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State v. Peluso

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BERNARD J. PELUSO
(SC 20303)

McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.*

Syllabus

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child in connection with the alleged sexual abuse of the minor victim, the defendant appealed. The sexual abuse allegedly occurred when the defendant was living in the same condominium complex as the victim and her family. The original information and the long form substitute information, the latter of which was filed three weeks before the start of evidence, both alleged that the abuse occurred in 2010 or 2011, when the victim was in the fifth grade, which was consistent with the victim's sworn statement to the police. At trial, however, the victim testified that the alleged abuse occurred in 2008 or 2009, when she was in the third grade. Thereafter, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the alleged offenses could not have occurred in the time frame alleged in the long form information because the defendant did not live in the condominium complex at that time. In response, the state moved to amend its information to allege that the incidents of abuse had occurred in 2008 or 2009, consistent with the victim's testimony. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the state had failed to show good cause for the late amendment, as required by the applicable rule of practice (§ 36-18), insofar as the prosecutor admitted to the court that the state had become aware two to four weeks before the start of trial, when preparing the victim for her court appearance, that the time frame alleged in the information was inaccurate and that the alleged incidents of abuse could not have occurred in 2010 or 2011. Defense counsel also argued that the defendant would be prejudiced by the late amendment because the defendant's entire defense was based on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011. The trial court granted the state's motion to amend its information, determining that there was good cause for the late amendment, in part because of the victim's young age. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction,

* This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller. Although Justice Kahn was not present at oral argument, she has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision.

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concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it found that good cause existed to permit the state to amend its information after the start of trial and that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the late amendment. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. *Held* that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in permitting the state to amend its information after the start of trial on the ground that good cause existed for the late amendment, and, accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed, and the case was remanded with direction to reverse the judgment of conviction and to remand for a new trial: although Connecticut courts routinely have allowed the state to amend its information in light of a minor victim's testimony at trial when the state could not have reasonably anticipated a change in the victim's testimony or when the state experienced some unforeseeable difficulty in limiting the time frame in question before trial, in the present case, the state became aware, two to four weeks prior to trial, that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate or incomplete, the state knew, prior to the start of trial, that the defendant did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011, and, therefore, that the abuse must have occurred before 2009, when the defendant moved out of the condominium complex, and the state failed to act on that knowledge; moreover, although the victim's trial testimony that the abuse occurred when she was in the third grade may have alleged a narrower time frame than the state anticipated prior to trial, this additional degree of specificity did not obviate the state's duty to amend its information before trial to provide the defendant with the more accurate information in its possession, and the focus on the victim's young age and the general deficiencies in the testimony of minor victims regarding dates distracted from the central question of whether the state had good cause to amend its information after the start of trial, even though it first became aware weeks before the defendant's trial that the time frame alleged in the information was inaccurate; furthermore, although the timing of the alleged abuse was not a material ingredient of the charged offenses and the defendant did not assert an alibi defense, the defendant was prejudiced by the late amendment to the information because that timing was a material factor in the defendant's theory of defense, as a review of the record, including defense counsel's cross-examination of various witnesses and his focus on the victim's conflicting accounts of the timing of the alleged abuse, confirmed that the defendant's defense was predicated on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011 and that it was impossible for him to have been there at that time, the amendment to the information effectively precluded him from asserting that defense, and the record suggested that the defendant would likely have presented a different defense if the amendment to the information had been made prior to trial.

Argued March 29—officially released August 18, 2022**

** August 18, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

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Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, and with three counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the jury before *K. Murphy, J.*; thereafter, the state filed an amended information; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed; subsequently, the Appellate Court, *DiPentima, C. J.*, and *Sheldon and Bear, Js.*, affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. *Reversed; new trial.*

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom was *Megan L. Wade*, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were *Maureen Platt*, state's attorney, and *Amy Sedensky*, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

McDONALD, J. We consider in this certified appeal whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to amend its information after the commencement of trial when the state was aware, between two to four weeks prior to the start of trial, that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate.¹ The

¹ We emphasize, at the onset, that the issue presented in this case, whether the trial court properly permitted the state to amend its information after the commencement of trial, is different from the issue of whether the state was *required* to amend its information or, alternatively, whether it could have gone to judgment on its original information alleging an inaccurate time frame. The state did not argue, at trial or on appeal, that it was not required to amend its information. Accordingly, we confine our analysis to the precise question posed in this appeal, namely, whether the trial court properly permitted the state to amend its information after the commencement of trial.

