who assaulted the victim. The defendant attempted to present this version of the facts by offering the uniform arrest report into evidence through the testimony of Bobrowiecki.

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that there were other means by which the defendant adequately was permitted to present his misidentification defense.[16] The uniform arrest report was the only independent documentary evidence that was offered at trial showing the defendant's height and weight and that he did not have tattoos, at least at the time he was arrested. See *Scrimo* v. *Lee*, 935 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir. 2019) (defendant "was deprived of his constitutional right to present a complete defense" because "[i]n circumstances in which . . . the marginal evidence pointing to the defendant over another person is flimsy, and *the excluded evidence was the only independent source of facts essential to proving the defense's theory that the other person committed the crime*, we must conclude that the wrongfully excluded testimony would have introduced reasonable doubt where none otherwise existed" (emphasis added)). The fact that Sarbieski testified, during the state's case-in-chief, that the defendant did not have tattoos, by itself, cannot be construed as adequate other means by which to present the defendant's theory of defense. Sarbieski was the defendant's long-standing employer and, as the prosecutor pointed out to the jury, a "good friend" of the defendant. His testimony about

[16] We note that there is nothing in the record indicating that the jury was otherwise able to view the defendant's forearms at trial. Although the state directs our attention to a statement made by the trial court during a postjudgment hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial in which the court stated that, at times during the trial, the defendant's sleeves were rolled up, the court's statement does not establish that *the jury* was able to view the defendant's forearms. The court never indicated how high the defendant's sleeves were rolled up and to what extent, if any, the defendant's forearms *were exposed to the jury*, and the statement does not convey in any way whether *the jury was able to view* the defendant's forearms during trial. Moreover, although the state makes general assertions that the jury could have viewed the defendant at trial, the state has failed to point to anything in the record indicating that the jury was able to view the defendant's forearms during trial or to any factual finding made during an evidentiary hearing to that effect. Notably, at oral argument before this court, the state expressly represented that it "was not making . . . any proffer now that we know the set up and what the jury could see . . . ."

the defendant's lack of tattoos, as juxtaposed against evidence from an objective and independent third party, the uniform arrest report, was not evidence of equivalent value to the defendant. See *State* v. *Osimanti*, supra, 299 Conn. 17 (exclusion of evidence of victim's conviction for violation of protective order and of inquiry into victim's history of domestic violence, which was offered to prove victim's "violent character," when defendant claimed self-defense, was nonconstitutional because defendant "was able to introduce evidence to that effect in the form of the victim's lengthy criminal record and gang affiliations, as well as through his cross-examination of [a witness]"); *State* v. *Papineau*, 182 Conn. App. 756, 780–82, 190 A.3d 913 (exclusion of testimony from defendant's mother concerning innocent explanation for defendant's flight—that prior to crime, he planned to travel to Massachusetts—was not constitutional in nature because "the defendant was permitted to present evidence that he had preexisting plans to travel to [Massachusetts] by means other than the narrow inquiry that was excluded," namely, through testimony of two other witnesses), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 916, 193 A.3d 1212 (2018). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the defendant was adequately permitted to present his misidentification defense through the evidence that was admitted at trial.

In sum, no reasonable review of the record could lead to the conclusion that the defendant was "adequately . . . permitted"; (internal quotation marks omitted) *State* v. *Leniart*, supra, 198 Conn. App. 604; "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"; (internal quotation marks omitted) *State* v. *Cerreta*, supra, 260 Conn. 260; as the court prevented him from presenting relevant and material evidence that supported his version of the facts, that he considered to be "essential" to his misidentification theory of defense, and that was central to the critical issue of identity. See *State* v. *Torres*, supra, 343 Conn. 217; *State* v. *Cerreta*, supra, 264–65. Accordingly, we are convinced that the court's erroneous exclusion of the uniform arrest report rose to the level of a constitutional violation, as it resulted in the exclusion of evidence that was material