SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to Connecticut’s all property equitable distribution scheme in distributing property as part of an action for dissolution, legal separation or annulment of marriage or civil union, effective October 1, 2005.

DEFINITIONS:

·         “It is black letter law that Connecticut is an equitable distribution property state . . . .” Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 662, 757 A.2d  1225 (2000) (emphasis added).

·          “At the time of entering an decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other.” Conn. Gen. Stat  § 46b-81(a) (2001) (emphasis added).

·         "This approach to property division is commonly referred to as an 'all-property' equitable distribution scheme." Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792, 663 A.2d 365 (1995) (emphasis added).

CASES:

·         Falkenstein v. Falkenstein, 84 Conn. App. 495, 504, 854 A.2d 749 (2004). “We would be remiss if we did not note that a dissolution of marriage action is an equitable proceeding and that the division of the marital estate is to be done equitably . . . . By claiming that the court abused its discretion in denying her the right to buy the marital home, the plaintiff has argued, in essence, that the court did not act equitably. In doing so, the plaintiff has overlooked the basis of the court's decision, i.e., the need to bring the dissolution litigation to an end.”

·         Ricciuti v. Ricciuti, 74 Conn. App. 120, 124, 810 A.2d 818, cert. den. 262 Conn. 946 (2002). "Here, the defendant began receiving a pension from the Department of Defense after his retirement in 1996. The pension accrued over twenty-two years, during nineteen of which the parties were married. The court, therefore, correctly determined that the defendant's pension was subject to distribution under § 46b-81."

·         Mongillo v. Mongillo, 69 Conn. App. 472, 481-482, 794 A.2d 1054 (2002). “In fashioning its orders for the disposition of property, the court is obligated to consider the statutory factors relating to the disposition of property in marital dissolution. See General Statutes § 46b-81. The statutory scheme setting forth the criteria for the court's exercise of discretion in making property awards provides no support for the plaintiff's argument that it was error for the court not to award the plaintiff a portion of the defendant's retirement benefits.”

·         Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 673, 757 A.2d 1225, cert. den. 255 Conn. 918. (2000).  “The court made extraordinary efforts to ensure that the valuation and the division of the marital property was within the bounds of our statutes, case law and constitution. We will not disturb the court's thoughtful analysis and conclusion, which falls well within the bounds of its broad discretion.”

·         Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 365, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998). "Recent decisions from this court have indeed empowered trial courts to deal broadly with property and its equitable division incident to dissolution proceedings."

·         Watson v. Watson, 221 Conn. 698, 607 A 2d. 383 (1992). “Trial court must be accorded discretion in fashioning equitable assignment of property. The power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.”

·         Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 235, 449 A.2d 151 (1982). "The division of property was structured in such a manner as to return to the defendant her contribution and that of her family. Payments for the defendant's counsel fees, medical bills, her out standing debts and any capital gains tax on the property were to be made from the proceeds resulting from the sale of the real estate. The defendant, in addition, is to receive significant sums of money and one-half the remainder of the net proceeds from the sale of the real estate."

The alimony awarded the defendant was not substantial in amount nor was it for a long period of time. When considered, in the context of other orders which required the plaintiff to pay for the full support, college education, and medical expenses of the five children of the marriage and to maintain insurance on his life for the benefit of the defendant, we cannot say the award is clearly erroneous."

·         Lane v. Lane, 187 Conn. 144, 444 A.2d 1377 (1982). “Differences inherent in particular family situations require that the court’s discretion be broad enough to make suitable orders upon dissolution of marriage to fit the circumstances.”

·         Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 740-741, 453 A.2d 1151 (1982). 'While the trial court must consider the delineated statutory criteria, no single criterion is preferred over the others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of each case."

·         Tsopanides v. Tsopanides, 181 Conn. 248, 435 A.2d 34 (1980). "The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether in a dissolution action the court may properly render a judgment ordering the conveyance of property to a party who has not filed a claim for such relief."

