The motion for default that was filed during the statutorily mandated mediation period—in 2014—was promptly withdrawn after the defendants' objection. The long, contentious route that this case has taken has resulted in delay of the plaintiff's relief—while it is undisputed that the defendants have remained in the property in continued default of their obligations on the note and mortgage—for more than one decade. After considering the defendants' arguments, the court determined that "nothing in the case at bar persuades this court that equity requires anything other than a judgment in the plaintiff's favor." We cannot disagree with that determination. The court's denial of the equitable relief requested by the defendants was not an abuse of its discretion.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of making a new finding as to the amount of the debt, for the setting of a new sale date, and for other proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

MARYANNE HORNISH ET AL. *v.* TOWN OF SUFFIELD (AC 47147)

Alvord, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the Superior Court's judgment dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture, which had affirmed a disposal order, issued by an animal control officer for the defendant town, to euthanize the plaintiffs' dog. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 22-358 (c)) authorizing the euthanizing of the dog was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the town in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. *Held*:

The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 22-358 (c) violated the separation of powers doctrine because, pursuant to *Bottone* v. *Westport* (209 Conn. 652), the separation of powers doctrine does not pertain to