

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Appellate Reports**  
**Volume 226**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

<p>Altavista Investments, LLC v. Makeeva . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Summary process; motion to intervene; claim that trial court improperly determined that prospective intervenor, which held note that was secured by mortgage on plaintiff's real property, was not proper party to eviction action related to that property and was not entitled to intervene in postjudgment proceedings pursuant to statute (§ 47a-35b) regarding final distribution of use and occupancy payments made by defendants during pendency of their appeal of trial court's judgment in eviction action.</i></p> <p>Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Real estate tax appeal; claim that trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding proper valuation of his residential dwelling during trial; claim that trial court improperly considered factors in statute governing classification of land as farmland (§ 12-107c) in its determination that plaintiff's property was no longer being used as farm pursuant to statute (§ 12-504h); claim that trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff had changed use of nonresidential property so as to have lost entitlement to farmland designation previously granted to him by town tax assessor.</i></p> <p>C. W. v. E. W. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Breach of contract; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; claim that trial court improperly rendered judgment for defendants on plaintiff's breach of contract claim; claim that trial court failed to consider judicial admissions allegedly made by defendants in original answers as to existence of alleged oral contract to sell property to plaintiff; whether trial court, in ruling on plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, erred in finding that plaintiff's evidence of his labor at property was unreliable.</i></p> <p>Czunas v. Mancini . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment proceedings; motion to modify child support; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to modify child support on ground that there had been no change in parties' circumstances since date of previous child support order; whether trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to pay plaintiff \$10,000 to defend against his appeal.</i></p> <p>Demarco v. Charter Oak Temple Restoration Assn., Inc. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Employment discrimination; motion to strike; claim that trial court improperly concluded that provision (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) did not apply to claims of discrimination arising from employee's association with individual with physical disability.</i></p> <p>Finocchio Bros, Inc. v. 587 CTA, LLC. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Breach of contract; claim that trial court's finding that defendant properly cancelled contract within time frame required by parties' contract was clearly erroneous.</i></p> <p>GHP Media, Inc. v. Hughes. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Indemnification; motion to strike third-party complaint; claim that trial court improperly granted third-party defendants' motion to strike third-party complaint seeking indemnification; whether third-party plaintiff, rival printing company, and third-party defendants, who were officers of plaintiff printing company, owed identical duties to plaintiff printing company to protect trade secrets and other proprietary information from being used by third-party plaintiff.</i></p> <p>Greenwich v. Freedom of Information Commission . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Administrative appeal; claim that trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of defendant Freedom of Information Commission by concluding that requested records were preliminary drafts exempt from disclosure under statute (§ 1-210 (b) (1)); whether trial court improperly concluded that it was not necessary for town plaintiffs to review requested records to determine that those records were preliminary drafts and that public interest in withholding records outweighed public interest in disclosure pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (1); whether commission's order directing plaintiffs to retrieve requested records and to disclose</i></p>	<p>175</p> <p>191</p> <p>144</p> <p>256</p> <p>335</p> <p>351</p> <p>162</p> <p>40</p>
--	--