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce  

# 248. Disposition of Property

# 252.3.  —Particular property or interests and mode of allocation

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         27B C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§508  Disposition of Property

·         24 Am Jur 2d Divorce & Separation (1998).

Equitable Distribution [§§ 484-586]

In general (§§ 484-496]

§ 484. Generally

§ 485. Limitations on court's discretion

§ 487. Community property distinguished

§ 490. Alimony or maintenance distinquished

§ 491. Constitutionality of equitable distribution statutes

·         Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 ALR4th 481 (1985).

II. General aspects of equitable distribution

§ 3. Marriage viewed as partnership or shared enterprise

§ 4. Goal is final separation of parties

§ 5. Extent of application of equitable distribution doctrine

[a] View that doctrine is generally available

III. Meaning of “Equitable, “ “Just,” or “Fair”

V. Relationship between property division and support award

§ 16. Equitableness of award requires consideration of all economic awards

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         2 Elizabeth Williams, Marital Property Law (rev. 2d ed. 2004)

Chapter 40. Equitable distribution doctrine

§ 40:01. General aspects of equitable distribution

§ 40:02. Meaning of "Equitable," "Just," or "Fair"

·         John DeWitt Gregory et al. Property Division in Divorce Proceedings: A Fifty State Guide (2003).

§ 2.08. All property distribution

·         3 Arnold H. Rutkin, Family Law and Practice (2005).

Chapter 37. Principles of property division

§ 37.01  Theories and Principles

[b] Equitable distribution: an overview

[i] Equitable distribution defined

[ii] Goals of equitable distribution

[iii] Validity of equitable distribution statutes

[v] "All property" regimes

·         Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (2d ed. 1994).

Chapters 1. Introduction to equitable distribution

§ 1.01   The Equitable Distribution Concept

§ 1.02   Equitable Distribution: History and Background

§ 1.03. Constitutionality

Chapter 2. Property Division Systems

§ 2.01. Introduction

§ 2.02. Goals of Property Division

§ 2.05. Community Property

§ 2.07. Equitable distribution: all property model

§ 2.09. All property versus dual classification: a comparison

·         1 Valuation and distribution of Marital property (2005).

§ 30.3. Statutory provisions governing property distribution in equitable states

[1]. —Statutes making all property subject to equitable distribution

LAW REVIEWS:

·         Judith I. Avner, Using The Connecticut Equal Rights Amendment At Divorce To Protect Homemaker’s Contributions To The Acquisition Of Marital Property, 4 Univ. of Bridgeport Law Review 265 (1983).

COMPILER:

Lawrence Cheeseman, Supervising Law Librarian, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457. (860) 343-6560.  EMAIL

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to what types of property are classified as property in Connecticut as part of an action for dissolution, legal separation or annulment of marriage or civil union, effective October 1, 2005.

DEFINITION:

·         Classification of marital property: “whether the resource is property within § 46b-81 to be equitably distributed . . . .” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 792-793, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

·         Marital property: “Nothing in the legislative history of § 46b-81 indicates an intent to narrow the plain meaning of ‘property’ from its ordinarily broad and comprehensive scope. Indeed, the term ‘property’ has been broadly defined elsewhere in the General Statutes. See General Statutes § 52-278 (for purposes of attachment, property is defined as ‘any present or future interest in real or personal property, goods, chattels or choses in action, whether such is vested or contingent.’

Interpreting the term property broadly is also consistent with the purpose of equitable distribution statutes generally.” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 795, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

·         Types of property interests:  “Neither § 46b-81 nor any other closely related statute defines property or identifies the types of property interests that are subject to equitable distribution in dissolution proceedings. Our prior cases interpreting § 46b-81 indicate, however, that in enacting § 46b-81, the legislature acted to expand the range of resources subject to the trial court's power of division, and did not intend that property should be given a narrow construction.” Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 515-516, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).

·         Property interest vs. expectancy: : “ . . . § 46b-81 applies only to presently existing property interests, not ‘mere expectancies.’” Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 797, 663 A.2d 365 (1995).