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defendant, Bernard J. Peluso, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts each of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, and of three counts of risk of injury to a child. See *State v. Peluso*, 187 Conn. App. 498, 500–501, 511, 202 A.3d 1085 (2019). On appeal to this court, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the state had demonstrated good cause to amend its information during trial and that the defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced by the late amendment. See *id.*, 501. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and order a new trial.

The Appellate Court's opinion, as supplemented by the record, sets forth the facts and procedural history; see *id.*, 501–505; which we summarize in relevant part. In 2008 and 2009, when the victim, S,² was in third grade, she lived in a condominium complex with her mother, her older sister, L, and her older brother. At that time, the defendant was living with his girlfriend in the same condominium complex. S and L spent a lot of time with the defendant during that time period; approximately three to five times per week, S and L would go to the defendant's condominium after school. The defendant was “like an uncle” to S and L, and he called them his nieces. Generally, the defendant's

² In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained.

Moreover, in accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

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girlfriend was not home during the times he spent with S and L after school. On certain occasions, S spent time alone with the defendant. It was during these times, in particular, that the defendant began making sexually suggestive comments to S. Soon thereafter, he allegedly began sexually assaulting her.

In connection with three separate incidents of alleged abuse that occurred “[o]n or about . . . 2010–2011”; see *id.*, 502 and n.3 (describing those three incidents and other uncharged misconduct); the defendant was arrested and charged on January 14, 2015, with one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child. In April, 2016, more than fifteen months after the defendant was originally charged and during the first day of jury selection, the state filed a long form substitute information, in which it charged the defendant with two counts each of sexual assault in the first degree and sexual assault in the fourth degree, and with three counts of risk of injury to a child, but continued to allege that the incidents occurred “on or about a date during the year 2010 or 2011”³ The long form information was filed while the prosecutor was in court and in the presence of defense counsel. At trial, approximately three weeks later, however, during her direct examination, S acknowledged that she had been prepared for her courtroom appearance by the prosecutor “a few weeks” beforehand and testified that the incidents had occurred when she was in third grade, in 2008 or 2009.

On cross-examination, defense counsel inquired regarding the inconsistency in the time frames. Specifically, defense counsel confirmed that, in her sworn statement to the police, taken in 2015, S alleged that the incidents

³ Although two of the seven counts in the long form information used language that was slightly different from the quoted language, these minor differences do not affect our analysis.

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occurred in 2010 or 2011, when she was in fifth grade. The following colloquy occurred:

“[Defense Counsel]: Was your memory better [in 2015] or was it better today?”

“[S]: Today.

“[Defense Counsel]: And it is better today because you testified that, two weeks before this trial, you start[ed] preparing with the state . . . is that correct?”

“[S]: Yes.

“[Defense Counsel]: And is it correct that you were told by either the assistant state’s attorney or an investigator that [the defendant] did not live in that [condominium] unit in the year[s] 2010 and 2011?”

“[S]: Yes.⁴

“[Defense Counsel]: And, when you were in fifth grade, ten years old . . . [although] you swore [in your statement to the police] that this is when [the incidents] occurred, that was impossible because [the defendant] didn’t live there. Isn’t that correct?”

“[S]: Yes.” (Footnote added.)

