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ROBINSON, C. J., concurring. I join the majority’s well reasoned opinion in this case. I write separately only to highlight the importance of factual context in considering whether a statement, which facially may be susceptible to varying interpretations, rises to the level of a true threat, rendering it unprotected by the first amendment to the United States constitution. See, e.g., *Haughwout v. Tordenti*, 332 Conn. 559, 570–72, 211 A.3d 1 (2019); *State v. Taupier*, 330 Conn. 149, 193–94, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019); *State v. Krijger*, 313 Conn. 434, 454–55, 97 A.3d 946 (2014). The thoughtful analysis in the majority opinion aptly highlights how a defendant’s conduct may provide the necessary context for a reasonable understanding of the meaning of his or her words. In my view, the majority opinion furnishes a cogent example of the searching and independent appellate review necessary to ensure that not every public expression of anger or frustration may be deemed to constitute criminal conduct, namely, a breach of the peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a).<sup>1</sup> See also General Statutes § 53a-181a (creating public disturbance is infraction).<sup>2</sup> I therefore join the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court.

<sup>1</sup> General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior in a public place; or . . . (3) threatens to commit any crime against another person or such other person’s property . . . . For purposes of this section, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or private interests.”

<sup>2</sup> General Statutes § 53a-181a (a) provides: “A person is guilty of creating a public disturbance when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys or interferes with another person by offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.”