·         “Thus, Sunbury requires that in dissolution proceedings, the court must determine whether an asset was earned prior to or subsequent to the date of dissolution in order to determine whether the asset is marital property.” Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 521, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2005)

§ 46b-81(a). “At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other. The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.” [emphasis added].

·         2005 Conn. Acts 10 § 15 (eff. October 1, 2005). “. . . a civil union shall be included in such use or definition.”

CASES:

·         Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 386, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).“Pension benefits often are among the most valuable assets that parties possess when a marriage ends, and our courts have accordingly classified such benefits as property pursuant to § 46b-81 and divided them incident to a dissolution.”

·         Kiniry v. Kiniry, 71 Conn. App. 614, 624 (2002). “On the one hand, stock options that are awarded prior to the date of dissolution and awarded solely for past services are considered to be earned during the marriage and are, therefore, considered marital property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81 . . . . On the other hand, stock options that are earned prior to the date of dissolution, but that constitute compensation for future services, are not considered to be earned during the marriage and, therefore, are not subject to distribution as marital property under § 46b-81.”

·         Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 748, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). “[I]n determining whether a certain interest is property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81, we look to whether a party's expectation of a benefit attached to that interest was too speculative to constitute divisible marital property . . . . In cases in which an interest was so speculative as to constitute a mere expectancy, we concluded that it was not property subject to equitable distribution . . . whereas, in cases in which an interest was not so speculative as to constitute a mere expectancy, but rather a presently existing interest in property, we treated it as property subject to equitable distribution.”

·         Borneman v. Borneman, 245 Conn. 508, 517-518, 752 A.2d 978 (1998). “Despite the fact that the stock options at issue in this case had not yet "matured" or "vested" at the time of dissolution, the options created an enforceable right in the defendant.”

·         Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 168, 708 A.2d 949 (1998). “Consequently, we conclude that an advanced degree is properly classified as an expectancy rather than a presently existing property interest. It is not, therefore, subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution pursuant to § 46b-81.”

·         Krafick v. Krafick , 234 Conn. 783,793, 663 A.2d  365, (1995). “We first consider whether pension benefits should be classified as property pursuant to § 46b-81. We conclude that they should.”

·         Cooley v. Cooley, 32 Conn. App. 152, 162-163, 628 A.2d  608, cert. denied 228 Conn. 901, 634 A.2d .295 (1993). “The plaintiff had no vested right at any time to the trust corpus that would permit its inclusion in the marital estate.”

·         Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 232, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987). “We have concluded that the award to the defendant of a share of the plaintiff's expectancy cannot be sustained as a permissible transfer of property under 46b-81.”

·         Trubowitz v. Trubowitz , 5 Conn. App. 681, 687, 502 A.2d 940 (1985). “No statute requires a trial court to make an equal percentage division of all assets. There is often good reason to treat assets differently. Some assets, such as a business dependent upon the personal services of one party, or objects of art or personal furnishings, cannot be divided equally per item or in toto. One party or the other may have a particular interest in, or claim to, a particular asset, and a trial court is not hampered in making whatever distribution of them it chooses, as long as it does so in accordance with statutory guidelines.”

·         Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 365, 387 A.2d 548 (1978). “‘Expectancy’ is the bare hope of succession to the property of another, such as may be entertained by an heir apparent. Such a hope is inchoate. It has no attribute of property, and the interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent and may never exist.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce

           # 248. Disposition of property        

# 252. 3. ¾Particular property or interests and mode of allocation

ENCYCLOPEDIAS

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 477-606. Division of property by court

§§ 497-517. Property Subject to Distribution

§§ 518-547. Specific Types of Property

§§ 518-522. In general

§§ 523-526. Marital residence

§§ 527-531. Professional degrees, license, and practice

§§ 532-536. Pension rights; other benefit payments and awards

§§ 537-540. Government pensions

§§ 541-547. Other benefit payments and awards

·         27C C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§§ 508-610. Disposition of property