The next day, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the alleged offenses could not have occurred in 2010 or 2011, the time frame alleged in the state’s long form information filed at the beginning of jury selection approximately three weeks earlier, because the defendant did not live in the condominium complex at that time. The state, in turn, moved to amend its information to allege that the incidents had occurred in 2008 or 2009, consistent with S’s trial

⁴ Later in S’s testimony, defense counsel asked: “[W]ho told you that [the defendant and his girlfriend] didn’t live in that unit in the year[s] 2010 and 2011?” S responded, “I don’t know.” Later on, when asked directly whether her mother told her that the defendant did not live in the condominium complex in the years alleged in the information, S responded, “[y]es.”

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testimony. The court inquired: “[W]hen did the state become aware that the approximate date was not the year 2010 or [20]11?” The prosecutor responded: “When we met with [S] . . . two to four weeks ago. In discussing the facts of the case, she indicated to us, in our interview . . . that she couldn’t recall specifically when it was. My recollection of our conversation was that she indicated that it was sometime in grammar school, fifth grade or [earlier]. . . . So, she did not narrow it down for us, like she did in court yesterday, essentially left it with us that she thought it was fifth grade or earlier, that she was younger but not [in] middle school. And, when she was in court yesterday, we all know that she was quite specific and testified . . . that she was eight years old or in third grade.”

Defense counsel objected to the state’s motion to amend, arguing that the state failed to show good cause for the late amendment, as required by Practice Book § 36-18. Defense counsel contended that the state knew, two to four weeks before trial, when it prepared S for her court appearance, that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate and that the alleged incidents could not have occurred in 2010 or 2011. Defense counsel argued that the state had no justifiable reason for failing to properly amend its information before the commencement of trial. In addition, defense counsel argued that the defendant would be prejudiced by the late amendment insofar as his “entire defense was based on [the] fact that it was impossible for [the defendant] to be there [in 2010 or 2011],” as the defendant did not live in the condominium complex when the events allegedly occurred.

In response to defense counsel’s claim of prejudice, and without directly addressing the good cause aspect of defense counsel’s objection,⁵ the prosecutor argued

⁵The reference to good cause, in fact, was introduced by the trial court, not by the prosecutor. Following the state’s motion to amend, the trial court commented: “I do think it’s appropriate for the court to [permit the state

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that the defendant was not unduly prejudiced by the change in time frame, as S—in her police statement and subsequent testimony—consistently indicated that the offenses occurred when the defendant was living in the condominium complex. The prosecutor specifically noted: “[S] talk[ed] about [the defendant’s] couches, his pornography magazine, his desks, his bed when he clearly is living there. . . . She talked about how they cooked, how they watched TV. So, this is not an undue surprise to the defendant.”

Ultimately, the trial court granted the state’s motion to amend its information. In reaching its decision, the court considered the requirements set forth in Practice Book § 36-18. First, the court stated: “I will find good cause. This is a child sexual assault case. This does involve a very young child. The incident[s] occurred when [S] was eight or nine [years old] [T]here [are] [a] substantial amount of studies that indicate [that] children of those age[s] have no conception of dates and times. [S] was very clear that [the abuse] occurred with the defendant. And it’s very clear . . . that the defendant had access to [S] for a period of time, whether it was 2010 or 2008. So, you know, we’re [talking] basically of semantics.” Second, the court found that “there are no additional charges [in] . . . the [state’s amended information].” Finally, the court went on to discuss whether the defendant’s substantive rights would be prejudiced due to the state’s late amendment. The court explained: “I don’t believe it’s [the]

to amend its information]. I will say, having tried [child] sexual assault cases, it is fairly common that a child, [like] in this case, an eight or ten year old . . . [will] not disclose [the alleged abuse] for a number of years, [and it] is also not unusual to get [a] date wrong.” Only then, in response to defense counsel’s subsequent argument in opposition to the state’s motion to amend, did the prosecutor argue: “This is a child sexual assault case. *And, as the court indicated earlier*, these types of cases are such that the children, being so young, [delay] . . . their disclosure, [so] exact, precise dates and time[s] are difficult for them to recall.” (Emphasis added.)

