

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Appellate Reports**  
**Volume 187**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

Anderson v. Dike . . . . .	405
<i>Personal injury; whether trial court improperly granted motion for summary judgment; whether plaintiff failed to meet burden of demonstrating existence of genuine issue of material fact; failure of plaintiff to offer any evidence in opposition to motion for summary judgment that could properly be considered at summary judgment; claim that trial court improperly denied motions for jury trial and appointment of counsel; whether court-appointed counsel is available in civil proceedings.</i>	
Bank of America, N.A. v. Gonzalez . . . . .	511
<i>Foreclosure; special defenses; whether trial court correctly concluded that named defendant could not prevail on his special defenses; whether trial court's finding that certain mortgage broker was not agent or employee of original mortgagee was clearly erroneous; whether named defendant satisfied his burden of proving that mortgage broker was agent or employee of original mortgagee.</i>	
Bank of America, National Assn. v. Liebskind (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .	902
Boucher v. Saint Francis GI Endoscopy, LLC . . . . .	422
<i>Employment discrimination; whether trial court improperly granted motion for summary judgment; whether trial court properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff presented prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation; claim that trial court improperly concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate adverse employment action by defendant; whether plaintiff established genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant intentionally created intolerable work atmosphere that forced her to quit involuntarily to support claim of constructive discharge.</i>	
Bucknor v. Golden Hawk, LLC (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .	902
Buie v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .	414
<i>Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court improperly determined that petitioner received effective assistance from prior habeas counsel and criminal trial counsel; whether petitioner established that he was prejudiced as result of allegedly deficient performance by criminal trial counsel or prior habeas counsel.</i>	
Caron v. Connecticut Pathology Group, P.C. . . . .	555
<i>Medical malpractice; motion to dismiss; personal jurisdiction; whether trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; whether trial court properly interpreted complaint as having alleged negligence by pathologists employed by defendant in their capacity as anatomic pathologists; whether trial court properly concluded that opinion letter authored by board certified clinical pathologist was legally insufficient pursuant to relevant statute (§ 52-190a [a]) because it was not authored by similar health care provider as that term is defined by statute (§ 52-184c [c]).</i>	
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Pritchard (Memorandum Decision). . . . .	901
Coppedge v. Travis . . . . .	528
<i>Personal injury; action pursuant to dog bite statute ([Rev. to 2013] § 22-357); claim that trial court improperly determined that § 22-357 applied to facts of case because dog's conduct was not vicious or mischievous; whether dog's conduct in charging toward plaintiff in exuberant manner fit within definition of mischievous behavior; whether trial court's finding on element of proximate cause was clearly erroneous.</i>	
Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C. . . . .	486
<i>Legal malpractice; whether trial court properly granted motion to strike for improper joinder; whether plaintiffs' action concerned separate and distinct transactions that were independent of each other; whether plaintiffs were necessary and indispensable parties in each other's case; whether doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata barred subsequent litigation by plaintiff once that plaintiff was removed from case; whether trial court properly denied motion for costs pursuant to statute (§ 52-243).</i>	

