

**Cumulative Table of Cases**  
**Connecticut Appellate Reports**  
**Volume 191**

*(Replaces Prior Cumulative Table)*

<p>Clasby v. Zimmerman . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Arbitration; whether trial court improperly denied application to confirm arbitration award; whether, pursuant to statute (§ 52-417), trial court lacked discretion to deny timely application to confirm arbitration award where award had not been timely vacated, modified or corrected; whether trial court correctly denied request that it vacate subsequent arbitration award that reduced certain costs of cabinetry work and hold plaintiffs responsible for cost of cabinetry work as set forth in original arbitration award.</i></p> <p>Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ponger . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Foreclosure; whether trial court properly rendered judgment of strict foreclosure; claim that plaintiff failed to provide defendant, who was joint tenant of mortgaged property and joint obligor on mortgage deed, with proper notice of default and acceleration of note, where plaintiff had sent notice to mortgaged property that was addressed to other joint tenant of mortgaged property and joint obligor on mortgage deed, but not to defendant.</i></p> <p>Dinham v. Commissioner of Correction . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Habeas corpus; manslaughter in first degree with firearm; whether habeas court improperly dismissed claims that respondent Commissioner of Correction misconstrued and misapplied statute (§ 54-125a) pertaining to parole suitability hearings and application of risk reduction credit toward advancement of parole eligibility date, and statute (§ 18-98e) pertaining to risk reduction credit; claim that respondent misinterpreted and misapplied 2013 amendments to § 54-125a, as set forth in No. 13-3 of 2013 Public Acts (P.A. 13-3) and No. 13-247 of 2013 Public Acts (P.A. 13-247), and 2015 amendments to § 18-98e, as set forth in No. 15-216 of 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-216); claim that amendments to statutes as set forth in public acts were substantive rather than procedural in nature and, therefore, should not apply retroactively to petitioner; whether habeas court improperly dismissed claim that when petitioner pleaded guilty in 2012 to manslaughter in first degree with firearm, he relied on governmental representations that he would receive risk reduction credits to advance his parole eligibility date and reduce total length of his sentence; whether habeas court improperly dismissed certain counts of habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claim on which habeas relief could be granted; whether petitioner established cognizable liberty interest by alleging that respondent, through his customary practices, had created liberty interest.</i></p> <p>Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Attorney's fees; claim that trial court erred in awarding supplemental attorney's fees; claim that trial court abused its discretion in amount of attorney's fees awarded; adoption of trial court's memorandum of decision as proper statement of relevant facts and applicable law on issues.</i></p> <p>In re Leo L. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Termination of parental rights; motion to transfer guardianship; claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to transfer guardianship of minor children to intervening grandparent and erroneously determined that transfer of guardianship would not be in children's best interests; whether trial court had authority to weigh evidence elicited in intervenor's favor; whether trial court properly determined that transferring guardianship was not in children's best interests; claim that trial court failed to acknowledge certain evidence in making its decision.</i></p> <p>In Re Skylar F. . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 2em;"><i>Child neglect; whether trial court properly denied respondent father's motion to open judgment of neglect concerning father's minor child that was rendered after father was defaulted for failing to attend case status conference; whether father's rights to due process were violated; claim that this court should exercise de novo review of claim that father was denied due process of law as result of trial court's</i></p>	<p>143</p> <p>76</p> <p>84</p> <p>110</p> <p>134</p> <p>200</p>
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	<i>rendering default judgment at case status conference; claim that trial court abused its discretion in denying father's motion to open default judgment.</i>	
Maria W. v. Eric W. . . . .		27
	<i>Dissolution of marriage; motion for contempt; claim that trial court abused its discretion by admitting plaintiff's testimony that defendant previously had been arrested and charged with certain criminal offenses; claim that trial court improperly found defendant in arrears on child support and alimony obligations and ordered him to make certain weekly payments; whether order appealed from was final where trial court resolved some, but not all, claims in motion for contempt and continued matter to later date for determination of whether defendant's failure to pay arrears was wilful or due to inability to pay; whether this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain claim on appeal due to lack of final judgment.</i>	
Marvin v. Board of Education . . . . .		169
	<i>Negligence; summary judgment; governmental immunity; claim that trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of defendant on ground of government immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n [a] [2] [B]) that provides immunity for discretionary acts of employees, agents and officers of political subdivisions of state; claim that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether inspection and maintenance of school locker room floor by defendant's employees constituted ministerial duty; claim that there remained genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was identifiable person subject to imminent risk of harm and, thus, whether identifiable person, imminent harm exception to defense of governmental immunity applied; whether plaintiff fell within identifiable class of foreseeable victims or was identifiable person for purposes of exception.</i>	
McGinty v. Stamford Police Dept. . . . .		163
	<i>Workers' compensation; whether Compensation Review Board properly affirmed decision of Workers' Compensation Commissioner that plaintiff employee's claim for benefits under Heart and Hypertension Act (§ 7-433c) was compensable; whether commissioner's finding that plaintiff suffered from heart disease was supported by record.</i>	
1916 Post Road Associates, LLC v. Mrs. Green's of Fairfield, Inc. . . . .		16
	<i>Landlord-tenant; guarantee of commercial lease; whether trial court properly granted motion for summary judgment; whether guarantor's letters to plaintiff created genuine issue of material fact as to whether guarantor was liable to plaintiff lessor for debts of lessee.</i>	
Smith v. Marshview Fitness, LLC . . . . .		1
	<i>Fraudulent transfer; motion for summary judgment; claim that trial court improperly concluded that transfer of certain property to defendant company was not fraudulent under common law or Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (§ 52-552a et seq.) on ground that property did not constitute "assets" because it was encumbered by valid lien in excess of its value; claim that trial court improperly rendered summary judgment on claim alleging violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) because underlying conduct on which plaintiff claimed defendant company violated CUTPA was broader than facts supporting his fraudulent transfer claims; whether trial court abused its discretion in denying motion to reargue motion for summary judgment.</i>	
State v. Chavez. . . . .		184
	<i>Manslaughter in first degree; claim that trial court improperly deprived defendant of constitutional right to fair trial when it failed to instruct jury, sua sponte, about inherent shortcomings of simultaneous foreign language interpretation of trial testimony; claim that trial court improperly deprived defendant of constitutional right to fair trial when it instructed jury that it could consider as consciousness of guilt evidence that defendant changed shirt shortly after victim was stabbed; whether defendant was presented with meaningful opportunity to review and comment on trial court's jury instructions; whether defendant waived right to challenge constitutionality of jury instruction under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); whether jury reasonably could have found from evidence that defendant's act of changing shirt was motivated by desire to avoid detection by law enforcement.</i>	
State v. Clark. . . . .		191
	<i>Assault in second degree; whether trial court properly denied motion to suppress oral statement defendant made to police officer during alleged custodial interrogation in defendant's apartment before defendant was advised of constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436); whether trial court properly</i>	