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defense’s position that the defendant committed these acts two years earlier, so . . . their defense is . . . just that they were committed [on] a different date than the [long form] information [alleged].”⁶

In light of the newly amended information, the trial court offered to grant the defendant a continuance in order to prepare his defense. Because the case was “early in the game,” the court expressed that it was confident that it would have available jurors “[one] week from now, [or one] month from now.” Accordingly, the court indicated that it would provide the defendant “as long a continuance as . . . [was] need[ed] to prepare” Following a recess, defense counsel informed the court that the defendant would need a continuance. Defense counsel requested “at least five weeks.” The court responded: “To do what? No. No. No. Be specific here, [counsel]. We’re not taking a five week continuance unless—if you need a five week continuance, you’ll get it.” The court then asked defense counsel to be specific and explain what the defense would need to do during the continuance period. Once the court established that the continuance was needed to “do some records checking,” the court granted defense counsel a one week continuance. The court further stated: “[Y]ou can subpoena . . . any witness that you feel you need to examine, as well as anyone that’s already been called, you could examine again.”

Later that day, defense counsel informed the court: “I talked to [the defendant], Your Honor. If it works out better for Friday rather than next Tuesday to resume . . . we would be willing to come back Friday.” Thus, although the court was prepared to grant the defendant a one week continuance, defense counsel informed the

⁶ Although the trial court did not make any explicit findings regarding prejudice, it went on to permit the state to amend its information, which required a finding that the substantive rights of the defendant would not be prejudiced.

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court that, under the circumstances, the defense would be ready to resume three days later, on Friday, May 13, 2016.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court rendered judgment accordingly and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-two years of incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years, followed by fifteen years of probation.

The defendant appealed and claimed that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that the state had good cause to amend its information during trial and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment. *State v. Peluso*, supra, 187 Conn. App. 507. The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. *Id.*, 507, 511.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following two issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court properly hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the state had demonstrated ‘good cause’ to amend the information after the commencement of trial, as required by Practice Book § 36-18?” And (2) “[d]id the Appellate Court properly hold that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the state’s amendment to the information caused prejudice to his substantive rights, in violation of . . . § 36-18?” *State v. Peluso*, 331 Conn. 924, 924–95, 207 A.3d 518 (2019).⁷

The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the circumstances surrounding

⁷ Although the certified questions reference Practice Book § 38-18, both parties agree that the provision at issue in this case is Practice Book § 36-18. As a result, pursuant to our authority to modify certified questions, we reformulate the certified questions to accurately reflect the relevant provision in the rules of practice. See, e.g., *Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.*, 276 Conn. 168, 191–92, 884 A.2d 981 (2005).

the state's late amendment to its information satisfied the requirements set forth in Practice Book § 36-18. See *State v. Peluso*, supra, 187 Conn. App. 501. Specifically, the defendant contends that the state could not demonstrate that it had good cause to amend its information, particularly insofar as the state knew, two to four weeks before trial, that the time frame it alleged in its information was inaccurate. The defendant contends that he was prejudiced by the late amendment because his defense was predicated on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011, the time frame alleged in the information. In conjunction with this claim, the defendant also argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proving prejudice from the state to the defendant when the court requested that defense counsel explain the need for a five week continuance, as opposed to the one week continuance offered by the trial court.

The state contends that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing the state to amend its information. See *id.* With respect to the good cause requirement, the state argues that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that, in light of S's age and the length of time between when the alleged offenses occurred and the prosecution of the case took place, the state had good cause to amend its information during trial to conform to S's testimony. See *id.*, 508. In addition, the state claims that the defendant's substantive rights were not prejudiced by the late amendment because time was not an element of the offenses, and the defendant did not assert an alibi defense. The state also argues that the record supports the Appellate Court's conclusion that the defendant, regardless of the time frame alleged in the information, was on notice that the alleged abuse occurred when he lived at the condominium, before he moved out in February, 2009. See *id.*, 509. Finally, the

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state contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant a one week continuance, particularly in light of the fact that defense counsel could not justify why a five week continuance was warranted.

