### Cumulative Table of Cases

**Connecticut Reports**

**Volume 334**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC (Orders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrews v. Commissioner of Correction (Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asselin &amp; Vieceli Partnership, LLC v. Washburn (Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayres v. Ayres (Orders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birch v. Commissioner of Correction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birch v. State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carolina v. Commissioner of Correction (Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldstein v. Hu (Order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henning v. Commissioner of Correction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Connecticut Law Journal**

January 14, 2020

*Habeas corpus; claim that state deprived petitioner of due process right to fair trial insofar as it failed to correct trial testimony of former director of state police forensic laboratory that red substance on towel found in victim’s home after murder of which petitioner was convicted tested positive for blood when no such test had been conducted and when subsequent testing performed years after petitioner’s criminal trial revealed that red substance was not in fact blood; certification to appeal; whether habeas court applied correct standard in determining whether petitioner was entitled to new trial; standard to be applied whenever state fails to correct testimony that it knows or should have known to be false; whether former director of state police forensic laboratory should have known that his testimony was incorrect; whether such testimony is imputed to prosecutor; claim that respondent, Commissioner of Correction, failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that incorrect testimony was immaterial; strength of state’s case against petitioner discussed.*

*Felony murder; petition for new trial based on claim of newly discovered DNA and other evidence; claim that habeas court incorrectly determined that newly discovered DNA evidence did not warrant new trial; whether this court’s decision in Birch v. Commissioner of Correction (334 Conn. 37), which addressed petitioner’s appeal from denial of habeas petition and in which court determined that petitioner was entitled to new trial, rendered present appeal moot.*

*Civil action alleging assault and battery; criminal trespass; certification from Appellate Court; claim that trial court improperly instructed jury with respect to special defense of justification by incorporating charge on criminal trespass; whether jury was misled by trial court’s improper instruction on criminal trespass and defense of premises in arriving at its finding on defendant’s justification defense; whether trial court’s improper instruction affected jury’s independent finding with respect to defendant’s special defense of defense of others; whether evidence was sufficient to support jury’s finding that defendant was acting in defense of others when he forcibly removed plaintiff from house.*

*Habeas corpus; claim that state deprived petitioner of due process right to fair trial insofar as it failed to correct trial testimony of former director of state police forensic laboratory that red substance on towel found in victim’s home after murder of which petitioner was convicted tested positive for blood when no such test had been conducted and when subsequent testing performed years after petitioner’s criminal trial revealed that red substance was not in fact blood; certification to appeal; whether habeas court applied correct standard in determining whether petitioner was entitled to new trial; standard to be applied whenever state fails to correct testimony that it knows or should have known to be false; whether former director of state police forensic laboratory should have known that his testimony was incorrect; whether such testimony is imputed to prosecutor; claim that respondent, Commissioner of Correction, failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that incorrect testimony was immaterial; strength of state’s case against petitioner discussed.*
Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment motion for modification of alimony; motion for sanctions; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court properly reversed trial court's contempt order; civil contempt, disbarment.

Jerez v. State. Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment motion for modification of alimony; motion for sanctions; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court properly reversed trial court's contempt order; civil contempt, disbarment.

Jenner v. State. Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment motion for modification of alimony; motion for sanctions; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court properly reversed trial court's contempt order; civil contempt, disbarment.

Janzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge Associates, LLC. Foreclosure; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court correctly determined that entity that had been assigned promissory note and mortgage that was granted as collateral to secure personal guarantee of that note had standing to foreclose mortgage even though guarantee was not explicitly assigned to foreclosing party; whether Appellate Court incorrectly determined that initial entry in plaintiff's record of debt, provided by entity that sold note to plaintiff, was inadmissible under statutory (§ 52-180) business records exception to hearsay rule.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Shack (Order). Termination of parental rights; claim that trial court improperly terminated respondent's parental rights as to his minor child on statutory (§ 17a-112 [j] [3] [D]) ground that respondent had no ongoing parent-child relationship with child; certification from Appellate Court; claim that Appellate Court improperly upheld trial court's termination of respondent's parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Klein v. Quinnipiac University (Order). Election; primaries; action brought by electors pursuant to statute (§ 9-329a) to challenge, inter alia, improprieties in handling of absentee ballots during primary election and seeking order directing new primary election; expedited appeal pursuant to statute (§ 9-325); whether appeal challenging results of primary and seeking new primary election was moot when general election has already occurred; whether trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1); whether trial court applied proper standard in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to new primary election.

Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc. (Order). Motion to disqualify after remand; motion to open judgment; motion to allow new evidence; calculation of damages award pursuant to statute (§ 52-560a [d]) for violation of conservation easement; whether trial judge incorrectly concluded that he was not required by statute (§ 51-183c) to disqualify himself from presiding over proceedings after remand by this court; whether § 51-183c was applicable when trial court's judgment was reversed in part and case was remanded for reconsideration on fewer than all issues in case; whether § 51-183c was applicable when trial court's judgment was reversed as to damages award and case was remanded to trial court to take evidence and to recalculate damages; whether this court should address defendant's remaining claims that trial court improperly denied her motions to open and to allow new evidence and improperly awarded plaintiff $350,000 in punitive damages pursuant to § 52-560a (d) on remand.

