

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Reports**  
**Volume 340**

---

Barnes v. Greenwich Hospital (Order) . . . . .	904
Doe v. Madison . . . . .	1
<i>Negligence; governmental immunity; summary judgment; action against defendant town, defendant board of education, and defendant high school principal alleging negligence insofar as defendants failed to properly supervise teacher who sexually abused plaintiff students during school hours and failed to train school employees to identify and report such abuse or imminent risk of abuse; whether defendants breached ministerial duty to report reasonable suspicion of child abuse, as imposed by mandatory reporting statute (§ 17a-101a) and board of education reporting policy; whether defendants' employees had reasonable cause to suspect that teacher was sexually abusing plaintiffs or exposing plaintiffs to imminent risk of sexual abuse; whether deposition testimony of high school athletic director established ministerial duty of professionalism; whether imminent harm to identifiable persons exception to governmental immunity applied; whether town was liable for failure of its police officer, who was assigned to school as resource officer, to monitor school's security camera footage; whether there was ministerial duty to monitor security camera footage.</i>	
Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .	52
<i>Habeas corpus; denial of petition for certification to appeal from habeas court's discovery order; certification from Appellate Court; claim that habeas court improperly granted motion filed by respondent, Commissioner of Correction, for production of materials from petitioner's underlying criminal defense and investigative files, which purportedly were relevant to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; whether Appellate Court properly granted respondent's motion to dismiss appeal on ground that habeas court's discovery order was not final judgment under State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27); whether this court should reach merits of petitioner's appellate claims by treating his appeal as direct appeal from interlocutory order on certification by Chief Justice pursuant to statute (§ 52-265a) allowing Chief Justice to certify appeals involving matters of substantial public interest.</i>	
In re Neveah D. (Order) . . . . .	904
Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	904
KeyBank, N.A. v. Yazar (Order) . . . . .	901
Leconte v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . .	902
Maghfour v. Waterbury . . . . .	41
<i>Lien filed on certain settlement proceeds pursuant to public act (P.A. 17-165, § 1); whether P.A. 17-165, § 1, authorized city to file lien when plaintiff's injuries occurred and his action against third-party tortfeasor was commenced before effective date of public act; whether trial court properly granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; claim that allowing city to place lien on plaintiff's settlement proceeds would not present retroactive application of statute because plaintiff settled his action against third-party tortfeasor after effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1.</i>	
Normandy v. American Medical Systems, Inc. . . . .	93
<i>Negligence; recklessness; civil conspiracy; violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.); violation of Connecticut Product Liability Act (§ 52-572m et seq.); statutes of limitations; continuing course of conduct doctrine; fraudulent concealment doctrine; summary judgment; claim that defendant was liable for injuries sustained by named plaintiff in connection with surgical implantation of vaginal mesh sling performed at defendant's hospital by obstetrician and gynecologist who was not hospital employee; whether trial court incorrectly determined that defendant was not "product seller," as that term is defined in § 52-572m (a), for purposes of plaintiffs' product liability claim; whether essence of relationship between plaintiff patient and defendant was for provision of medical services or sale of mesh sling product; whether trial court correctly determined that statutes of limitations and repose period were not tolled by continuing course of conduct or fraudulent concealment doctrine.</i>	

People's United Bank v. Brown (Order) . . . . . 905  
Pietraka v. Rogowski (Order) . . . . . 903  
Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) . . . . . 903  
State v. Fields (Order) . . . . . 901  
State v. Heriberto B. (Order) . . . . . 903  
State v. Paschal (Order) . . . . . 902  
State v. Robert R. . . . . 69

*Sexual assault first degree; whether trial court improperly precluded defense counsel from arguing to jury defendant's theory that victim had planted physical evidence in effort to substantiate her false allegations against defendant, in violation of defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel; whether there was sufficient evidence in record to support defendant's theory of case; claim that evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree sexual assault; claim that trial court had abused its discretion in admitting testimony of expert in field of child and adolescent sexual abuse when victim was eighteen years old at time of alleged sexual assault.*