Daley v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. . . . .	587
<i>Wrongful termination of employment; whether trial court improperly denied motion seeking new trial or, alternatively, evidentiary hearing regarding competency of juror; whether, under unique circumstances of case, trial court erred in failing to hold postverdict evidentiary hearing to examine juror's competency during trial; whether there must be preliminary showing of strong evidence that juror likely was incompetent during his or her jury service before trial court is required to conduct full postverdict inquiry into juror's competency; whether there was sufficient evidence indicating that juror likely was not competent to serve on jury such that full inquiry by court into juror's competency was necessary.</i>	
Designs for Health, Inc. v. Miller . . . . .	1
<i>Contracts; whether trial court improperly granted motion to dismiss; whether trial court improperly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant; whether plaintiff met its burden to make prima facie showing that trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant; whether plaintiff submitted evidence, which if credited by trier of fact, was sufficient to establish that defendant had signed electronically subject agreement containing forum selection clause.</i>	
Dubinsky v. Reich . . . . .	255
<i>Legal malpractice; motion to dismiss; subject matter jurisdiction; absolute immunity; claim that trial court improperly concluded that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity; whether complaint was grounded on any conduct by defendant attorney in which she acted outside role of statutory (§ 46b-54) court-appointed guardian ad litem for plaintiff's minor child; claim that granting absolute immunity to guardians ad litem is contrary to public policy.</i>	
Fields v. Skeen (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .	903
Fitzgerald v. Bridgeport. . . . .	301
<i>Injunction; action seeking injunctive relief to prevent defendants from making appointments to position of police captain based on results of police captain examination; whether trial court properly granted motion to dismiss counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on basis that defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies; claim that there was no reason to appeal to defendant Civil Service Commission because defendant was not aggrieved by determination that he was eligible to take captain's examination; claim that defendant lacked necessary qualifications to sit for captain examination; claim that because city council had not approved increase in number of lieutenant positions from twenty-one to twenty-two, defendant's seniority was calculated on improper basis; whether trial court properly concluded that defendant did not meet eligibility requirements for captain examination and should not have been permitted to take examination; whether claim of error in selection by commission of date on which vacancy in rank of captain occurred was subject to exhaustion requirement; whether policies underlying exhaustion doctrine would be best served by requiring defendant to bring challenge to date of vacancy before commission; whether defendant as municipal employee candidate for promotion to captain possessed specific, personal and legal interest in date establishing candidates' eligibility for captain examination; aggravement; claim that trial court improperly concluded that twenty-second lieutenant position was not legally established under city charter; whether commission lacked authority to increase number of lieutenants; whether plain language of charter required that city council establish new lieutenant position; claim that even if trial court properly determined that twenty-second lieutenant position was not legally established under charter, trial court's conclusion that defendant was ineligible to sit for captain examination constituted improper sanction of illegal appointment.</i>	
Ham v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .	160
<i>Habeas corpus; whether habeas corpus abused its discretion in denying petition for certification to appeal; claim that prosecutor failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence concerning police witness; claim that prior habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance that was prejudicial to petitioner by failing to pursue claims that petitioner's criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance that was prejudicial to petitioner.</i>	
Hodges v. Commissioner of Correction. . . . .	394
<i>Habeas corpus; claim that habeas court improperly determined that petitioner's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance; whether trial counsel was ineffective by pursuing defense theory of mere presence; whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult with and retain expert witness in video forensics; claim that habeas court abused its discretion by precluding</i>	

*testimony of petitioner's firearm identification expert as to whether surveillance video depicted presence of firearm.*

Hoffkins v. Hart-D'Amato . . . . . 227  
*Unpaid legal fees; whether trial court abused its discretion when it denied motion for disqualification of trial judge; whether defendant met burden of showing reasonable appearance of impropriety; whether there were any instances of impropriety or bias in record; whether trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit unredacted transcript as full exhibit.*

Hospital Media Network, LLC v. Henderson . . . . . 40  
*Breach of fiduciary duty; default judgment; claim that defendant had fiduciary relationship with plaintiff and breached his fiduciary duty by working for unrelated company without the plaintiff's permission or knowledge; claim that trial court erred in determining monetary awards; whether trial court abused its discretion in ordering wholesale forfeiture of defendant's salary and bonus and requiring defendant to disgorge in full all profits received from third parties; whether award of monetary relief was disproportionate to misconduct at issue and failed to take into account equities in case.*

In re Angelina M. . . . . 801  
*Termination of parental rights; claim that trial court improperly terminated respondent mother's parental rights; claim that trial court erred in concluding that mother failed to achieve requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by statute (§ 17a-112); whether trial court's finding that termination of mother's parental rights was in best interest of child was clearly erroneous; whether trial court's findings were substantiated by ample evidence in record.*

In re Tresin J. . . . . 804  
*Termination of parental rights; whether trial court properly determined, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 [j] [3] [D]), that respondent father had no ongoing parent-child relationship with child; claim that alleged interference by petitioner, Commissioner of Children and Families, led to lack of ongoing parent-child relationship between father and child; claim that trial court should have considered father's feelings toward child when father was incarcerated and child was less than two years old.*

Jacobson v. Commissioner of Correction (Memorandum Decision) . . . . . 901

Kirwan v. Kirwan . . . . . 375  
*Dissolution of marriage; motion for contempt; whether trial court abused its discretion in granting motion for order regarding children's private middle school tuition; claim that trial court erred by ordering defendant to pay 75 percent of children's tuition for certain academic years; claim that trial court erred by ordering defendant to pay portion of children's tuition that was incurred prior to date of dissolution judgment; whether trial court properly exercised its authority pursuant to applicable statute (§ 46b-81) to allocate between parties marital debt related to children's tuition; whether trial court abused its discretion in finding defendant in contempt for his failure to comply with its order regarding children's private middle school tuition; whether underlying order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous to support contempt finding; whether defendant's noncompliance with order was wilful; whether finding that defendant did not meet his burden of proving that he was unable to pay his court-ordered obligation was clearly erroneous.*

