a gun permit or firearms eligibility certificate to anyone subject to such an order. The act makes a person ineligible to possess firearms or ammunition on receiving legal notice that he or she is subject to an ex parte order and makes it a class C felony (see Table on Penalties) for such a person to violate firearms or ammunition transfer, delivery, or surrender requirements, as is already the case for anyone subject to any other order of protection.</i></p>
<p><i>The act also requires the commissioner, at the request of a person who was subject to such an order and on verification of the order's expiration, to reinstate any gun or ammunition credential revoked as a result of the order, if the person is otherwise eligible for the credential.</i></p>
<p><i>The act also shortens, from two business days to 24 hours, the deadline by which a person who becomes subject to any type of order of protection in a case involving physical force must transfer, deliver, or surrender his or her firearms and ammunition. It imposes the same 24-hour deadline on such transfers by people subject to an ex parte order. It (1) gives people required to surrender their firearms or ammunition to law enforcement the option to surrender them to a municipal police department, instead of just the DESPP commissioner; (2) requires the DESPP commissioner to update the protocol to allow for such a surrender; (3) requires DESPP and law enforcement agencies, in certain circumstances, to return firearms and ammunition when an ex parte order expires; and (4) provides for the request and return of firearms and ammunition when an order expires or is rescinded.</i></p>
<p>Selected affected statutes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36k Transfer, delivery or surrender of firearms or ammunition by persons ineligible to possess firearms or ammunition. Request for return of firearms or ammunition. Destruction of firearms or ammunition. Penalty.• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-15 Relief from physical abuse, stalking or pattern of threatening by family or household member. Application. Court orders. Duration. Service of application, affidavit, any ex parte order and notice of hearing. Copies. Expedited hearing for violation of order. Other remedies.• Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-16a Issuance of civil protection order on behalf of person who has been victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault or stalking. Application. Hearing. Court orders. Duration. Notice. Other remedies.