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Jackson also fled because there were outstanding warrants for his arrest and he feared becoming involved with the police. As Jackson ran east toward Bunnell Street through the backyards of houses on Sixth Street, he said aloud, “I’m going to jail.” He then heard a voice reply, “[m]y bad my n*****,” and realized that the defendant, whose face was no longer covered, was running close behind him. The defendant continued running in the direction of Stratford Avenue.

A juvenile standing in the backyard of a house on Bunnell Street, which abutted the backyards of houses on Sixth Street, heard the gunshots and called 911. Shortly thereafter, police and emergency response personnel found the unconscious victim, who was later pronounced dead at Bridgeport Hospital. The police recovered four spent bullets from the victim’s car, four spent casings in the roadway and a white tank top in the grass near the victim’s car. A firearm never was recovered. As part of his investigation, Detective Robert Winkler obtained surveillance footage from cameras posted by the Bridgeport Police Department at three intersections along Stratford Avenue.²

On July 25, 2013, Jackson was arrested on unrelated charges and interviewed by Detectives Winkler and

² Winkler’s review of the video surveillance revealed that the defendant emerged from an apartment at the intersection of Stratford and Hollister Avenues at approximately 7 a.m. The defendant walked west on Stratford Avenue, in the direction of Sixth Street, while using his cell phone. The defendant had something white draped over his shoulder and his dominant right hand was positioned in a way that suggested he was carrying a concealed weapon. At 7:22 a.m., minutes prior to the shooting, the camera posted at the intersection of Stratford and Newfield Avenues captured the defendant at the corner of Stratford and Bunnell walking in the direction of Sixth Street. The shooting was not captured on video as there was no camera focused on that area of Sixth Street. At 7:27 a.m., the defendant emerged from the empty lot on the corner of Bunnell and Stratford without the white item. The defendant continued eastbound on Stratford Avenue, at times running, repeatedly looking back in the direction of Sixth Street.

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Dennis Martinez about the victim's murder. Initially, Jackson was reluctant to provide the detectives with the assailant's identity. Jackson stated that he had been sitting in the victim's car for approximately four to seven minutes before the assailant ran up to the car and started shooting at the victim. He described the victim's assailant as a black male at least six feet, three inches tall, wearing a black shirt and a scarf or shirt covering most of his face, and wielding a black small caliber gun. Jackson stated that as he was running to his girlfriend's apartment on Bunnell Street, the assailant, whose face was still covered, ran by him and continued in the direction of Stratford Avenue. Later in the interview, Martinez inadvertently used the defendant's street name, "Sleep," instead of the victim's street name, "Stretch." Jackson was shown portions of the Stratford Avenue surveillance video and he confirmed that the man in the video was the person he recognized as the assailant. He claimed, however, that he did not know the assailant's name. Jackson stated that he had seen the assailant on Sixth Street previously and would recognize him if he saw him again. He also stated that he knew the assailant's voice because he had heard it before and that he could match that voice to a face.

The detectives conducted a blind sequential photo array of eight photographs. When he was shown the seventh photograph, that of the defendant, Jackson became quiet and asked to return to his cell multiple times. The detectives urged Jackson to tell them what he knew and whether the seventh photograph was the assailant. Jackson asked to speak alone with Winkler and attempted to negotiate a release on a promise to appear on his unrelated charges. Winkler stated multiple times that he could try to help but could not promise anything. Jackson admitted that he knew the defendant

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was the assailant all along, identified him in the seventh photograph in the array and stated that Martinez already had used his street name, “Sleep.”

On July 30, 2013, the defendant was arrested and charged with murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress Jackson’s out-of-court identification and any subsequent in-court identification of the defendant, claiming, *inter alia*, that the procedures used by the detectives during the out-of-court identification were unnecessarily suggestive, and that, as a result, any in-court identification would be tainted by the improper out-of-court identification. In response, the state contended that it did not seek to offer Jackson’s out-of-court identification of the defendant at trial.

A seven day jury trial commenced on September 24, 2014. During trial, outside the presence of the jury, the court conducted a two part evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. After reviewing Jackson’s videotaped interview and hearing testimony from Winkler,³ the court determined that the police identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and suppressed the out-of-court identification. The court reasoned that Martinez’s inadvertent use of the defendant’s street name and “showing [Jackson] the surveillance video that only contained [the defendant was] tantamount to making a suggestion as to who should be picked out of the [photographic] array.”