Ledyard v. Perkins Properties, LLC (Memorandum Decision) . . . . . 901

Margarita O. v. Irazu (Memorandum Decision) . . . . . 902

Maria G. v. Commissioner of Children & Families . . . . . 466  
*Habeas corpus; petition for writ of habeas corpus to regain custody of minor child; whether trial court properly granted motion for summary judgment; claim that trial court erroneously failed to credit foreign court's decree; whether trial court properly concluded that foreign court's judgment was not required to be enforced as matter of comity; whether enforcement of foreign court's decree was contrary to this state's public policy of prevention of fraud; whether trial court correctly determined that any notice of foreign proceedings provided to respondent Commissioner of Children and Families was insufficient as matter of law.*

Morera v. Thurber . . . . . 795  
*Dissolution of marriage; visitation orders; motion to modify; claim that trial court violated plaintiff's right to due process of law by improperly dismissing motion to modify visitation without evidentiary hearing; whether trial court improperly failed to offer plaintiff adequate opportunity to review report of court-appointed*

	<i>therapist and to present evidence in opposition to report and in favor of plaintiff's own position before court ruled.</i>	
Mosby v. Board of Education . . . . .		771
	<i>Discrimination; service of process; motion to dismiss; release of jurisdiction; whether trial court properly granted motion to dismiss action as untimely; whether plaintiff timely commenced action within ninety days of receiving release of jurisdiction from Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, as required by statute (§ 46a-101 [e]); whether action is commenced by service of process; whether action was untimely where defendant was served after expiration of statute of limitations; whether action could be saved by application of remedial savings statute (§ 52-593a).</i>	
Norris v. Trumbull . . . . .		201
	<i>Negligence; whether trial court properly denied motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity; claim that trial court improperly determined that role of defendant regional educational service center in supervising students committed to its care and custody was municipal function not shielded by doctrine of sovereign immunity; claim that defendant acted as agent of state when overseeing care and safety of children enrolled in its schools and programs; whether criteria for determining when entity properly can assert sovereign immunity defense weighed against concluding that defendant acted as arm of state with respect to any duty it may have had to supervise minor plaintiff; whether enabling legislation demonstrated that defendant was not created by statute (§ 10-66a et seq.); whether statutory language supported conclusion that legislature intended for entities like defendant to be treated like state agent for all purposes; whether defendant was financially dependent on state; whether record indicated that state had any direct oversight or control over defendant, its property or its operations other than to conduct annual audit of finances and evaluation of programs and services; whether judgment against defendant would have direct adverse effect on state.</i>	
People's United Bank, National Assn. v. Purcell . . . . .		523
	<i>Personal jurisdiction; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to open judgment and to dismiss action; claim that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant because he had never been served with writ of summons and complaint; validity of service of process where defendant had different addresses.</i>	
State v. Anderson . . . . .		569
	<i>Motion to correct illegal sentence; motion to revise judgment mittimus; whether trial court properly denied in part and dismissed in part motion to correct illegal sentence; whether trial court properly dismissed motion to revise judgment mittimus; claim that defendant was entitled to jail time credit for same period of incarceration toward service of two separate sentences that did not run concurrent to each other; claim that defendant was entitled to presentence credit for all time incarcerated in lieu of bail or to revision of judgment mittimus to implement trial court's order that he receive all pretrial credits to which he was entitled; whether trial court's jurisdiction under applicable rule of practice (§ 43-22) applied to claim that concerned legality of sentence as calculated by Department of Correction and did not arise from sentencing proceeding.</i>	
State v. Berrios . . . . .		661
	<i>Manslaughter in first degree; tampering with witness; intimidating witness; evasion of responsibility in operation of motor vehicle; whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction of tampering with witness and intimidating witness; claim that state failed to prove that defendant intended to prevent witness from testifying or to induce witness to testify falsely; whether trial court abused its discretion when it permitted medical examiner to testify as to manner of victim's death, which involved ultimate issue in case; claim that medical examiner's conclusion as to manner of victim's death was improperly based on information from police investigation; whether trial court improperly admitted prior misconduct evidence; claim that trial court abused its discretion in determining that certain testimony was admissible as uncharged misconduct evidence or pursuant to opening door doctrine; claim that trial court abused its discretion in determining that probative value of testimony as to prior misconduct outweighed its prejudicial impact; whether trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence crude text messages defendant sent to witness; whether trial court properly determined that probative value of text messages outweighed prejudicial effect of defendant's crude language; claim that trial court improperly instructed jury on</i>	

