

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Reports**  
**Volume 343**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

<p>AGW Sono Partners, LLC v. Downtown Soho, LLC . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Breach of commercial lease agreement; unjust enrichment; damages; claim that trial court incorrectly concluded that defendants had failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, that their breach of contract was excused by doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose, in light of certain executive orders issued by governor that limited various commercial activities at bar and restaurants throughout the state during public health and civil preparedness emergencies that governor declared in response to COVID-19 pandemic; whether executive orders restricting operations of defendants' restaurant rendered performance of lease agreement impossible as matter of law; whether shutdown and restrictions compelled by executive orders frustrated purpose of lease agreement; claim that trial court improperly assigned plaintiff lessor, as nonbreaching party, burden of proving that it had mitigated its damages in attempting to lease premises to new lessee; whether lessor or lessee bears burden of proving that lessor failed to undertake commercially reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages when lessee breached lease agreement.</i></p> <p>Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Gabriel (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Baker v. Argueta (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Bank of America, National Assn. v. Sorrentino (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Chase v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>C. L. v. J. E. (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Cockayne v. Bristol Hospital, Inc. (Order) . . . . .</p> <p>Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Employment discrimination; claims of employment discrimination in violation of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-60), violation of general antidiscrimination statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), and violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as predicate for claim under § 46a-58 (a); whether trial court properly sustained in part and reversed in part Judicial Branch's administrative appeal from decision of defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities awarding named defendant back pay, interest, and emotional distress damages in connection with named defendant's claim that branch discriminated against her on basis of gender; whether trial court incorrectly concluded that commission was authorized to award emotional distress damages and attorney's fees in employment discrimination action under general antidiscrimination statute (§ 46a-58 (a)) and that statute's civil remedies provision (§ 46a-86 (c)); whether commission exceeded its authority under federal law by adjudicating Title VII claim; claim that state law precludes commission from awarding damages for Title VII violations under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-86 (c); whether trial court incorrectly concluded that state waived its sovereign immunity with respect to recovery of prejudgment and postjudgment interest on awards under § 46a-86; whether trial court incorrectly concluded that commission should have precluded named defendant from recovering emotional distress damages as sanction for purported violations of human rights referee's discovery orders; whether trial court improperly admitted certain testimony that went beyond mere garden-variety emotional distress; whether trial court improperly vacated injunction requiring plaintiff to give named defendant option of returning to original work location, after she was transferred to other locations in retaliation for lodging harassment complaint.</i></p> <p>Conroy v. Idlibi . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Marital dissolution; motion to open judgment on basis of fraud; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to open dissolution</i></p>	<p>309</p> <p>911</p> <p>901</p> <p>912</p> <p>909</p> <p>903</p> <p>905</p> <p>906</p> <p>90</p> <p>201</p>
---	--

