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grand list, pursuant to statute (§ 12-60) that governs corrections to grand list due to clerical omission or mistake; whether trial court improperly concluded that although assessor had violated statute (§ 12-55 [b]) that requires assessor to make any assessment required by law prior to signing grand list, only redress for assessor's failure to comply with provisions of § 12-55 (b) was to postpone right of plaintiffs to appeal action to assessor until succeeding grand list, and that penalty prescribed for in § 12-63c (d) makes no provision for removal of penalty imposed by legislature, regardless of action taken by assessor; whether, pursuant to § 12-55 (b), imposition of late filing penalty constitutes assessment required by law and, as such, it must be made by assessor prior to taking oath; whether assessor lacked statutory authority to impose late filing penalties after he took oath; whether late adjustments were invalid and prevented any recovery of taxes based thereon; claim that language in § 12-55 (a) demonstrated legislative intent to exclude, by implication, late penalties under § 12-63c (d) as required assessment; whether trial court improperly concluded that delayed imposition of late filing penalties did not correct clerical omission or mistake, rendering § 12-60 inapplicable; claim that plaintiffs were not harmed by assessor's imposition of late filing penalties because plaintiffs were able to seek review of assessor's imposition of penalties by appealing to board.

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 Wilton River Park 1688, LLC v. Wilton (See Wilton Campus 1691, LLC v. Wilton) 712