STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
Jocelyn Minto, Complainant vs. Hyacinth V. Douglas-Bailey, Respondent
Grievance Complaint #01-0251
DECISION
Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35, the duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee comprised of Attorney Robert Kor, Attorney Kathryn Webster-O’Keefe and Reverend Meredith Payton conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 300 Grand Street, Waterbury, Connecticut on March 5, 2002. The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on September 20, 2001 and the probable cause determination filed by the Hartford Judicial District for Geographical Area 12 and the towns of Avon, Bloomfield, Canton, Farmington, West Hartford and Tolland Grievance Panel on November 21, 2001, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice Book §2-32(a)(1).
A hearing previously scheduled for February 5, 2002 was continued at the request of the Complainant. Notice of the March 5, 2002 hearing was mailed to the Complainant and to the Respondent on January 16, 2002. The Complainant appeared at the hearing and testified. Yale Law School student intern Richard Casper and Attorneys Barbara Cantrell and Dennis Curtis of the Yale Lawyering Ethics Project represented the Complainant. The Respondent did not appear at the hearing. After the hearing, the reviewing committee filed a contemplated probable cause finding dated March 22, 2002, advising the Respondent that it was contemplating issuing additional findings of probable cause. In its correspondence, the reviewing committee advised the Respondent that she had fourteen days in which to respond to the contemplated probable cause finding in writing, or to request a hearing on the matter. The Respondent did not reply to the reviewing committee’s letter and, on July 31, 2003, the reviewing committee found probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.7 and 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. These findings were in addition to the grievance panel’s probable cause findings.
Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35, the undersigned duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee conducted a hearing at the Superior Court, 1061 Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut on February 8, 2006. The hearing addressed the record of the complaint filed on September 20, 2001, the probable cause determination filed by the Hartford Judicial District for Geographical Area 12 and the towns of Avon, Bloomfield, Canton, Farmington, West Hartford and Tolland Grievance Panel on November 21, 2001, and the reviewing committee’s probable cause finding filed on July 31, 2003.
Notice of the February 8. 2006 hearing was mailed to the Complainant and to the Respondent on January 5, 2006. Neither the Complainant nor the Respondent appeared at the hearing. Attorneys Barbara Cantrell and Dennis Curtis of the Yale Lawyering Ethics Project represented the Complainant.
This reviewing committee finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
The Complainant’s father, Urel G. Lawrence, died on June 21, 1996. At the time of his death, Mr. Lawrence was married to Claire Lawrence. The couple resided in a home located on Homestead Avenue in Hartford, Connecticut (hereinafter referred to as the “Hartford property”). Mr. Lawrence’s other children were Lenora, Gwendolyn, Cynthia, Carol Ann, Urel Jr., Mary, and Richard and step-daughter, Jacinth Palmer. Mr. Lawrence’s will was prepared by the Respondent and executed by Mr. Lawrence on or about September 5, 1991. The will named the Complainant and Mrs. Lawrence as co-executors. Mr. Lawrence’s will provided that Mrs. Lawrence would inherit his home located in Miami, Florida and his other tangible personal property. Mr. Lawrence left his children, with the exception of Richard and Jacinth, the Hartford property. The Hartford property was heavily mortgaged at the time of Mr. Lawrence’s death, however, Mr. Lawrence held a mortgage life insurance policy that paid off the mortgage debt upon his death.
Mrs. Lawrence retained the Respondent to represent the Lawrence Estate in June of 1996 and the estate paid her $1000. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lawrence’s will was read to the heirs. At that time, the Respondent advised the heirs that Mr. Lawrence’s estate owed Mrs. Lawrence $50,000. The Respondent told the heirs that the Hartford, Connecticut property would be sold and $50,000 of the proceeds would be given to Mrs. Lawrence. The Complainant recognized that the Respondent was acting in a manner that favored Mrs. Lawrence’s interests rather than the interests of the Lawrence Estate and, as a result, she retained Attorney Wendella Battey to represent her interests and the interests of her siblings on or about August 16, 1996. The decedent’s children advised the Respondent that they objected to Mrs. Lawrence receiving $50,000 from the sale proceeds. Unbeknownst to the Complainant, the Respondent filed a claim against the Lawrence Estate with the probate court on behalf of Mrs. Lawrence.