<i>judgment; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that defendant's allegations, even if true, would not likely have altered ultimate resolution of parties' divorce.</i>	
Crouzet v. First Baptist Church of Stonington. . . . .	88
<i>Environmental contamination; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court properly reversed judgment of trial court rendered in favor of defendants on grounds that trial court committed clear error in finding that secondary source was responsible for contamination of plaintiff's property and that, even if there had been secondary source of contamination, the presence of that secondary source did not mean that plaintiff failed to prove that defendants' oil tank contaminated their property; appeal dismissed on ground that certification was improvidently granted.</i>	
Housing Authority v. Stevens (Order). . . . .	907
Icelo-Hernandez v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	911
Ill v. Manzo-Ill (Order) . . . . .	909
In re Christian C. (Order) (See In re Lucia C.) . . . . .	912
In re Lucia C. (Order). . . . .	912
J. E. v. C. L. (Order) . . . . .	907
Lopez v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. . . . .	31
<i>Housing discrimination; claim that defendant real estate salesperson unlawfully discriminated on basis of plaintiff's lawful source of income, in violation of statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1) and (3)), by making certain statements regarding plaintiff's participation in Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program; whether trial court improperly applied ordinary listener standard in considering context of real estate salesperson's statements in determining if they conveyed any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on lawful source of income; whether real estate broker was vicariously liable for statements of real estate salesperson pursuant to statute (§ 20-312a); whether owners of property were vicariously liable for statements of real estate salesperson.</i>	
Lucky 13 Industries, LLC v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (Order). . . . .	905
Nutmeg State Crematorium, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection (Order)	906
Maldonado v. Flannery . . . . .	150
<i>Negligence; personal injury; additur; certification from Appellate Court; whether trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs' joint motion for additurs on ground that jury verdict awarding plaintiffs economic damages but zero noneconomic damages was internally inconsistent; claim that Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that trial court failed to sufficiently explain in its memorandum of decision evidentiary and logical basis for its decision; claim that Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that trial court had abused its discretion by granting plaintiffs' joint motion for additurs.</i>	
Mozzochi v. Purtill (Order). . . . .	911
O'Brien v. Commissioner of Correction (Order). . . . .	907
O'Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. (Order). . . . .	910
Overly v. Overly (Order) . . . . .	901
Parker v. Zoning Commission (Order) . . . . .	908
Purnell v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission (Order). . . . .	908
Rafi v. Yale University School of Medicine (Order). . . . .	903
Reyes v. State (Order) . . . . .	909
Salce v. Cardello (Order). . . . .	902
Saunders v. Commissioner of Correction. . . . .	1
<i>Habeas corpus; claim that petitioner's due process rights were violated on ground that he was incompetent at time of his criminal trial; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that procedural default doctrine applies to competency claims; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that petitioner failed to allege sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome procedural defaults; whether mental incompetency is internal to habeas petitioner; whether habeas court correctly determined that petitioner had failed to allege sufficient prejudice to survive motion to dismiss.</i>	
State v. Butler (Order) . . . . .	904
State v. Daniel M. (Order) . . . . .	906
State v. Jones (Order). . . . .	901
State v. Morel-Vargas . . . . .	247
<i>Sexual assault first degree; unpreserved claim that defendant's conviction must be reversed on ground that defendant did not personally inform trial court that he was waiving his right to testify; whether trial court was constitutionally required</i>	

*to obtain on-the-record waiver of right to testify from defendant, himself; whether right to testify is personal constitutional right that can be waived only by defendant himself and not by defense counsel acting on behalf of defendant; whether right to testify is among personal constitutional rights that require affirmative waiver on record by criminal defendant, himself; exercise of supervisory authority over administration of justice to require, prospectively, that trial court either canvass defendant or, in certain circumstances, inquire of defense counsel whether counsel adequately advised defendant regarding waiver of right to testify; reviewability of claim that prosecutor committed improprieties during her direct examination of victim by virtue of prosecutor's allegedly excessive use of leading questions, in violation of defendant's right to fair trial.*

State v. Police . . . . . 274

*Robbery first degree; assault first degree; conditional plea of nolo contendere; claim that trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to dismiss information; whether John Doe arrest warrant that identified suspect on basis of general physical description and mixed partial DNA profiles violated particularity requirement of fourth amendment to United States constitution; whether John Doe arrest warrant served to toll applicable statute of limitations; whether record was adequate for review of defendant's unpreserved claim that John Doe arrest warrant identifying suspect through mixed partial DNA profiles violated particularity requirement of fourth amendment; whether trial court properly relied on subsequent DNA reports in determining that prior DNA report, which police had relied on to establish probable cause for John Doe arrest warrant, identified suspect with particularity.*

State v. Prudhomme (Order) . . . . . 902

State v. Stephanie U. (Orders) . . . . . 903, 904

State v. Torres . . . . . 208

*Murder; carrying pistol without permit; claim that trial court improperly excluded evidence that state's witness was assaulted before defendant's first trial, in violation of defendant's sixth amendment rights to present defense and to confront witnesses against him; whether defendant met his burden of proving that trial court's improper exclusion of evidence relating to assault of state's witness was harmful; claim that trial court violated defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation and rules of evidence by preventing defendant from impeaching state's witness with evidence of her prior criminal convictions.*

Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners . . . . . 62

*Application for issuance of state pistol permit; administrative appeal; appeal from trial court's judgment reversing decision of named defendant, Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, ordering issuance of pistol permit to defendant; denial by plaintiff police department of pistol permit application on basis of applicant's prior conviction of criminal possession of controlled substance in New York; whether trial court incorrectly concluded that statute (§ 29-28 (b) (2) (B)) automatically disqualifies pistol permit applicant with out-of-state conviction that is equivalent to conviction under statute (§ 21a-279) proscribing possession of controlled substance from receiving permit; whether trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of board following board's determination that applicant was suitable person to obtain pistol permit.*

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Black (Order) . . . . . 905

Zubrowski v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . . 908