determined that defendant was not in custody at time statement was made; whether reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that her freedom of movement was restrained to degree associated with formal arrest.

State v. Daniels . . . . . 33

*Intentional manslaughter in first degree; reckless manslaughter in first degree; misconduct with motor vehicle; claim that jury's guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent in that each of alleged crimes required mutually exclusive mental state; claim that trial court erred when it failed to exclude certain testimonial hearsay; whether verdicts required findings that defendant simultaneously acted intentionally and recklessly with respect to different results; whether jury reasonably could have found that defendant specifically intended to cause serious physical injury to victim and that, in doing so, consciously disregarded substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions created grave risk of death to victim; whether defendant's conviction required jury to find that defendant acted intentionally and criminally negligent with respect to different results; whether defendant could have intended to cause serious physical injury to victim while, at same time, failing to perceive substantial and unjustifiable risk that manner in which defendant operated vehicle would cause victim's death; whether mental state element for crimes of reckless manslaughter and misconduct with motor vehicle, or criminally negligent operation of motor vehicle, were mutually exclusive when examined under facts and state's theory that two strikes of victim's vehicle by defendant was one continuous act; whether defendant could have consciously disregarded substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions would cause victim's death while simultaneously failing to perceive substantial and unjustifiable risk that actions would cause victim's death; whether mental states required for reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation related to same result; whether admission of out-of-court statement for purposes other than its truth raised confrontation clause issue and was of constitutional magnitude under second prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); whether statement at issue was hearsay.*

State v. Francis . . . . . 101

*Motion to correct illegal sentence; whether trial court properly denied motion to correct illegal sentence; claim that sentence was imposed in illegal manner because sentencing court substantially relied on materially inaccurate information in presentence investigation report concerning defendant's prior criminal history; whether record demonstrated that sentencing court did not substantially rely on certain inaccuracies in presentence investigation report in imposing sentence; whether disputed fact that victim sustained graze wound prior to sustaining fatal stab wound substantially relied on by sentencing court; claim that sentencing court misconstrued evidence concerning manner in which underlying crime of murder was committed.*

Stone v. East Coast Swappers, LLC . . . . . 63

*Unfair trade practices; alleged violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.); attorney's fees; claim that this court should recognize rebuttable presumption in context of attorney's fees for CUTPA violations, whereby prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such award unjust; whether trial court abused its discretion in declining to award plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to statute (§ 42-110g [d]); claim that trial court erred by conflating analyses for awarding attorney's fees and punitive damages under CUTPA.*