On August 16, 1996, Attorney Battey wrote to the Respondent advising her that the Complainant had retained her services and requesting that the Respondent contact her to discuss the probate of the Lawrence Estate. The Respondent did not answer Attorney Batty’s letter nor did she communicate with Attorney Batty at anytime thereafter. Due to Attorney Batty’s inability to make progress with the Respondent, she suggested to the Complainant that she may be wasting her money on fees paid to Attorney Batty since the Respondent refused to cooperate with her in any way. Accordingly, the Complainant ceased using Attorney Batty’s services.
The closing on the Hartford property was completed on June 18, 1999. The proceeds from the sale totaled $53,287.76. Thereafter, the Respondent advised the Complainant that she had filed a claim against the estate with the probate court on behalf of Mrs. Lawrence in the amount of $50,000. Mrs. Lawrence claimed that in 1992, there was an outstanding mortgage debt on the Hartford property wherein she and the decedent were debtors. Mrs. Lawrence claimed that she loaned the decedent $50,000 in 1992 to avert a foreclosure. After 1992, the decedent took additional mortgages against the Hartford Property. Notwithstanding the fact that the funds disbursement was clearly disputed, the Respondent failed to place the funds from the closing in an escrow account. In addition, although the funds belonged to the Lawrence Estate, they were not placed in a separate, interest bearing account. The Respondent did not disburse the proceeds of the sale of the Hartford property to the heirs until May of 2001.
In a letter dated July 8, 1999, the Complainant wrote a letter to the probate judge stating the heirs’ objection to Mrs. Lawrence’s claim. The letter also advised the court that the Complainant had asked the Respondent for an itemized bill for attorney’s fees and that the Respondent had refused to provide one. In addition, the Complainant complained that the Respondent provided conflicting information to the heirs. On November 5, 1999, a hearing was held before the probate court on the issue of Mrs. Lawrence’s claim for $50,000. On January 26, 2000, the probate court issued its ruling on the issue of Mrs. Lawrence’s $50,000 claim. In its decision, the court concluded that Mrs. Lawrence was unable to substantiate her claim of a promise to pay and that the evidence did not “support a conclusion that the decedent made a binding promise to repay the funds in question”. Accordingly, the court denied Mrs. Lawrence’s claim. Thereafter, with the issue of Mrs. Lawrence’s claim resolved, the probate should have been closed.
The Complainant repeatedly telephoned the Respondent’s office requesting that she complete the final accounting and that she provide her with a copy of the accounting. The Respondent did not comply. The Complainant later learned from the court that the preliminary accounting submitted by the Respondent did not accurately represent the funds that ought to have been in the estate. When the Complainant questioned the missing funds, she was advised that Mrs. Lawrence had used the unaccounted for funds to “pay bills” without prior probate court approval. The Complainant could not understand how Mrs. Lawrence had accessed the funds since both she and the Complainant were necessary signatories on the estate account. Upon investigation, the Complainant discovered that a new signature card had been filed and the signatories were changed to the Respondent and Mrs. Lawrence. Accordingly, on May 3, 2000, the Complainant wrote to the probate court requesting its assistance. The Complainant advised the court that the preliminary accounting submitted to the court by the Respondent was not accurate and that Mrs. Lawrence had used the unaccounted for funds to “pay bills”. The Complainant advised the court that she and Mrs. Lawrence were originally signatories on the estate account and that, unbeknownst to her, the signatories were changed to the Respondent and Mrs. Lawrence. On August 15, 2000, the Complainant again wrote to the probate court asking for its assistance with obtaining the final accounting from the Respondent.