- initial aggressor and provocation exceptions to defense of self-defense; whether jury reasonably could have concluded that defendant was initial aggressor and, thus, not justified in using any physical force; whether evidence was adequate to warrant trial court's jury instruction on provocation exception to defense of self-defense; whether trial court improperly included objective standard in its jury instruction on retreat exception to use of deadly physical force; harmless error; whether jury reasonably could have been misled by trial court's failure to properly convey subjective standard of duty to retreat.*
- State v. Bethea . . . . . 263  
*Falsely reporting incident in second degree; whether evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction of falsely reporting incident in second degree; reviewability of claim that verdict returned by jury was legally inconsistent; claim that search warrant for cell phone records and arrest warrant were obtained without probable; reviewability of unpreserved claims that trial court improperly permitted witness to make in-court identification in absence of prior nonsuggestive out-of-court identification, and that trial court erred by admitting testimony of eyewitness and defendant's out-of-court statements; whether unpreserved claims were evidentiary in nature; claim that prosecutor improperly withheld testimony of eyewitness to evading incident in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83); whether evidence was suppressed within meaning of Brady.*
- State v. Bumgarner-Ramos . . . . . 725  
*Assault in first degree; aggravated sexual assault of minor; risk of injury to child; manslaughter in first degree; claim that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of aggravated sexual assault of minor; whether state proved that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with minor victim; whether there was evidence defendant penetrated victim's vaginal opening; whether trial court's finding that victim's injuries were inflicted by application of physical force on subject areas of victim's body by defendant was sufficient to support conviction of aggravated sexual assault of minor; claim that conviction of both assault in first degree and manslaughter in first degree as charged violated defendant's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy; whether assault charge was lesser included offense of manslaughter charge; whether defendant could have caused death of victim in manner described in operative information without first having caused serious physical injury to victim; whether error was harmless.*
- State v. Carey . . . . . 438  
*Murder; whether trial court erred in admitting certain testimony to explain victim's fear of defendant and to rebut defendant's claim of self-defense; claim that testimony was inadmissible hearsay; harmless error; whether state engaged in prosecutorial impropriety that deprived defendant of fair trial when, during direct examination of defendant, prosecutor stated that defense counsel was cheating; claim that prosecutor improperly impugned credibility of defense counsel; claim that prosecutor directed jury to disregard trial court's charge as to affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance; whether prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence or expressed personal opinion regarding defendant's credibility; whether trial court abused its discretion by giving jury falsus in uno instruction.*
- State v. Hanisko . . . . . 237  
*Possession of child pornography in second degree; claim that trial court improperly denied motion to suppress evidence seized from property where defendant resided because information in search and seizure warrant affidavit was stale at time that search warrant was issued; whether trial court correctly determined that probable cause existed to support issuance of search and seizure warrant; whether trial court properly denied motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search and seizure warrant; reviewability of claim that defendant was entitled to judgment of acquittal on ground that trial court's failure to recognize that oppressive delay between execution of search and seizure warrant in 2009 and issuance of arrest warrant in 2014 resulted in violation of his right to due process; failure of defendant to file pretrial motion to dismiss.*
- State v. Jerrell R. . . . . 537  
*Risk of injury to child; unlawful restraint in second degree; double jeopardy; prosecutorial impropriety; claim that defendant's conviction of two counts of risk of injury to child under different subdivisions of statute (§ 53-21 [a] [1] and [2]) violated constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy; whether defendant established that charged offenses arose out of same act or transaction; credibility of witnesses; claim that defendant was denied fair trial as result of prosecutorial*