The court then addressed the reliability of any subsequent in-court identification. The court heard testimony

³ Winkler testified that prior to the interview, he knew that Jackson was the victim’s friend and was sitting in the passenger seat of the victim’s car at the time of the homicide. He further testified that he “was quite confident that [Jackson] was familiar with the [defendant], just reluctant to give [him] specific details.”

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from Jackson, who stated that he knew that the defendant was the shooter prior to the interview, but did not want to provide that information to the detectives. Jackson testified that there weren't "too many different people . . . on Sixth Street" and that he "[paid] attention to who was out there." It was important for Jackson, who was involved in the sale of narcotics, to know who the regular people were, "because other people could be snitches." Jackson further testified that he had seen the defendant on Sixth Street four or five times in the two weeks prior to the shooting, and had become familiar with both the defendant's appearance and voice. Jackson indicated that he would have known that the defendant was the shooter even if he had not seen him a second time as he was running away. The court then asked Jackson the following questions:

"The Court: Sir, you were shown some video by the detectives that was taken from a street pole camera that day. Is that right?"

"[Jackson]: Yes.

"The Court: Did that video influence or plant the idea in your mind that [the defendant] was the shooter?"

"[Jackson]: No.

"The Court: How sure are you of that?"

"[Jackson]: A hundred percent.

"The Court: And did Detective Martinez, using the name Sleep while he was interviewing you, did that influence your identification of the defendant here in court as the shooter of [the victim]?"

"[Jackson]: No."

On the basis of Jackson's testimony, the court ruled that "the state [had] established by clear and convincing evidence that under the totality of the circumstances

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. . . [Jackson’s] in-court identification . . . [was] based upon his independent recollection and [was] untainted by any faulty pretrial identification process.” The court made the following findings of fact in support of its determination: “[T]his case did not involve a one-time encounter between an eyewitness and a shooter who was a total stranger”; “[t]he defendant and Jackson had been together in each other’s company in close proximity in social settings [on Sixth Street] in the days leading up to [the victim’s] murder”; “Jackson . . . was already personally familiar with [the defendant] before [the victim] was murdered”; “[Jackson] was also privy to the bad blood that existed between [the defendant] and the victim at the time of the shooting”; “Jackson had a chance to view the [defendant] that morning, both during and after the murder”; “Jackson also interacted and spoke with the defendant immediately after [the defendant] shot [the victim]”; and “Jackson demonstrated an obvious reluctance to cooperate [during his interview] with [the] detectives.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Jackson then testified before the jury and identified the defendant as the man who shot the victim. Jackson testified that the main factor in being able to identify the defendant as the shooter was seeing him unmasked as they ran away from the crime scene. On October 6, 2014, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and the court found him guilty of criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-217c (a) (1). Thereafter, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of fifty years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant’s principal claim on appeal is that the trial court violated his federal constitutional right to due

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process by denying his motion to suppress Jackson's in-court identification of him.⁴ The defendant's arguments in support of that claim are twofold. First, he argues that, although the court determined that the out-of-court identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive,⁵ the court improperly concluded that the state had proven the reliability of Jackson's in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence. Second, he argues that the court improperly permitted the jury to consider Jackson's out-of-court identification as evidence of guilt. We disagree.

A

We first address the defendant's claim that the court improperly concluded that the state had proven the reliability of Jackson's in-court identification by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, the defendant argues that Jackson's "brief prior acquaintance" with the defendant and Jackson's "denial that the identification procedure affected him" does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of reliability.⁶ In response, the

⁴ The defendant also asks this court to consider whether his state constitutional rights provide him greater protection. We decline to review the defendant's state constitutional claim because it is inadequately briefed. The defendant allots two paragraphs of his brief to this claim, which provides no substantive analysis in support of his claim. This court is "not required to review issues that have been improperly presented . . . through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control*, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003). Because the defendant's state constitutional claim is inadequately briefed, we decline to address it.

⁵ On appeal, the state has not challenged the trial court's finding with respect to the suggestiveness of the out-of-court identification.

⁶ The defendant also asks this court to extend our Supreme Court's holding in *State v. Dickson*, 322 Conn. 410, 141 A.3d 810 (2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 2263, 198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017), to disallow in-court identifications in situations "when the out-of-court identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive and either suppressed or the prosecution