Mahoney v. Commissioner of Correction (Order). Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Gabriel (Orders). Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Savitt (Order). Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital (Order). Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Perez v. Commissioner of Correction (Order). Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.

Puff v. Puff. Termination of parental rights; claim that virtual infancy exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied when child was less than two years old at time that respondent was incarcerated but six years old at time of termination hearing; claim that interference exception to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination applied because child's mother was unable to foster ongoing parent-child relationship between child and respondent during respondent's incarceration.
cussed; whether trial court failed to make specific findings that plaintiff acted in bad faith and did not advance colorable claims in support of its award of, inter alia, attorney’s fees to defendant for plaintiff’s purported litigation misconduct; remand for further proceedings on defendant’s motion for sanctions.

Reałe v. Rhode Island (Order) ......................................................... 901
Robbins Eye Center, P.C. v. Commerce Park Associates, LLC (Orders) ........................................................................... 912
Robert S. v. Commissioner of Correction (Order) .......................... 913
Saunders v. Briner ............................................................................. 135

Limited liability companies; standing; subject matter jurisdiction; whether, in absence of authorization in limited liability company’s operating agreement, members or managers lack standing to bring derivative claims in action brought under Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act ([Rev. to 2017] § 34-100 et seq.) or under common law; whether trial court may exempt single-member limited liability company from direct and separate injury requirement necessary to bring direct action; policy considerations applicable in determining whether to treat action raising derivative claims as direct action, discussed; under what circumstances, if any, trial court may apportion award of attorney’s fees under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.); claim that trial court abused its discretion in declining to order defendants to reimburse limited liability company for fees incurred by joint, court-appointed fiduciary retained to wind up limited liability companies.

Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev (Order) ........................................ 905
State v. Alexis (Order) ......................................................................... 904
State v. Blaine .................................................................................. 208

Conspiracy to commit robbery first degree; certification from Appellate Court; claim that trial court’s failure to instruct jury on requisite intent necessary to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in first degree constituted plain error; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that trial court did not commit plain error by failing to instruct jury that, to find defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, it had to find that he intended and specifically agreed that he or another participant in robbery would be armed with deadly weapon.

State v. Bryan (Order) ......................................................................... 906
State v. Cane (Order) .......................................................................... 901
State v. Crewe (Order) ....................................................................... 901
State v. DeJesus (Order) ................................................................. 909
State v. Gomes (Order) .................................................................... 902
State v. Holmes ................................................................................... 202

Felony murder; home invasion, conspiracy to commit home invasion; criminal possession of firearm; claim that trial court improperly overruled defendant’s objection, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79), to prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenge to excuse prospective African-American juror; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that trial court had properly overruled defendant’s Batson objection; whether prosecutor’s explanation for exercising challenge was race neutral; claim that this court should overrule State v. King (249 Conn. 645) and its progeny, holding that distrust of police and concern regarding fairness of criminal justice system constitute race neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenge; shortcomings of Batson in addressing implicit bias and disparate impact that certain race neutral explanations for peremptory challenges have on minority jurors, discussed; Batson reform in Connecticut, including convening of Jury Selection Task Force to study issue of racial discrimination in selection of jurors and to propose necessary changes, discussed.

State v. Moore .................................................................................... 275

Murder; certification from Appellate Court; claim that trial court improperly denied defendant’s motion to strike venire panel; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that data pertaining to entire African-American population in Connecticut and New London county did not constitute probative evidence of underrepresentation of African-American males in jury pool; claim that Appellate Court should have exercised its supervisory authority over administration of justice to require jury administrator to collect and maintain prospective jurors’ racial and demographic data in accordance with statute (§ 51-232 [c]) concerning the issuance of questionnaires to prospective jurors; certification improvidently granted.

State v. Palumbo (Order) ................................................................. 900
State v. Pernell (Order) ........................................... 910
State v. Raynor ......................................................... 264

Assault first degree as accessory; conspiracy to commit assault first degree; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court correctly concluded that record was inadequate to review defendant's challenge under Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79) to prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenge to strike prospective juror; adoption of Appellate Court's well reasoned opinion as proper statement of certified issue and applicable law concerning that issue.

State v. Salters (Order) ........................................... 913
State v. Sentementes (Order) ....................................... 902
State v. Ward (Order) .................................................. 911
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Caldrello (Order) .................. 905
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Magana (Order) ................... 904
Wiederman v. Halpert .............................................. 199

Limited liability companies; breach of fiduciary duty; motion to open; claim that trial court improperly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims because her alleged injuries were derivative of harm suffered by limited liability companies of which she and certain defendants were members; certification from Appellate Court; whether Appellate Court properly upheld determination of trial court that plaintiff had standing to sue; certification improvidently granted.

Wozniak v. Colchester (Order) ................................... 906