Rosemary A. Gurn v. Althea S. Dinan

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

Rosemary A. Gurn, Complainant vs. Althea S. Dinan, Respondent

Grievance Complaint #95-0501

PROPOSED DECISION

Pursuant to Practice Book '27J, the undersigned, duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 95 Washington Street, Hartford, Connecticut on August 8, 1996. The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on December 15, 1995, and the probable cause determination rendered by a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee on May 16, 1996, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.4(b) and 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The probable cause determination rendered by the reviewing committee was contrary to the determination of no probable cause filed by the Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel on April 3, 1996.

Notice of the hearing was mailed to the Complainant and to the Respondent on July 9, 1996. The Complainant appeared and gave testimony. The Respondent, represented by counsel, also appeared and gave testimony. This reviewing committee also heard the testimony of James Gurn on behalf of the Complainant. Exhibits were received into evidence.

This reviewing committee finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

On or about August 17, 1994, the Complainant retained the Respondent to represent her in a divorce. In connection with her representation, the Respondent met with the Complainant on occasion and communicated with her by telephone. In or about February, 1995, the Complainant received from the Respondent an itemized bill for services rendered by the Respondent in connection with her divorce. The bill reflected that on September 26, 1994, the Complainant met with the Respondent for one hour. The bill also reflected that on that same date, the Respondent made two telephone calls on the Complainant's behalf. The Complainant was charged separately for her one hour office conference with the Respondent and each of the two telephone calls. The Respondent made the telephone calls during the course of her conference with the Complainant.

The Complainant and her husband had agreed to most of the terms of their dissolution on their own and the matter was essentially concluded by way of a court hearing on October 24, 1995. Prior to the October 24, 1995 court hearing, the Respondent received from the attorney for the husband of the Complainant a settlement agreement which the Respondent brought to court with her on the morning of October 24, 1995. Although the matter was scheduled for 10:00 a.m., and the Complainant, her husband, and her husband's attorney were present at that time, the Respondent did not arrive at the courthouse until at least 11:00 a.m. Immediately prior to the hearing, the Respondent hurriedly reviewed the twenty-six page separation agreement with her client. This was the first time the Complainant had seen the separation agreement or reviewed it with the Respondent.

This reviewing committee also considered the following testimony:

The Respondent testified that her bills to the Complainant did not reflect all the time she spent on the Complainant's case. The Respondent contended that the Complainant was not billed for all the time the Respondent spent on her case. The Respondent also testified that it was her opinion that a separation agreement was not required in the case. She testified that the Complainant desired to have one and she, therefore, agreed to review the agreement prepared by the attorney for the Complainant's husband. The Respondent further testified that she did not receive the final version of the separation agreement until the evening before the October 24, 1995 court date.

It is the opinion of this reviewing committee that there exists clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has violated Rules 1.4(b) and 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Although the Respondent did not believe that a separation agreement was necessary in the case of her client, the Respondent had an obligation to review the separation agreement with her client in a timely fashion. The morning that a hearing to finalize a divorce is scheduled is not an appropriate time to review with a client for the very first time the details of a lengthy separation agreement. It was unreasonable for the Respondent to expect that the Complainant could absorb and understand each of the written provisions of a separation agreement of approximately twenty-six pages in length on the day her divorce was to be finalized. It is the opinion of this reviewing committee that there exists clear and convincing evidence, therefore, that the Respondent did not provide the Complainant with reasonable communication regarding the details of her divorce in violation of Rule 1.4(b). It is also the opinion of this reviewing committee that there exists clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by billing the Complainant twice for the same services. It is our opinion that it was unreasonable for the Respondent to bill the Complainant for telephone calls that the Respondent made in the Complainant's presence while billing the Complainant for meeting at the same time. While the Respondent may have not charged the Complainant for other services or time expended on her behalf, that is no excuse for overbilling the Complainant for other services rendered. It is the recommendation of this reviewing committee that the Respondent be reprimanded by the Statewide Grievance Committee.

_______________________________

Attorney Anne R. Hoyt

_______________________________

Attorney Robert J. Kor

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Ms. Carol E. Johnson-Springmeyer