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<p><i>violations of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), and of unjust enrichment; whether plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered any damages as result of defendants' use of his name; whether plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered actual loss as result of defendants' alleged interference with his business expectancies or that he suffered any ascertainable loss as result of alleged CUTPA violations; whether plaintiff could recover under theory of unjust enrichment where he recovered under theory of breach of contract; whether plaintiff lacked standing to bring claims relating to breach of operating agreement.</i></p>	
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