§ § 514-526. Property or interests subject to disposition

§§ 549-571. Specific kinds of property or interests

§§ 549-552. Homestead or marital residence

§§ 553-559. Retirement, pension, other employment-related benefits

§§ 560-571. Other kinds of property or interests

·         See Table 1 for ALR annotations

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 26. Assets subject to distribution

§ 26.1. In general

§ 26.2. Definition of property

§ 26.3. Identification of particular assets for distribution

§ 26.4. Realty

§ 26.5. Marital home

§ 26.7. Personal property and rights

§ 26.8. Financial interests

§ 26.9. Insurance annuities and other policy benefits

§ 26.10. Receivables

§ 26.11. Pension and retirement benefits and interests

§ 26.12. Other employment related benefits and assets

§ 26.13. Professional licenses and degrees

§ 26.14. Business interests and professional practices

§ 26.15. Gifts

§ 26.16. Inheritances, trusts and other estate interests

§ 26.17. Property acquired before the marriage

§ 26.18. Property acquired after dissolution action commenced

§ 26.19. Fraudulent transfers and property transferred while action is pending

§ 26.20. Debts and liabilities

§ 26.21. Tort and worker's compensation claims and other pending actions

·         John DeWitt Gregory et al. Property Division in Divorce Proceedings: A Fifty State Guide (2003).

Chapter 3. Recurrent classification issues

·         Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (2^nd ed. 1994).

Chapter 5. Classification

§ 5.01. Importance of classification

§ 5.02. Classification process

§ 5.03. Burden of proof

§ 5.06. Property

Chapter 6. Specific Property

§ 6.01. Introduction

§ 6.02. Future benefits plans: background and terminology

§ 6.04. Military retirement pay: federal law

§ 6.05. Other military service benefits: federal law

§ 6.06. Other federal government benefits: federal law

§ 6.07. Private future benefits plans: federal law

§ 6.11. Method for distributing retirement benefits

§ 6.15. Stock options and other restricted employment benefits

§ 6.19. Workers' compensation awards

§ 6.20. Degrees and licenses

§ 6.22. Professional practices and other businesses

§ 6.23. Intellectual property

§ 6.24. Prizes and awards

§ 6.25. Marital home

§ 6.26. Insurance proceeds and policies

§ 6.27. Future inheritance and gifts

§ 6.29. Debts

·         3 Arnold H. Rutkin, Gen. Ed., Family Law and Practice (2005).

Chapter 36. Valuation of marital property

§ 36.03. Defining property

[1]. Professional degrees and licenses

[2]. Professional goodwill

[3]. Retirement benefits

Chapter 37. Principles of property distribution

§ 37.04. Classification of property

§ 37.07. The marital home

§ 37.08. Business interests

§ 37.09. Professional goodwill

§ 37.10. Increased earning capacity resulting from a professional license, graduate degree, or education

§ 37.11. Retirement benefits

§ 37.12. Federal government benefits

[1] Social security

[2] Military retirement

§ 37.13. Personal injury, workers' compensation, and other awards and claims

§ 37.14. Debts

Chapter 38. Guide to equitable distribution

§38.02. Step Number One: Property Subject to Distribution

·         2 & 3 John Tingley and Nicholas B. Svalina, Marital Property Law (rev. 2d ed. 2001).

Chapter 44. Spouses professional degree or license as marital property

Chapter 45. Pension or retirement benefits as subject to award or division

Chapter 46. Accrued vacation, holiday time, and sick leave as marital or separate property

Chapter 49. Appreciation in value of separate property during marriage without contribution by either spouse as separate or marital property

Chapter 50. Treatment of stock options for purposes of dividing marital property

·         1 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY (2005).

Chapter 18. Property subject to equitable distribution

·         2 Richard E. Crouch, Family Law Checklists (2001).

