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<p>Commission on Human Rights &amp; Opportunities v. Edge Fitness, LLC . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Sex discrimination; whether trial court properly dismissed plaintiff commission's appeal from decision of commission's human rights referee; claim that defendant fitness facilities discriminated against complainants, who identified as males, on basis of sex by providing women's only workout areas in their otherwise public facilities, in violation of Public Accommodation Act (§ 46a-64); whether there was an implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a-64 (b) (1), which exempts "separate bathrooms and locker rooms based on sex" from act's general prohibition against sex discrimination in public accommodations.</i></p>	25
<p>Crandle v. Connecticut State Employees Retirement Commission . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Administrative appeal; whether trial court properly dismissed appeal from ruling of defendant retirement commission; whether retirement commission incorrectly concluded that, under State Employees Retirement Act (§ 5-152 et seq.), state employee disability retirement benefits become payable on first day of month following receipt of application for such benefits by Retirement Services Division rather than on day following employee's last day of paid state employment; claim that trial court improperly deferred to commission's interpretation of State Employees Retirement Act because that interpretation was neither time-tested, insofar as it was not formally articulated or adopted pursuant to formal rule-making or adjudicatory procedures, nor reasonable; claim that retirement commission, as fiduciary of plaintiffs, former state employees, had burden of proving fair dealing by clear and convincing evidence with respect to commission's use of unwritten practice regarding when disability retirement benefits become payable.</i></p>	67
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<p>Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Negligence; statute of limitations ((Rev. to 2015) § 52-584); motion for summary judgment; claim that plaintiff's action was barred by two year limitation period set forth in § 52-584; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court correctly construed term "injury" in § 52-584 to mean actionable harm, consistent with this court's decision in Lagassey v. State (268 Conn. 723); whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that, viewing facts in light most favorable to plaintiff, there was genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff commenced her action within two years from date of her "injury," as that term is understood in context of § 52-584; claim that Appellate Court improperly applied failure to diagnose or latent injury cases to facts of this case; claim that facts of present case were similar to those in Burns v. Hartford Hospital (192 Conn. 451), in which court determined that limitation period set forth in § 52-584 started running when plaintiff sustained injuries; claim that this court in Lagassey improperly neglected to apply statutory (§ 1-2z) plain meaning rule and to interpret term "injury" in § 52-584 to mean hurt, damage, or loss sustained.</i></p>	103
<p>State v. Belcher . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Motion to correct illegal sentence; kidnapping first degree; sexual assault first degree; robbery first degree; burglary first degree; attempt to commit sexual assault first degree; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence; claim that sentencing court substantially relied on materially false information in sentencing defendant, in violation of his right to due process; claim that sentencing court's reliance on superpredator theory,</i></p>	1

*concerning rise of teenage male predatory street criminals who would terrorize society, and sentencing court's characterization of defendant as charter member of that group of superpredators, warranted resentencing.*