STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Lawrence J. Goldstein, M.D., Complainant vs. Anthony O. Famiglietti, Respondent
Grievance Complaint #95-0997
PROPOSED DECISION
Pursuant to Practice Book '27J, the undersigned, duly- appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 95 Washington Street, Hartford, Connecticut on February 13, 1997. The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on June 10, 1996, and the probable cause determination rendered by the Hartford-New Britain Judicial District, Geographical Areas 12, 15, 16 and 17 Grievance Panel on October 4, 1996, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Notice of the hearing was mailed to the Complainant and to the Respondent on December 31, 1996. The Complainant, represented by counsel, and the Respondent appeared and gave testimony. This reviewing committee also heard the testimony of Robin Vinyard on the Respondent's behalf. Exhibits were received into evidence.
This reviewing committee finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
The Respondent was retained by Miller Vinyard on or about March 31, 1989 to represent him in connection with a workers' compensation claim related to a back injury incurred on or about September 26, 1988. Shortly after being retained to represent Vinyard, Vinyard was admitted to the psychiatric ward at Hartford Hospital. On or about the time of his hospitalization, Vinyard became a patient of the Complainant. The Complainant's bills reflect an initial office consultation with Vinyard on April 20, 1989 and a hospitalization of Vinyard on June 11, 1989.
As the Respondent recites in his July 15, 1996 answer to the grievance complaint, in the Fall of 1989, he began contacting the workers' compensation carrier regarding Vinyard's psychiatric treatment bills. An informal hearing proved useless and so the Respondent requested a formal hearing. A notice of formal hearing issued on April 17, 1990 followed by a new notice on May 21, 1990 for a hearing on June 12, 1990.
On or about February 20, 1990, the Respondent addressed a letter to the Complainant dated February 20, 1990 reading as follows:
"RE; Letter of Protection
Dear Dr. Goldstein:
In consideration of your agreement to continue caring for Miller Vinyard, please rest assured that your fees for services rendered will be paid from Mr. Vinyard's Specific Agreement.
My best guess is that said agreement will be reached within the next twelve months.
Very truly yours,
Anthony O. Famiglietti"
The Respondent ultimately settled Vinyard's workers' compensation case and disbursed the proceeds to Vinyard. Neither before settling Vinyard's case nor after, did the Respondent inquire of the Complainant what his outstanding bill was for treatment of Vinyard. The Respondent disbursed the funds to Vinyard and maintained nothing in escrow to protect the Complainant's bill.
In his answer to the grievance complaint, the Respondent stated in part the following: "The letter dated February 20, 1990 was not a letter of protection, at least not in the usual sense. As I have explained to Dr. Goldstein and his several attorneys on prior occasions, it was written because Mr. Vinyard wanted to have Dr. Goldstein continue to treat him. It was sort of a way to get Dr. Goldstein to keep him on as a patient.... And although I was trying to get it paid by the carrier, I had no authority to pay it or promise that it would be paid out of the comp (sic) money until it was approved."
This reviewing committee concludes that there exists clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Respondent's February 20, 1990 letter was clearly authored by the Respondent to induce the Complainant to continue providing psychiatric care to the Respondent's client. The Respondent admitted in his answer that he did not have the authority to promise to protect the Complainant's fee and that his letter was an attempt to have the Complainant continue to treat his client. His failure to contact the Complainant either before or after settling his client's case evidences what he has admitted in his answer, that he did not intend to protect the Complainant's fees. It is our opinion, therefore, that there is clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the misrepresentation provision of Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. It is our recommendation that the Respondent be reprimanded by the Statewide Grievance Committee.
Attorney Anne R. Hoyt
Attorney Kerry A. Tarpey