We begin our analysis with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. “Before the commencement of trial, a prosecutor has broad authority to amend an information under Practice Book § [36-17]. Once the trial has started, however, the prosecutor is constrained by the provisions of Practice Book § [36-18]. . . . For purposes of Practice Book § 36-18, a trial begins with the commencement of voir dire.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Ayala*, 324 Conn. 571, 585, 153 A.3d 588 (2017).

Practice Book § 36-18 provides in relevant part: “After commencement of the trial for good cause shown, the judicial authority may permit the prosecuting authority to amend the information at any time before a verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and no substantive rights of the defendant would be prejudiced. . . .” It is well settled that the state shoulders the burden of establishing that it has complied with the requirements of § 36-18 in seeking permission to amend the information. See, e.g., *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 585; see also, e.g., *State v. Tanzella*, 226 Conn. 601, 614, 628 A.2d 973 (1993). On appeal, our standard of review of the trial court’s decision to permit an amendment to the information is one of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., *State v. Ayala*, supra, 585.

Our case law has traditionally viewed Practice Book § 36-18 as containing three predicates, all of which the state must prove to obtain permission to amend the information after the start of trial: (1) good cause for the amendment, (2) that no additional or different offense is charged, and (3) that no substantive right of the

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defendant will be prejudiced by the late amendment. See, e.g., *id.*; *State v. Tanzella*, *supra*, 226 Conn. 614. These requirements serve two main purposes. First, they encourage the state to prepare its case carefully. See, e.g., *State v. Tanzella*, *supra*, 614–15. Second, the requirements ensure that the defendant has adequate notice of the charges against which he must defend. See, e.g., *id.*, 608. Accordingly, we have described § 36-18 not merely as a rule of procedure, but also as “a prophylactic rule designed to protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him with sufficient precision to enable him to meet them at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Ayala*, *supra*, 324 Conn. 586.

In this case, the defendant concedes that the state satisfied the second prong of the test—as no additional or different offense was charged—but he argues that the state failed to satisfy the first and third prongs of the test. Accordingly, we begin with the defendant’s claim that the state lacked good cause to amend the information. We agree with the defendant.

“To comply with the first prong of the test and meet its burden of showing good cause to amend an information pursuant to [Practice Book § 36-18], the state must provide more than a bare assertion that it is merely conforming the charge to the evidence. . . . The state must demonstrate *why* the information necessitated substitution.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Victor C.*, 145 Conn. App. 54, 65, 75 A.3d 48, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 933, 78 A.3d 859 (2013); see also, e.g., *State v. Jordan*, 132 Conn. App. 817, 825, 33 A.3d 307, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 909, 39 A.3d 1119 (2012).

The state argues that it had good cause to amend the information given the young age of S. It is true that our

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courts have long adhered to the principle that “[t]he testimony of minor victims . . . requires special consideration . . .” *State v. Enrique F.*, 146 Conn. App. 820, 824, 79 A.3d 140 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 903, 83 A.3d 350 (2014); cf. *In re Tayler F.*, 296 Conn. 524, 544–47, 995 A.2d 611 (2010) (creating special procedures for hearsay testimony of child witnesses pursuant to which trial court properly may conclude that child is unavailable if there is competent evidence that child will suffer psychological harm from testifying). This is because, “[i]n a case involving the sexual abuse of a very young child, that child’s capacity to recall specifics, and the state’s concomitant ability to provide exactitude in an information, are very limited.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Stephen J. R.*, 309 Conn. 586, 596, 72 A.3d 379 (2013). A careful review of our case law in this context reflects that, although our courts have “allowed the state to amend the time frame in [its] information in light of a minor victim’s testimony at trial”; *State v. Enrique F.*, supra, 824; they have consistently recognized that good cause exists only when some circumstance arises “that the state *could not have reasonably anticipated or safeguarded against before trial commenced.*” (Emphasis added.) *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 585–86. Accordingly, our courts have routinely allowed the state to amend its information in light of a minor victim’s testimony at trial when the state could not have reasonably anticipated a change in the victim’s testimony or when the state experienced some unforeseeable difficulty in obtaining a narrower time frame before trial.