Chapter 8. Property division

Checklist 8-1. Sketch of law nationwide

Checklist 8-2. Divisible property types

Checklist 8-3. Identification of property as separate or marital

LAW REVIEWS:

• Judith I. Avner, Using The Connecticut Equal Rights Amendment At Divorce To Protect Homemaker’s Contributions To The Acquisition Of Marital Property, 4 Univ. of Bridgeport Law Review 265 (1983).

COMPILER:

Lawrence Cheeseman, Supervising Law Librarian, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457. (860) 343-6560. EMAIL

ALR Annotations:

Classification of Marital Property

Accounting practice

Michael J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Goodwill In Accounting Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of Marriage, 77 ALR4th 645 (1990).

Attorney's unliquidated contingent fee contracts

Charles W. Davis, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Attorney's Contingent Fee Contracts As Marital Property Subject To Distribution, 44 ALR5th 671 (1996).

Degree or License

William M. Howard, Annotation, Spouse’s Professional Degree Or License As Marital Property For Purposes Of Alimony, Support, Or Property Settlement, 3 ALR6th 447 (2005).

Dental Practice

Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Medical Or Dental Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of Marriage, 76 ALR4th 1025 (1990).

Intellectual Property

Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Copyright, Patent, Of Other Intellectual Property As Marital Property For Purposes Of Alimony, Support, Or Divorce Settlement, 80 ALR5th 487 (2000).

Law Practice

Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Goodwill In Law Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of Marriage, 79 ALR4th 171 (1990).

Medical Practice

Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Medical Or Dental Practice As Property Subject To Distribution On Dissolution Of Marriage, 76 ALR4th 1025 (1990).

Pension

Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Pension Or Retirement Benefits As Subject To Award Or Division By Court In Settlement Of Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 ALR3d 176 (1979).

Personal Injury Action

Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Spouse’s Cause Of Action For Negligent Personal Injury, Or Proceeds Therefrom, As Separate Or Community Property, 80 ALR5th 533 (2000).

Retirement benefits

Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Pension Or Retirement Benefits As Subject To Award Or Division By Court In Settlement Of Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 ALR3d 176 (1979).

Separate Property, Appreciation in value

Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Appreciation In Value Of Separate Property During Marriage Without Contribution By Either Spouse As Separate Or Community Property, 24 ALR4th 453 (1983).

Sick leave

Gavin L. Phillips, Annotation, Accrued Vacation, Holiday Time, And Sick Leave As Marital Or Separate Property, 78 ALR4th 1107 (1990).

Stock options

Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Treatment Of Stock Options For Purposes Of Dividing Marital Property,” 46 ALR4th 640 (1986).

Vacation (accrued)

Gavin L. Phillips, Annotation, Accrued Vacation, Holiday Time, And Sick Leave As Marital Or Separate Property, 78 ALR4th 1107 (1990).

Workmen’s compensation

Annotation, Divorce And Separation: Workmen’s Compensation Benefits As Marital Property Subject To Distribution,” 30 ALR5th 139 (1995).

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to valuation of property determined to be property assets relating to marriage or civil union in Connecticut, effective October 1, 2005.

SEE ALSO:

§ 4. Specific issues in property valuation

DEFINITIONS:

·         Fair market value: “the price that would probably result from fair negotiations between a willing seller and a willing buyer . . . .” Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 275 (1983).

·         “In assessing the value of the property taken, the trier arrives at his own conclusions by weighing the opinions of the appraisers, the claims of the parties, and his own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value, and then employs the most appropriate method of determining valuation. Esposito v. Commissioner of Transportation, 167 Conn. 439, 441, 356 A.2d 175; Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 345, 355 A.2d 307. The trial court has the right to accept so much of the testimony of the experts and the recognized appraisal methods which they employed as he finds applicable; his determination is reviewable only if he misapplies, overlooks, or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration which it was his duty to regard. Greenfield Development Co. v. Wood, 172 Conn. 446, 451, 374 A.2d 1084 (1977).

·         Date of valuation: “This court held that, under § 46b-81, the date of dissolution is the appropriate date on which to value the parties’ assets . . . .” Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 515-516, 752 A.2d 978 (1998).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81 (2005).

