petitioner is afforded considerable leeway by virtue of his self-represented status, it cannot reasonably be said that he has adequately briefed this issue.

Moreover, it is apparent that the evidence proffered by the petitioner in support of his opposition to the respondents' motion for summary judgment, namely, the "Iris S." letters, is inadequate for that purpose. First, as the respondents point out, the letters have never been authenticated. "This court has made clear that [the] rules [of practice] would be meaningless if they could be circumvented by filing [unauthenticated documents] in support of or in opposition to summary judgment. . . . Therefore, before a document may be considered by the court [in connection with] a motion for summary judgment, there must be a preliminary showing of [the document's] genuineness, i.e., that the proffered item of evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. . . . Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to . . . the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *Anderson* v. *Dike*, 187 Conn. App. 405, 411–12, 202 A.3d 448, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 910, 203 A.3d 1245 (2019). In the absence of some kind of authentication, the letters cannot reasonably be relied on as probative evidence.[14]

Furthermore, the petitioner has never identified "Iris S." with any particularity, and there is nothing in the record to corroborate the content of the letters she purportedly wrote. Indeed, there is no proof that the respondents received the letters, and the petitioner has made no showing that, if they did receive the letters, they concealed them from the petitioner for the purpose

[14] The petitioner was granted permission by the trial court to subpoena "Iris S." Although the petitioner asserted that he received the letters from

of preventing him from seeking a new trial. For all these reasons, the petitioner has failed to present evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim that the three year limitation period of § 52-582 was tolled by the respondents' fraudulent concealment of the letters.[15] Accordingly, the respondents are entitled to summary judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

THE METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION *v.* MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.* (AC 44790)

Prescott, Elgo and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff municipal water control authority sought to recover damages from the defendants, the state of Connecticut and M Co., a hotel franchisor, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff entered

"Iris S." and not the respondents, it appears that he did not know her last name or address, thereby rendering him unable to secure her presence or testimony.

[15] As the respondents acknowledge, because the petitioner's fraudulent concealment claim regarding newly discovered evidence also gives rise to a *Brady* claim, the petitioner's right to a new trial may be vindicated by virtue of a petition for a new trial; see *State* v. *McCoy*, 331 Conn. 561, 598, 206 A.3d 725 (2019) ("newly discovered *Brady* claims may . . . be brought by way of a petition for a new trial up to three years after sentencing"); and via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In fact, while the present case was pending in the trial court, the petitioner filed a habeas petition based on the same alleged *Brady* violation that he has raised here. He subsequently withdrew that claim, however, without explanation. We express no view with respect to any aspect of any such habeas claim that the petitioner might seek to commence in the future.

Finally, it bears noting that, in cases that do not involve an alleged constitutional violation, a petition for a new trial will almost invariably be the only relief available to an individual seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This is true, of course, with respect to both criminal and civil cases.

* Vacated. See *Metropolitan District Commission* v. *Marriott International, Inc.*, 348 Conn. 963, 963–64, A.3d (2024).