The Appellate Court’s decision in *State v. Enrique F.*, supra, 146 Conn. App. 823–25, is instructive. In *Enrique F.*, when trial commenced, the state’s information alleged that the conduct that formed the basis of the risk of injury to a child charges had occurred “in or around January–June 2010” (Internal quotation

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marks omitted.) Id., 823. Three days into trial, the state moved to amend its information to allege that the conduct occurred “in or around August 2009–August 2010,” so that the information would conform to the victim’s testimony that the conduct occurred when she was in the seventh grade. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In support of its motion to amend, the state contended that the victim’s testimony “came in differently” than anticipated because it had expected that the victim would have been able to “narrow [the alleged conduct] down to a six month [time frame] and [was] unable to” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 825. Ultimately, the Appellate Court cited “the state’s *unexpected difficulty* in establishing a narrower time frame through the testimony of the minor victim” in determining that good cause existed to amend the information. (Emphasis added.) Id.

Similarly, in *State v. Wilson F.*, 77 Conn. App. 405, 823 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 905, 831 A.2d 254 (2003), the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the state to amend its information after the start of trial. Id., 414. The Appellate Court considered the age of the victim at the time of the alleged incidents, the victim’s age at the time of trial, and the victim’s trial testimony concerning dates. Id., 413. In finding that good cause existed for the late amendment in that case, the court specifically noted that there was no reason to believe that the state could have solicited a more accurate date from the victim in earlier interviews. Id.; see also, e.g., *State v. Mullien*, 140 Conn. App. 299, 312–13, 58 A.3d 383 (2013) (court found good cause for late amendment, in light of victim’s age at time of alleged incidents, age at time of trial, and trial testimony concerning dates, as well as fact that there was “no reason to believe that a more accurate date could have been solicited in earlier interviews [with the victim or through other witnesses]”

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(internal quotation marks omitted)); *State v. Grant*, 83 Conn. App. 90, 98, 848 A.2d 549 (court found good cause for late amendment “by virtue of the change from the anticipated testimony of the victim, which occurred at trial”), cert. denied, 270 Conn. 913, 853 A.2d 529 (2004).⁸

Unlike the aforementioned cases, in which the state could not have reasonably anticipated a change in the minor victim’s testimony before trial, in this case, the state freely acknowledges that it was well aware that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate or, at a minimum, incomplete. A review of S’s testimony and the prosecutor’s comments to the trial court confirms that, at their meeting two to four weeks prior to trial, which encompasses the time period during which the state filed its long form information that continued

⁸To the extent the Appellate Court’s decision in *State v. Victor C.*, supra, 145 Conn. App. 54, suggests a contrary good cause analysis, we respectfully disagree. In *Victor C.*, the state’s information stated that the alleged crimes occurred at “an undetermined date in November or December of 2009” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.*, 63. After the start of trial, the state sought to amend its information to expand the time frame to “an undetermined date between March and December of 2009” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.* The Appellate Court concluded that the state established good cause for its late amendment because the prosecutor adequately explained why the information necessitated substitution. See *id.*, 66.

In *Victor C.*, the victim initially stated that the alleged abuse occurred in November or December, 2009, but, in a pretrial interview, she alleged with certainty that the incident occurred while her mother was staying at a drug rehabilitation center. *Id.* The state learned that the victim’s uncle would be testifying that the victim’s mother attended the rehabilitation center in March, 2009, through September, 2009, necessitating the amended time frame. *Id.* It is unclear from the Appellate Court’s decision, however, *when* the state learned that the victim’s uncle would be testifying regarding the March through September, 2009 time frame. Thus, it is entirely possible that this was a circumstance in which there is no reason to “believe that a more accurate date could have been solicited [prior to the commencement of trial].” *State v. Wilson F.*, supra, 77 Conn. App. 413. Nevertheless, to the extent *Victor C.* is inconsistent with the principle that good cause, in this context, exists only when there is some circumstance that the state could not reasonably have anticipated or safeguarded against before the commencement of trial; see, e.g., *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 585–86; we now reaffirm that this is the principle that guides the good cause inquiry.

