

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Reports**  
**Volume 340**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

Abel v. Johnson . . . . .	240
<i>Action to enjoin defendant property owner, who was operating landscaping business on her property, from violating restrictive covenant limiting use of property to residential purposes only; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court incorrectly determined that plaintiff property owners did not have standing to enforce restrictive covenant, which was contained in deed from original grantors to housing developer that subsequently subdivided property; whether language in deeds conveying lots from housing developer to parties' predecessors in title providing that they took title "subject to" earlier deed rendered that restriction enforceable by grantees of housing developer, when residential use restriction in deed from original grantors expressly inured to benefit of their remaining land; whether, in light of deed language and surrounding circumstances, housing developer intended to establish general plan of development limited to residential use.</i>	
Anketell v. Kulldorff (Order) . . . . .	905
Baldwin v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	906
Barnes v. Greenwich Hospital (Order) . . . . .	904
Boardwalk Realty Associates, LLC v. M & S Gateway Associates, LLC . . . . .	115
<i>Receiver of rents; claim that trial court improperly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment; whether trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff, which was appointed receiver of rents pursuant to statute (§ 12-163a (a)), was not authorized to collect rent or use and occupancy payments from occupants of property, when defendants had no effective lease and owner abandoned property and did not pursue its rights against defendants, which had been using property to operate automobile dealership since property owner abandoned that property.</i>	
Doe v. Madison . . . . .	1
<i>Negligence; governmental immunity; summary judgment; action against defendant town, defendant board of education, and defendant high school principal alleging negligence insofar as defendants failed to properly supervise teacher who sexually abused plaintiff students during school hours and failed to train school employees to identify and report such abuse or imminent risk of abuse; whether defendants breached ministerial duty to report reasonable suspicion of child abuse, as imposed by mandatory reporting statute (§ 17a-101a) and board of education reporting policy; whether defendants' employees had reasonable cause to suspect that teacher was sexually abusing plaintiffs or exposing plaintiffs to imminent risk of sexual abuse; whether deposition testimony of high school athletic director established ministerial duty of professionalism; whether imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental immunity applied; whether town was liable for failure of its police officer, who was assigned to school as resource officer, to monitor school's security camera footage; whether there was ministerial duty to monitor security camera footage.</i>	
Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .	52
<i>Habeas corpus; denial of petition for certification to appeal from habeas court's discovery order; certification from Appellate Court; claim that habeas court improperly granted motion filed by respondent, Commissioner of Correction, for production of materials from petitioner's underlying criminal defense and investigative files, which purportedly were relevant to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; whether Appellate Court properly granted respondent's motion to dismiss appeal on ground that habeas court's discovery order was not final judgment under State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27); whether this court should reach merits of petitioner's appellate claims by treating his appeal as direct appeal from interlocutory order on certification by Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) allowing Chief Justice to certify appeals involving matters of substantial public interest.</i>	

In re Neveah D. (Order) . . . . .	904
Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	904
Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	906
KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar (Order) . . . . .	901
Leconte v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	902
Maghfour v. Waterbury . . . . .	41
<i>Lien filed on certain settlement proceeds pursuant to public act (P.A. 17-165, § 1); whether P.A. 17-165, § 1, authorized city to file lien when plaintiff's injuries occurred and his action against third-party tortfeasor was commenced before effective date of public act; whether trial court properly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; claim that allowing city to place lien on plaintiff's settlement proceeds would not present retroactive application of statute because plaintiff settled his action against third-party tortfeasor after effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1.</i>	
Normandy v. American Medical Systems, Inc. . . . .	93
<i>Negligence; recklessness; civil conspiracy; violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.); violation of Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52-572m et seq.); statutes of limitations; continuing course of conduct doctrine; fraudulent concealment doctrine; summary judgment; claim that defendant was liable for injuries sustained by named plaintiff in connection with surgical implantation of vaginal mesh sling performed at defendant's hospital by obstetrician and gynecologist who was not hospital employee; whether trial court incorrectly determined that defendant was not "product seller," as that term is defined in § 52-572m (a), for purposes of plaintiff's product liability claim; whether essence of relationship between plaintiff patient and defendant was for provision of medical services or sale of mesh sling product; whether trial court correctly determined that statutes of limitations and repose period were not tolled by continuing course of conduct or fraudulent concealment doctrine.</i>	
NRT New England, LLC v. Longo (Order) . . . . .	906
People's United Bank v. Brown (Order) . . . . .	905
Pietraka v. Rogowski (Order) . . . . .	903
Raspberry Junction Holding, LLC v. Southeastern Connecticut Water Authority . . . . .	200
<i>Negligence; summary judgment; whether trial court correctly determined that defendant municipal water authority owed plaintiff no legal duty of care; economic loss doctrine; whether trial court correctly determined that, although plaintiff's economic losses were reasonably foreseeable, imposing duty on defendant was inconsistent with public policy under circumstances of case; whether factors in test first articulated in Jaworski v. Kiernan (241 Conn. 399) militated against imposition of duty, as matter of public policy.</i>	
Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	903
State v. Culbreath . . . . .	167
<i>Manlaughter first degree with firearm; criminal possession of firearm; carrying pistol without permit; claim that statements defendant made during custodial interrogation were improperly admitted into evidence because they were elicited by detective after defendant invoked his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights; whether defense counsel waived defendant's unpreserved claim under federal constitution that his Miranda rights were violated when counsel stated that he had no objection to admission of defendant's written statement to police and video recording of interrogation; whether defense counsel's waiver of defendant's state constitutional claim was knowing and intelligent when, after jury returned verdict, this court adopted more protective standard for Miranda rights under state constitution (art. I, § 8); claim that defendant invoked his right to counsel, before signing written form waiving Miranda rights, by asking detective why form stated "that I'm wavering . . . how I don't want the presence of an attorney"; claim that defendant's question regarding whether "there [was] anybody [he could] talk to . . . [l]ike an attorney" was conditional and equivocal inquiry that reasonably could be construed as request for counsel under article first, § 8; whether state satisfied its burden of establishing that improper admission of defendant's out-of-court statements was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.</i>	
State v. Dawson . . . . .	136
<i>Criminal possession of pistol or revolver; criminal trespass third degree; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that state had adduced sufficient evidence at trial to support defendant's conviction of criminal possession of pistol or revolver; whether there was sufficient evidence</i>	

<i>to establish beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had knowledge of gun and intent to exercise dominion or control over it; whether jury could have reasonably found that defendant constructively possessed gun; whether DNA evidence presented by state, standing alone or in combination with other evidence, was insufficient to support defendant's conviction.</i>	
State v. Fields (Order) . . . . .	901
State v. Green (Order) . . . . .	905
State v. Heriberto B. (Order) . . . . .	903
State v. Paschal (Order) . . . . .	902
State v. Robert R. . . . .	69
<i>Sexual assault first degree; whether trial court improperly precluded defense counsel from arguing to jury defendant's theory that victim had planted physical evidence in effort to substantiate her false allegations against defendant, in violation of defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel; whether there was sufficient evidence in record to support defendant's theory of case; claim that evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree sexual assault; claim that trial court had abused its discretion in admitting testimony of expert in field of child and adolescent sexual abuse when victim was eighteen years old at time of alleged sexual assault.</i>	
State v. Shawn G. (Order) . . . . .	907
Talton v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	907