(c). “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

·         2005 Conn. Acts 10 § 15 (eff. October 1, 2005). “. . . a civil union shall be included in such use or definition.”

CHECKLISTS:

·         3 Arnold H. Rutkin, Gen. Ed., Family Law and Practice (2005).

Chapter 36. Valuation of Marital Property

§ 36.16. Valuation checklist

[1]. Marital assets

[2]. Liabilities

[a]. Debts

[b]. Liability for debts of third person

[3]. Documents

·         2 Richard E. Crouch, Family Law Checklists (2001).

Chapter 8. Property division

 Checklist 8-4. Valuation

CASES:

·         Bartels v. Bartels, 85 Conn. App. 772, 776, 858 A.2d 879 (2004). “In this case, the court stated that it had considered the provisions of §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 in determining the appropriate property and support awards. The memorandum of decision discloses that the court questioned the defendant's credibility, expressly stating that ‘[t]he differing values which the defendant provided on mortgage applications and on his financial affidavit for the Hawaii property, $250,000 and $350,000 versus $10,000, respectively, and for the Borrego Springs, California, property, $1.5 million versus $350,000, respectively, were not satisfactorily explained. The defendant failed to provide credible evidence as to the fair market value of either.’”

·         Sowinski v. Sowinski, 72 Conn. App. 25, 27, 804 A.2d 872 (2002). "On appeal, the defendant specifically challenges the court's finding with regard to the fair market value of the Copake property and requests that we reverse the court's financial orders. He points out that the parties disputed the value of the Copake property at trial despite the fact that they had stipulated to the value of the Salisbury property. The defendant argues that the court improperly admitted hearsay as to that issue and that the court relied on such hearsay, in the absence of any other competent evidence in support of its finding, when arriving at its valuation of the Copake property. We agree."

·         Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn. App. 791, 800, 769 A.2d 725 (2001). "Here, neither party provided the court with expert testimony as to the value of the home. As a result, the court was left with the claims of the parties and its general knowledge to establish the value of the home. According to the defendant, the value of the home was $285,000. The court, however, determined the value to be $270,000, a figure slightly less than the value proposed by the plaintiff, $271,750, which she derived from the mid range of a market analysis. Given the circumstances the court faced in determining the value of the marital home, we cannot conclude that its valuation of $270,000 was clearly erroneous."

·         Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 760, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). “We conclude that it is within the trial court's discretion, as it is in the context of vested pension benefits . . . to choose, on a case-by-case basis, among the present value method, the present division method of deferred distribution, and any other valuation method that it deems appropriate in accordance with Connecticut law . . . . “

·         Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 531, 752 A.2d 978 (1998). “The court need not, however, assign specific values to the parties' assets.”

·         Carlos v. Carlos, 19 Conn. App. 416, 419, 562 A.2d 580 (1989). “More important than any speculation about how the trial court might have arrived at the amount of the encumbrances is the fact that the parties had never agreed on these figures. We read the memorandum of decision as stating that the parties stipulated to facts including the total amount of the encumbrances. For that reason, we are constrained to find that the underpinning of the decision is not sound even though the award may be fair.”

·         Cuneo v. Cuneo, 12 Conn. App. 702, 709, 533 A.2d 1226 (1987). “That requirement is simply part of the broader principle that the financial awards in a marital dissolution case should be based on the parties' current financial circumstances to the extent reasonably possible.”

·         Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 274-275, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). “We have approved the capitalization of actual income as an appropriate method of valuation . . . . In the present case the defendant's company was, at the time of its valuation in 1980, a going concern. There was no evidence that it was in the process of liquidation. Although the trier was not obliged to accept the income approach he was not precluded from doing so merely because the company is a closely held, ‘one-man’ business.”

