

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Appellate Reports**  
**Volume 219**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

Ahern v. Board of Education. . . . .	404
<i>Negligence; summary judgment; final judgments; governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n); indemnification pursuant to statute (§ 10-235); whether plaintiff's claims were barred by § 52-557n; whether summary judgment rendered with respect to some, but not all, counts of complaint brought against defendant board of education was appealable final judgment; whether trial court properly rendered summary judgment for certain individual defendants on ground that they were entitled to governmental immunity because there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not subject to imminent and apparent harm.</i>	
ARVYS Protein, Inc. v. A/F Protein, Inc. . . . .	20
<i>Arbitration; whether trial court improperly denied plaintiff's application to modify or vacate arbitration award; claim that arbitrator's award exceeded scope of submission by awarding noncontractual relief; claim that arbitrator manifestly disregarded law by ignoring undisputed contract provisions limiting damages and disclaiming warranties; claim that award violated public policy because it arose from unauthorized practice of law.</i>	
Carter v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .	389
<i>Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court incorrectly concluded that trial counsel did not provide ineffectively assistance by failing to investigate evidence containing biological material found at crime scene and to submit that evidence for DNA analysis; whether petitioner met his burden under prejudice prong of test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) that, if trial counsel had submitted biological material for DNA analysis, there was reasonable probability that outcome of trial would have been different; whether this court needed to address petitioner's argument as to performance prong of Strickland test.</i>	
C. M. v. R. M. . . . .	57
<i>Dissolution of marriage; postdissolution motion to relocate; subject matter jurisdiction; whether defendant was aggrieved by judgment of trial court granting his motion to relocate pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56d).</i>	
Commissioner of Transportation v. Chudy. . . . .	202
<i>Condemnation; notice of condemnation and assessment of damages filed by plaintiff pursuant to statute (§13a-73 (b)) for partial taking of certain of defendants' real property; application seeking reassessment of damages pursuant to statute (§ 13a-76) filed in connection with partial taking of defendants' real property; credibility of expert witnesses; whether trial court erred by failing to award severance damages to defendants as of date of taking; whether trial court's determination that defendants failed to prove that their property was landlocked on date of taking was clearly erroneous.</i>	
Crockett v. Chance (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .	901
Francis v. CIT Bank, N.A. . . . .	139
<i>Entry and detainer; motion to open judgment of nonsuit; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to open judgment after granting defendants' motion for nonsuit.</i>	
In re Cameron H. . . . .	149
<i>Termination of parental rights; claim that trial court improperly concluded that respondent mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services provided to her pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112); claim that there was insufficient evidence for trial court to conclude that mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services; whether trial court properly determined that Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with her children; claim that department's services provided to mother were inadequate given complex needs of children; claim that trial court improperly determined that mother failed to achieve sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage belief that, within reasonable time, considering age and</i>	

	<i>needs of children, she could assume responsible position in their lives as required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).</i>	
In re Daniel D. . . . .		211
	<i>Termination of parental rights; whether trial court properly admitted summaries from Department of Children and Families' service provider under business records exception to hearsay rule codified in provision (§ 8-4 (a)) of Connecticut Code of Evidence; claim that trial court improperly concluded that respondent mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services provided to her by department pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112).</i>	
K. G. v. T. G. (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .		901
Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Rocky Hill . . . . .		464
	<i>Tax appeal; personal property tax assessments; claim that trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence valuations of plaintiff's expert appraiser; whether opinions of plaintiff's expert were speculative and unreliable; claim that trial court's findings that plaintiff was aggrieved and as to true and actual value of plaintiff's personal property were clearly erroneous.</i>	
Lippman v. Dept. of Social Services (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .		901
Napolitano v. Ace American Ins. Co. . . . .		110
	<i>Workers' compensation; declaratory judgment; breach of contract; motion for summary judgment; motion to strike; whether trial court erred in granting plaintiff employer's motion for summary judgment on grounds that court improperly determined that defendant insurer's notice of cancellation of workers' compensation insurance policy was ineffective and that defendant breached its duty to defend or indemnify plaintiff under policy; claim that defendant's notice of cancellation of workers' compensation insurance policy pursuant to statute (§ 31-348) was effective because it was certain and unequivocal as required by § 31-348 and Dengler v. Special Attention Health Services, Inc. (62 Conn. App. 440); whether trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to strike claim asserting bad faith.</i>	
O'Reggio v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities. . . . .		1
	<i>Employment discrimination; claim that trial court erred in affirming administrative decision of defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities; whether defendant employer was liable to plaintiff under Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) ((Rev. to 2015) § 46a-51 et seq.) for claim of hostile work environment created by one of its employees; whether definition of "supervisor" adopted by United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University (570 U.S. 421) for purposes of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) applied to hostile work environment claims brought under CFEPA.</i>	
Padula v. Arborio . . . . .		432
	<i>Adverse possession; claim that trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs, title holders who never actually possessed property or used disputed area, could establish claim for adverse possession; whether plaintiffs intended users of property to possess property, including disputed area; claim that trial court erred in failing to bar plaintiffs from asserting adverse possession of certain portion of disputed area; whether defendants were sufficiently apprised of precise contours of property that plaintiffs were claiming to have adversely possessed; claim that trial court erred in its determination of area that plaintiffs adversely possessed; claim that trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs had proven claim of adverse possession for fifteen years by clear and convincing evidence.</i>	
Perdikis v. Klarsfeld. . . . .		343
	<i>Medical malpractice; general verdict rule; whether trial court erred in instructing jury to consider plaintiff's actions as sole proximate cause of his injuries in absence of any expert medical testimony to support such finding; whether trial court erred in declining to instruct jury in accordance with plaintiff's proposed instructions when defendant placed sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury at issue without requisite accompanying expert medical testimony; whether trial court's alleged error regarding jury instructions was harmful; claim that general verdict rule applied.</i>	
Reese v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .		545
	<i>Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's petition for certification to appeal; claim that habeas court erred in denying petitioner's motion to sequester witness at habeas trial; claim that habeas court erred in dismissing one count of petitioner's amended habeas petition on basis</i>	