	<i>improprieties; whether prosecutor misstated law with respect to subdivision (2) of § 53-21 (a) during closing argument by referring to evidence relating to risk of injury charge under § 53-21 (a) (1); failure of defendant to object to challenged remarks of prosecutor; whether prosecutor improperly offered personal opinion regarding credibility of witness; whether prosecutor's use of phrase "in my opinion" raised concern of improper unsworn testimony.</i>	
State v. Jones . . . . .		752
	<i>Murder; carrying pistol without permit; criminal possession of firearm; whether trial court properly declined to give special credibility instruction regarding jailhouse informants as to testimony of witness; whether jailhouse informant exception applied; claim that trial court erred with respect to its jury instruction on eyewitness identification; claim that jury was misled by court's instructions; whether trial court properly tailored instructions to adapt to issues of case.</i>	
State v. Joseph B. . . . .		106
	<i>Sexual assault in first degree; sexual assault in third degree; risk of injury to child; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for bill of particulars; whether defendant was prejudiced by trial court's denial of motion for bill of particulars; claim that trial court improperly admitted evidence that victim tested positive for sexually transmitted disease; whether evidence pertaining to victim's diagnosis was unduly prejudicial; claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to preclude evidence of text messages from defendant to victim's mother; claim that evidence of text messages should have been precluded as untimely because state knew or should have known of text messages prior to disclosure at start of trial; claim that evidence of text messages should have been precluded as sanction under applicable rule of practice (§ 40-5).</i>	
State v. Peluso . . . . .		498
	<i>Sexual assault in first degree; sexual assault in fourth degree; risk of injury to child; whether state lacked good cause to amend information during trial; whether trial court abused its discretion in permitting state to amend information to conform to victim's testimony as to when offenses allegedly occurred; claim that trial court erred in concluding that defendant's substantive rights were not prejudiced by state's amendment to information during trial; whether trial court abused its discretion in deciding that one week continuance was sufficient time for defendant to augment his defense in response to amended information; whether defendant was prejudiced by amendment to information.</i>	
State v. Roman (Memorandum Decision) . . . . .		903
State v. Santiago . . . . .		350
	<i>Murder; whether trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain written statement to police by witness as prior consistent statement; whether introduction of witness' prior consistent written statement was solely to rehabilitate credibility of witness; whether trial court abused its discretion in admitting, as relevant evidence, testimony of witness concerning uncharged misconduct by defendant; whether probative value of uncharged misconduct testimony was outweighed by unfair prejudice; claim that defendant was deprived of due process right to fair trial as result of prosecutorial improprieties; whether prosecutor's questions were intended to elicit inadmissible responses from witness; whether prosecutor relied exclusively on evidence admitted during trial during rebuttal closing argument; reviewability of unpreserved evidentiary claim that prosecutor improperly failed to redact certain portions of witness' statement to police; claim that Appellate Court should exercise its supervisory authority to order new trial.</i>	
State v. Stephenson . . . . .		20
	<i>Burglary in third degree; attempt to commit tampering with physical evidence; attempt to commit arson in second degree; claim that evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support defendant's conviction of charged offenses; whether there was evidence presented at trial that defendant touched case files in courtroom with intent to tamper with physical evidence.</i>	
State v. Williams . . . . .		333
	<i>Attempt to commit home invasion; manslaughter in first degree; whether evidence was sufficient to support conviction of attempt to commit home invasion; whether evidence was sufficient to show defendant had specific intent to commit felony assault against individual inside dwelling if defendant and his cohorts were successful in entering dwelling; whether evidence was sufficient to show that defendant took substantial step toward unlawfully entering dwelling; whether proof that defendant or one of his cohorts intended to commit felony against individual in</i>	

dwelling was legally sufficient where state charged defendant as principal and not as accessory.

Truskauskas v. Zoning Board of Appeals. . . . . 150  
*Zoning appeal; whether trial court properly found plaintiff in contempt for wilfull violation of stipulated judgments that prohibited him from conducting commercial activities at his residential property and using dump truck there as part of contracting business or for other commercial purposes; claim that trial court erroneously interpreted stipulation to encompass total prohibition against use of dump truck for any commercial purposes, including those that occurred off of plaintiff's property.*

Villages, LLC v. Longhi . . . . . 132  
*Fraud; intentional tortious interference with business expectancy; whether trial court properly denied motion for summary judgment as to liability; whether trial court properly granted motion for summary judgment; claim that trial court improperly determined defendant was not collaterally estopped from disputing liability because she was not party to prior action or in privity with planning and zoning commission; whether defendant and planning and zoning commission had identity of interest so as to share same legal right; whether trial court properly determined that plaintiff failed to present evidence that would sufficiently support essential elements of claim for fraudulent misrepresentation; whether trial court properly determined that no business relationship existed between plaintiff and planning and zoning commission.*

