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Connecticut Appellate Reports
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(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)

<p>Arrico v. Board of Education</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Workers' compensation; appeal from decision of Compensation Review Board, which reversed in part Workers' Compensation Commissioner's decision to approve form 36 filed by defendants seeking to discontinue or to reduce plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits; claim that board misconstrued commissioner's decision as including finding that plaintiff was totally disabled as result of preexisting, noncompensable injuries; claim that board misconstrued commissioner's conclusion that further medical care of plaintiff's compensable injuries was palliative; claim that board, in denying plaintiff's motion for articulation or reconsideration, violated statute (§ 51-183c) by denying his request for order that issues on remand be tried de novo before different commissioner.</i></p> <p>Chapnick v. DiLauro</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Nuisance; special motions to dismiss under anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a); whether trial court erred in granting defendants' special motions to dismiss as to claims of nuisance.</i></p> <p>Desmond v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, Inc.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Workers' compensation; motion to strike; whether trial court improperly struck complaints in three actions plaintiff employee brought against defendant employer as barred by exclusivity provision (§ 31-284 (a)) of Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.), where plaintiff had claimed defendant's conduct constituted employment discrimination pursuant to statute (§ 31-290a).</i></p> <p>Gilman v. Shames</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Wrongful death; medical malpractice; bystander emotional distress; motion to dismiss; claim that trial court improperly denied defendants' motion to dismiss; whether Claims Commissioner waived sovereign immunity with respect to plaintiff's claims; claim that accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592) exempted plaintiff from two year statute of limitations for wrongful death action.</i></p> <p>In re Teagan K.-O.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Termination of parental rights; reviewability of claim that trial court lacked authority to terminate respondent mother's parental rights pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112) because minor child was not in custody of petitioner Commissioner of Children and Families; whether respondent mother's claim that dismissal of neglect petition vitiated statutory predicate for order of temporary custody constituted impermissible collateral attack on order of temporary custody; claim that trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate petition for termination of parental rights because order of temporary custody was not final custody determination for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (§ 46b-115 et seq.) and because there was no mechanism by which order of temporary custody could become final custody determination.</i></p> <p>Jones v. Commissioner of Correction.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court abused its discretion in denying petition for certification to appeal; claim that habeas court deprived petitioner of his constitutional and statutory rights by failing to admit into evidence or to consider transcripts of petitioner's underlying criminal trial; claim that habeas court improperly concluded that petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; claim that habeas court improperly concluded that there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) at petitioner's underlying criminal trial.</i></p> <p>New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc.</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Breach of contract; claim that trial court misapplied state and federal environmental regulations; claim that trial court erred in failing to find that defendant's obligations under parties' contract were impossible to perform; claim that trial court improperly determined that plaintiff lawfully had terminated contract; claim that evidence of certain change orders executed by plaintiff in connection with subsequent contract with another contractor, pursuant to which plaintiff agreed</i></p>	<p>1</p> <p>263</p> <p>274</p> <p>147</p> <p>161</p> <p>117</p> <p>30</p>
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to modify terms of contract, constituted admissions that plaintiff's contract with defendant was defective and could not be performed by defendant as written; claim that trial court erred in making its award of damages to plaintiff.

Sease v. Commissioner of Correction. 99

Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court abused its discretion in denying petition for certification to appeal; whether it was premature to decide whether judgment of habeas court should be reversed on merits; whether habeas court erred in determining that no prejudice to petitioner had been established under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668); whether there was reasonable probability that petitioner's sentence would have been less severe in light of mitigating evidence that was presented at habeas trial and not presented at sentencing; remand to habeas court for making of underlying factual findings from record and for determination, based on those findings, of whether petitioner has shown that counsel's representation at sentencing constituted constitutionally deficient performance.

State v. Gray 193

Possession of narcotics with intent to sell; claim that trial court improperly denied defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss charges against him or, in alternative, to suppress any evidence relating to currency seized during his arrest; whether police department's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence violated defendant's right to due process under factors set forth in State v. Asherman (193 Conn. 695); whether trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's postverdict motions for new trial or, in alternative, mistrial, based on state's alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83); claim that trial court abused its discretion by permitting state to present enlarged lab photograph of narcotics and related witness testimony on rebuttal.

State v. Kyle A. 239

Burglary in first degree; criminal mischief in first degree; threatening in second degree; criminal violation of protective order; tampering with witness; attempt to commit criminal violation of protective order; claim that state presented insufficient evidence that defendant committed burglary in first degree; claim that state's theory of case, that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in victim's home because victim expressly forbid him from entering home, was not legally viable; claim that evidence was insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with dangerous instrument; claim that trial court's instruction concerning charge of burglary in first degree constituted plain error.