*of res judicata; claim that appeal should be dismissed because petitioner, in petition for certification, failed to raise substantive issues he raised on appeal.*

Sease v. Commissioner of Correction. . . . . 504  
*Habeas corpus; whether habeas court improperly concluded that trial counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to investigate and to focus on petitioner’s mental health background at sentencing; whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying petitioner certification to appeal as to claim that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to challenge admission of certain uncharged misconduct testimony; whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying petitioner certification to appeal as to claim that state violated his right to due process by knowingly presenting false testimony from coconspirator.*

Stanziale v. Hunt. . . . . 71  
*Negligence; contributory negligence; general verdict rule; whether general verdict rule barred this court from reviewing plaintiff motorcyclist’s claims on appeal regarding contested evidence of speed at which motorcycle was traveling and length of its skid mark at time of accident; whether contested evidence was relevant to both grounds on which jury could have based its general verdict for defendants, defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s claim of negligence and defendants’ special defense of comparative negligence; claim that trial court improperly denied plaintiff’s motion in limine to redact from his medical records all references to speed at which motorcycle had been traveling at time of accident; claim that defendants had burden of establishing that statements in plaintiff’s medical records about speed at which motorcycle had been traveling were admissible under applicable exception to rule against hearsay; claim that trial court improperly permitted defendant husband of motor vehicle operator to testify about length of skid mark where husband had measured skid mark three hours after accident occurred.*

State v. DeCosta. . . . . 137  
*Interfering with officer; claim that trial court improperly failed to advise defendant during its plea canvass that, by pleading guilty, defendant was waiving right to jury trial; whether defendant’s payment of fine imposed by trial court during sentencing required dismissal of appeal pursuant to statute (§ 54-96a).*

State v. Ebron . . . . . 228  
*Motion to correct illegal sentence; motion to dismiss; whether trial court erred in granting state’s motion to dismiss defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence because it considered merits of defendant’s claims instead of determining whether he had made colorable claim that his sentence was illegal or imposed in illegal manner; whether remand for consideration of merits of defendant’s claims would serve useful purpose because defendant’s claims failed as matter of law; claim that statutory provisions (§§ 54-91g and 54-125a (f)) requiring consideration of youth as mitigating factor and pertaining to parole eligibility for juvenile offenders violated twenty year old defendant’s rights to equal protection because those provisions do not apply to defendants who were over eighteen years of age but under twenty-one years of age at time of offense.*

State v. Santiago. . . . . 44  
*Motion to correct illegal sentence; mootness; motion to dismiss; postappeal motion for sentence modification; whether consideration of claims on appeal would result in practical relief to defendant in light of sentence modification granted by trial court during pendency of appeal; whether trial court’s ruling on appeal dismissing motion to correct had been superseded during pendency of appeal by sentence modification.*

State v. Taveras . . . . . 252  
*Violation of probation; probation revocation hearing; claim that admission of hearsay statements at probation revocation hearing violated defendant’s due process right to cross-examination; claim that trial court improperly failed to conduct balancing test pursuant to State v. Shakir (130 Conn. App. 458) to determine whether good cause existed for defendant’s inability to confront and cross-examine witness at probation revocation hearing concerning admitted hearsay statements; claim that hearsay statements should have been excluded on evidentiary grounds; whether hearsay statements were reliable and corroborated.*

Valentine v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . . 276  
*Habeas corpus; whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying petition for certification to appeal; claim that petitioner was deprived of due process right to fair trial because appellate counsel and first habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise claims of prosecutorial impropriety; whether habeas court abused its discretion in denying motion to open evidence.*

Young v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . . 171  
*Habeas corpus; whether habeas court properly concluded that state had not violated petitioner's right to due process under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) by failing to disclose agreement under which witness agreed to testify truthfully against him at his criminal trial in exchange for state's agreement to inform sentencing court in witness' criminal case of her testimony and cooperation; whether habeas court properly concluded that petitioner had failed to establish that witness' testimony at petitioner's criminal trial was false or substantially misleading and that prosecutor failed to correct it in violation of his due process rights.*