·         Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 529-530, 429 A.2d 964 (1980). “The defendant first contends that the court could not properly decide the questions of periodic alimony and the assignment of property because it lacked sufficient information respecting the value of the plaintiff's interest in a closely held corporation, in his life insurance policies and in his pension rights. This position is curious. In addition to having access to the plaintiff's financial affidavit, the defendant was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff at length regarding his financial circumstances. Further, the defendant had the opportunity to explore the plaintiff's financial circumstances through a variety of discovery procedures. Optimal use of the resources might well have generated additional pertinent facts for the court's consideration. From the defendant's failure to elicit such information, however, it in no way follows that the court acted on insufficient evidence. Reviewing the record in this regard, we find that there was sufficient financial information before the court for it to fashion the appropriate orders on the financial aspects of the case.”

WEST KEY NUMBERS:

·         Divorce

# 248. Disposition of property

# 253. —Proceedings for division or assignment

# 253(3). Valuation of assets

ENCYCLOPEDIAS:

·         24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998).

§§ 574-586 Valuation

§§ 574-579. In general

§ 575. Time of valuation

§ 576. Change in value after time of valuation

§ 577. Effect of dissipation of marital assets

§ 578. —Preventing dissipation

§ 579. Use and costs of experts to assist evaluation

§§ 580-586. Specific types of property

·         27B C.J.S. Divorce (1986).

§ 544. Valuation in general

§ 545. Time of valuation

§ 546. Expert evidence; appraisals

·         Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Necessity That Divorce Court Value Property Before Distributing It, 51 ALR4th 11 (1987).

TEXTS & TREATISES:

·         7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999).

Chapter 27. Valuation of assets

§ 27.1. In general

§ 27.2. Date of valuation

§ 27.3. Valuation methods and criteria

§ 27.4. Book value

§ 27.5. Assessed value

§ 27.6. Sale price or purchase offer

§ 27.7. Appraisal

§ 27.8. Business type and history

§ 27.9. General economic conditions

§ 27.10. Earning capacity

§ 27.11. Size of holding

§ 27.12. Goodwill and intangible values

§ 27.13. Buy-sell agreements

§ 27.14. Other factors

·         2 Family Law Practice in Connecticut (1996).

Chapter 12. QDROs and other Considerations for Retirement Plan Assets (by Elizabeth Lorion McMahon).

Chapter 13. Valuation of assets (by Lorraine D. Eckert)

I. The Need for valuation

II. How to value the asset

A. Valuation from inference, admission, owner’s testimony

B. Expert testimony

C. How does the court determine value

D. Evidence: estimated versus speculative

E. Taxation

·         John DeWitt Gregory et al. Property Division in Divorce Proceedings: A Fifty State Guide (2003).

Chapter 4. Valuation of assets—General principles

·         Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (2^nd ed. 1994 with 2004 supp.). 

Chapter 7. Valuation of Assets

§ 7.01. Need to value

§ 7.02. Date of valuation

§ 7.03. General rule: fair market value

§ 7.04. Determining value: rules for the Court

§ 7.05. Determining value: Advise for the parties

·         Ronald L. Brown, ed. Valuing Professional Practices and Licenses, A guide for the Matrimonial Practitioner  (3rd ed. 2004).

Part A: Basic concepts in valuing professional practices

Part B: Valuing law practices

Part C: Valuing medical practices

Part D: Valuing accounting practices

Part E: Valuing architectural and engineering practice

Part F: Valuing professional degrees and licenses

Part G: Merger and double counting

Part H: Handling celebrity cases

Part I: Miscellaneous topics

·         3 Arnold H. Rutkin, Gen. Ed., Family Law and Practice (2005).

Chapter 36. Valuation of Marital Property

§ 36.02. The valuation process—an overview

§ 36.06. The date of valuation

§ 36.07. Discovery

§ 36.09. Valuation expert

·         2 & 3 John Tingley and Nicholas B. Svalina, Marital Property Law (rev. 2d ed. 1995).

Chapter 41   Necessity that divorce value property before distributing it

Chapter 47. Method of valuation of life insurance policies in connection with trial court’s division of property

Chapter 51. Valuation of stock options for purposes of divorce court’s property division

·         2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY (2005).