In August of 2000, the Respondent submitted the final accounting, a list of creditors and an inventory for the Lawrence Estate. Under cover of a letter dated August 31, 2000, the probate court returned the documents to the Respondent and advised her that the following errors were made: the final accounting was done on the wrong form; the accounting contained numerous errors; required forms were missing altogether; the disbursement sheet was incomplete; and the expenses claimed needed to be itemized with specificity. By October of 2000 the corrections had not been made and resubmitted to the court and, as a result, the Complainant again sought the probate court’s assistance. Sometime thereafter, the Respondent submitted a revised accounting. On November 8, 2000, the Complainant notified the court that disbursements claimed from the Lawrence Estate on the Respondent’s revised accounting were fraudulent in that the medical expenses and funeral expenses claimed were already paid by Mr. Lawrence’s various insurance policies. As a result, the Probate Court returned the accounting to the Respondent to be corrected.
The Complainant filed the instant grievance complaint on September 20, 2001. The Respondent did not answer the grievance complaint. The Lawrence Estate was finally settled on February 16, 2002.
This reviewing committee also considered the following:
The Complainant testified that she had to assume much of the responsibility for moving her father’s estate through the probate process. This required her to repeatedly take time from work to attend hearings, research the probate file and track down the Respondent. The Complainant explained that the Respondent was retained to probate the Lawrence Estate but in actuality, the Respondent repeatedly acted on the behalf of Mrs. Lawrence. The Complainant had to telephone, write and visit the Respondent in order to obtain even the smallest piece of information. The Complainant expressed her frustration with the lack of diligence demonstrated by the Respondent, particularly the amount of time it took her to settle the Lawrence Estate.
This reviewing committee finds the following violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Practice Book by clear and convincing evidence:
The record before this reviewing committee indicates that the Lawrence Estate involved a straightforward probate matter and should have been resolved in a rather short period of time. However, Mr. Lawrence passed away in 1996 and the probate was not completed until at least six years later. With the exception of the $50,000 claim against the Lawrence Estate made by Mrs. Lawrence, the undue delay was entirely the fault of the Respondent. The Respondent filed the probate documents with numerous errors, both mathematical and practical. The extent of these errors clearly evidenced a lack of knowledge of basic probate law. If the Respondent lacked the most basic understanding of probate law, as she clearly did, she should have rejected the representation of the Lawrence Estate. The errors made by the Respondent needed to be rectified, resulting in significant delays. Her ethical failures resulted in many errors and omissions and her conduct violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Complainant and Mrs. Lawrence as co-executrixes held an interest in, and had a fiduciary duty to, the Lawrence Estate. The Respondent was retained to assist the women in the furtherance of their duties. The Respondent was ethically bound to protect the interests of the Lawrence Estate, including protecting the heirs of that estate. When the Respondent took on Mrs. Lawrence’s claim against the estate, she was acting in direct contravention to the interests of the other heirs and the estate. This representation created a distinct conflict of interest and was in violation of Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In addition, during the representation, the Respondent failed to return the Complainant’s telephone calls, failed to answer the Complainant’s numerous letters and failed to answer the Complainant’s many questions regarding the status of the Lawrence Estate. Accordingly, the Complainant was unable to ascertain the status of the probate of the Lawrence Estate and was unable to make educated decisions regarding the estate matters and, therefore, unable to appropriately fill her role as co-executrix. The Respondent’s failure to communicate with the Complainant on a regular basis violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) of the of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Respondent violated Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to place the proceeds from the sale from the Hartford property in a separate, interest-bearing account until the dispute over the funds was resolved. The Respondent’s failure to respond to the grievance complaint, and her failure to offer an explanation for her failure to do so, constitutes a violation of Practice Book § 2-32(a)(1).
This reviewing committee concludes that the Respondent engaged in serious misconduct and, therefore, we order the Respondent be presented to the Superior Court for the imposition of whatever discipline the court deems appropriate.
DECISION DATE: 3/3/06
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Attorney Raymond B. Rubens
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Attorney Dominick J. Rutigliano
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Ms. Dahlia Johnston