State v. Walker. . . . . 776  
*Aggravated sexual assault in first degree; sexual assault in first degree; kidnapping in first degree with firearm; kidnapping in first degree; threatening; criminal possession of weapon; credit card theft; illegal use of credit card; fraudulent use of automatic teller machine; larceny in sixth degree; motion to correct illegal sentence; motion to dismiss; subject matter jurisdiction; whether trial court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim that sentence was imposed in illegal manner due to sentencing court's failure to canvass defendant or defense counsel as to review and accuracy of presentence investigation report; whether our statutes and rules of practice require trial court to make affirmative inquiry as to accuracy of facts contained in presentence investigation report; whether trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider merits of defendant's claim that sentence was imposed in illegal manner due to sentencing court's reliance on inaccurate facts regarding previous convictions contained in presentence investigation report; whether it was plausible that defendant sought to challenge manner in which sentence was imposed instead of underlying convictions.*

Watson Real Estate, LLC v. Woodland Ridge, LLC . . . . . 282  
*Contracts; claim that trial court improperly failed to find that there was meeting of minds between parties as to number of layers of pavement to be applied to common driveway; claim that trial court should have drawn adverse inference against defendant for failing to call certain witness to rebut certain parol evidence presented by plaintiff; whether drawing of adverse inference is permissive rather than mandatory; whether trial court's failure to draw adverse inference was improper; reviewability of claim that trial court improperly failed to find that defendant breached escrow agreement by not reimbursing plaintiff for costs it had incurred; failure to allege claim in revised complaint or at trial; claim that trial court improperly denied request for leave to amend revised complaint to add claim of unjust enrichment.*

Wethersfield v. PR Arrow, LLC . . . . . 604  
*Zoning; whether trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to issue of whether parking and storage of commercial vehicles on defendant's property constituted valid accessory use within zoning regulations; whether claim that plaintiff zoning enforcement officer lacked standing to bring action on behalf of himself or plaintiff town was moot; claim that trial court improperly retained jurisdiction as to accessory use issue; whether trial court properly determined that defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to special defense that zoning enforcement officer exceeded authority in issuing cease and desist order to defendant; claim that zoning regulations vested exclusive authority in town Planning and Zoning Commission to interpret words in zoning regulations that were undefined; claim that appeal to Zoning Board of Appeals would have been futile; claim that zoning regulation (§ 5.2.H.5) was impermissibly vague; whether § 5.2.H.5 provided adequate notice to defendant of standards utilized to evaluate*

*special permit request for parking and storage of commercial vehicles; claim that trial court improperly interpreted term trucking operations in zoning regulations; claim that trial court substituted its interpretation of term trucking operations in zoning regulations for that of commission; whether trial court improperly exercised discretion in fashioning permanent injunctive relief in favor of plaintiffs; claim that trial court's injunction lacked sufficient clarity and definiteness; claim that trial court abused its discretion by imposing daily fine against defendant pursuant to statute (§ 8-12); claim that plaintiffs failed to prove that storage of commercial vehicles on defendant's property was public nuisance; claim that trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs and attorney's fees to plaintiffs pursuant to § 8-12; claim that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' postjudgment motion for contempt; claim that postjudgment motion for contempt was filed prematurely; claim that trial court improperly granted postjudgment motion for contempt; whether defendant waived objection to allegedly improper service of process of contempt motion by submitting to jurisdiction of court; whether defendant's noncompliance with trial court's order was wilful.*

Wood v. Rutherford . . . . . 61

*Battery; negligent infliction of emotional distress; informed consent; claim that although defendant physician obtained informed consent of plaintiff to perform laser ablation of her vulva and, as part of that course of treatment, to perform postoperative examination, substantial change in circumstances occurred when defendant discovered complication during postoperative examination that required medical intervention, which in turn obligated him to obtain her informed consent before proceeding further; whether trial court improperly granted motion to dismiss battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress counts due to plaintiff's noncompliance with statute (§ 52-190a); whether plaintiff's battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress counts were claims of medical negligence subject to requirements of § 52-190a; whether trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of defendant physician on plaintiff's revised complaint; whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding defendant's discovery of medical complication during postoperative examination; whether defendant physician's failure to obtain informed consent may be excused because exception applied, such as when patient has authorized physician to remedy complications that arise during course of medical treatment.*