Chapter 21. Discovery of identity and value of marital property and use of experts

Chapter 24. The use of estate planning precedents to evaluate marital property

Chapter 29. Use of appraisers in the valuation of marital property

Chapter 30. Use of home economist in valuation of marital property

·         2 Richard E. Crouch, Family Law Checklists (2001).

Chapter 8. Property division

 Checklist 8-4. Valuation

·         Barth H. Goldberg, Valuation of Divorce Assets (1984).

Chapter 1. Valuation process—Generally

Chapter 2. Experts and the use of them

Chapter 3. Understanding accounting protocol

Chapter 4. Use of financial statements

Chapter 5. Financial statement analysis

LAW REVIEWS:

• Judith I. Avner, Using The Connecticut Equal Rights Amendment At Divorce To Protect Homemaker’s Contributions To The Acquisition Of Marital Property, 4 Univ. of Bridgeport Law Review 265 (1983).

COMPILER:

Lawrence Cheeseman, Supervising Law Librarian, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457. (860) 343-6560. EMAIL

SCOPE:

Bibliographic resources relating to the valuation of specific types of assets including pensions, professional licenses, degrees, and QDROs. 

DEFINITIONS:

·         Goodwill: “It can hardly be doubted that the increment of value, loosely termed goodwill, that arises from the established reputation of a business for the quality of its goods or services may often be found to enhance the value of professional as well as other enterprises by increasing their ability to attract patrons.” Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 813, 591 A.2d 411 (1991).

STATUTES:

·         Conn. Gen. Stat. (2005)

§ 46b-81. Assignment of property and transfer of title

·         2005 Conn. Acts 10 § 15 (eff. October 1, 2005). “. . . a civil union shall be included in such use or definition.”

·         42 USC (1998)

§ 407 (a). Assignment; amendment of section.

CHECKLISTS:

·         3 Arnold H. Rutkin, Gen. Ed., Family Law and Practice (2005).

Chapter 36. Valuation of Marital Property

§ 36.16. Valuation checklist

[1]. Marital assets

[2]. Liabilities

[a]. Debts

[b]. Liability for debts of third person

[3]. Documents

·         2 Richard E. Crouch, Family Law Checklists (2001).

Chapter 8. Property division

 Checklist 8-4. Valuation

CASES:

·         Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn. App. 378, 387, 844 A.2d 250 (2004). “In accordance with that discretion, the court is free to fashion its financial orders either to assign interests in the parties' pensions or, as it did here, to order that the pensions remain with the respective parties. We conclude that the court was not obligated to divide equally, or in any manner, the portion of the parties' pensions that accrued during the term of the marriage.”

·         Kiniry v. Kiniry, 71 Conn. App. 614, 624 (2002). “On the one hand, stock options that are awarded prior to the date of dissolution and awarded solely for past services are considered to be earned during the marriage and are, therefore, considered marital property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81 . . . . On the other hand, stock options that are earned prior to the date of dissolution, but that constitute compensation for future services, are not considered to be earned during the marriage and, therefore, are not subject to distribution as marital property under § 46b-81.”

·         Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 814, 591 A.2d 411 (1991). “We reject the notion that professional goodwill may be evaluated without consideration of the salability of the practice and the existence of a market for its purchase.”

·         Sunbury v. Sunbury, 13 Conn. App. 651, 659-660, 538 A.2d 1082 (1988). “With regard to the valuation of the marital residence, we hold that the trial court's finding was solidly based on the evidence produced at trial. The defendant testified that the fair market value of the home was $75,000. The court was entitled to accept this testimony, especially in light of the fact that the only evidence produced by the plaintiff as to the value of the home was the testimony of an expert who did not know how many rooms the house had.”

·         Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 799, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). “We next must determine how vested pension benefits should be valued and distributed. The task of properly valuing pension benefits is complex because such benefits may be defeasible by the death of the employee spouse before retirement and the amount of benefits ultimately received depends upon a number of factors that remain uncertain until actual retirement. Therefore, a trial court, in valuing the parties' assets upon dissolu