	<i>them to defendant requestor “free of charge” constituted abuse of its discretion; whether plaintiffs’ proffered alternative ground for affirmance, that requested records were exempt from disclosure as records of standards, procedures, processes, software and codes under § 1-210 (b) (20), was persuasive.</i>	
In re A. H. . . . .	<i>Termination of parental rights; whether trial court’s reliance in adjudicatory phase of termination trial on social studies prepared by Department of Children and Families violated statute (§ 45a-717) and rule of practice (§ 35a-9); reviewability of respondent’s unpreserved claim that trial court’s use of social studies in adjudicatory phase of termination trial violated his due process rights; whether trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence; whether respondent demonstrated that he was harmed by admission of alleged hearsay evidence.</i>	1
L. K. v. K. K. . . . .	<i>Dissolution of marriage; postjudgment proceedings; motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support; claim that trial court abused its discretion by failing to address claim that reduction in child support component of defendant’s unallocated alimony and child support obligation was warranted because one of parties’ three children had reached age of majority; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to modify by declining to consider certain financial evidence that had been submitted by defendant.</i>	279
Michel v. Hartford. . . . .	<i>Employment discrimination; claim of retaliation in violation of federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) for exercise of rights guaranteed by first amendment to United States constitution; claim of retaliation in violation of state statute (§ 31-51q) for exercise of rights guaranteed by article first of Connecticut constitution; motion to strike; claim that trial court improperly granted defendant city’s motion to strike claim alleging retaliation in violation of § 1983 for failure to adequately plead facts to establish that defendant’s policies, practices, or customs led to violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, as required for municipal liability; claim that trial court improperly concluded that plaintiff failed to plead facts that, if proven, would establish that his deposition testimony related to fellow employee’s race discrimination claim was speech on matter of public concern pursuant to § 31-51q; claim that trial court erroneously determined that it was plaintiff’s burden to allege facts to establish that his speech did not substantially or materially interfere with his job performance or working relationship between him and his employer pursuant to § 31-51q.</i>	98
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vaccaro. . . . .	<i>Attorney presentment; whether trial court improperly suspended respondent attorney from practice of law for ninety days after attorney’s inaction during representation of client led to dismissal, with prejudice, of client’s personal injury lawsuit; claim that trial court erred when it failed to consider respondent’s assertion that his due process rights were violated and that he was prejudiced as result of delay in underlying disciplinary proceedings; claim that trial court mistakenly believed it was precluded from considering respondent’s due process rights and delay in underlying disciplinary proceedings as mitigating factor in determining punishment for respondent’s misconduct; claim that respondent could not have appealed from ruling by reviewing committee of Statewide Grievance Committee denying his motion to dismiss grievance complaint against him; claim that trial court abused its discretion because ninety day suspension was excessive and out of proportion to offense committed.</i>	75
Romanelli v. Dept. of Social Services. . . . .	<i>Administrative appeal; claim that trial court erred in determining that defendant Department of Social Services did not abuse its discretion when it included value of property contained in trust in its calculations to determine whether applicant exceeded asset limit for Medicaid eligibility; claim that defendant violated due process by failing to provide notice to applicant that revocability of trust was at issue in calculating his Medicaid eligibility.</i>	131
State v. Nichols . . . . .	<i>Sexual assault fourth degree; risk of injury to child; claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for mistrial after victim’s outburst in courtroom during defendant’s testimony; claim that evidence was insufficient to support conviction of fourth degree sexual assault.</i>	359
State v. Richey . . . . .	<i>Threatening second degree; whether evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction; claim that defendant’s statements did not constitute true threats;</i>	234

	<i>whether trial court properly denied defendant's request to provide jury with instruction on defense of premises.</i>	
Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley . . . . .		211
	<i>Claim for exemption from bank execution pursuant to statute ((Supp. 2022) § 52-376b); claim that trial court improperly determined that plaintiff's opposition to claim of exemption was barred by doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata; claim that trial court improperly failed to hold evidentiary hearing before granting defendant's claim for exemption from execution.</i>	
Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .		313
	<i>Habeas corpus; subject matter jurisdiction; ripeness; unpreserved claim that petitioner should not be required to register as deadly weapon offender pursuant to statute (§ 54-280a) upon his release into community because § 54-280a, enacted in 2013, was inapplicable to him in connection with 2002 conviction; whether phrase "on or after January 1, 2014," in § 54-280a (a) (1) applied to petitioner's date of conviction or only to petitioner's date of release; claim that petitioner's appeal was not ripe because he would not likely have to register and he has not yet been released.</i>	
Wylie v. APT Foundation, Inc. . . . .		267
	<i>Public nuisance; motion to strike; claim that trial court improperly concluded that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support public nuisance claim.</i>	