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to allege that the abuse occurred in the year 2010 or 2011, S expressed uncertainty regarding the time frame alleged in the state's information. According to the prosecutor, in her pretrial interview with S, S indicated that the sexual assault occurred "sometime in grammar school, fifth grade or [earlier]," namely, between 2005 and 2011. Moreover, as the state conceded at oral argument before this court, it was also aware prior to the start of trial that the defendant did not live in the condominium complex in the year 2010 or 2011, the time frame alleged in its original information and the long form information filed on the first day of jury selection, as he moved out of the complex in 2009. The state, therefore, was aware—weeks prior to the start of trial—that the charged conduct had to have occurred between 2005 (the year S began grammar school) and 2009 (the year that the defendant moved out of the condominium complex).

Although S's trial testimony further narrowed the time frame to third grade, a more specific time frame than the state may have anticipated prior to trial, the state's contention and the Appellate Court's conclusion; see *State v. Peluso*, supra, 187 Conn. App. 508; that this additional degree of specificity somehow obviated the state's duty to amend the information before trial to provide the defendant with the more accurate time frame learned weeks earlier miss the crux of the issue in this case. By focusing their respective good cause analyses principally on S's age—and the deficiencies in minor victims' testimony regarding dates, generally—the state, the trial court, and the Appellate Court were distracted from the central question to be addressed. The relevant inquiry is not whether the state had good cause to amend the information at *any* point in time in light of the minor victim's age and more specific trial testimony regarding the timing of the alleged abuse. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the state had

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good cause to amend its information after the start of trial, *notwithstanding the fact that it had first become aware—two to four weeks before the commencement of trial—that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate*. To be sure, because the state asserted that it did not know, before trial, that S would testify that the abuse occurred in third grade, it was not required to amend its information before trial to allege that the conduct occurred in 2008 or 2009. See, e.g., *State v. Laracuenta*, 205 Conn. 515, 519, 534 A.2d 882 (1987) (“[t]he state does not have a duty . . . to disclose information which the state does not have” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 108 S. Ct. 1598, 99 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1988). But that fact does not obviate the state’s duty to provide more accurate information within its possession prior to trial when it knows that the operative charging instrument is materially inaccurate. In short, within reasonable limits, the state and the defendant should have the same understanding of the relevant time period of the alleged crime prior to the start of trial. See, e.g., *id.* (“[t]he state has a duty to inform a defendant, within reasonable limits, of the time when the offense charged was alleged to have been committed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A review of the record confirms that, in this case, the state possessed information weeks earlier that could have provided the defendant with greater notice as to the relevant time frame than what it had previously provided in its information at both the time of the defendant’s arrest and the commencement of jury selection. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that good cause existed for the late amendment in the present case, as the state was aware—two to four weeks prior to trial—that the time frame alleged in its information was inaccurate and failed to act on the information it possessed. This

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was not a circumstance “that the state could not have reasonably anticipated or safeguarded against before trial commenced.” *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 585–86.

Our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to amend its information without good cause does not end the inquiry. As we have explained, “a trial court’s abuse of discretion in allowing the state to amend the information midtrial without a showing of good cause, *standing alone*, would fall squarely within our jurisprudence requiring the defendant to show that the nonconstitutional error was harmful to reverse the judgment of conviction.” (Emphasis added.) *Id.*, 592. This is because “the good cause requirement in Practice Book § 36-18, standing alone, is not intended to vindicate any constitutional right; rather, its purpose is to encourage the state to diligently prepare its case. . . . As such, consistent with our harmless error jurisprudence for nonconstitutional claims, our appellate case law has never treated a lack of good cause, in and of itself, as reversible error.” (Citation omitted.) *Id.*

Accordingly, we turn to the prejudice component of our inquiry to determine whether the late amendment prejudiced the defendant’s substantive rights. “[T]he burden clearly rests with the state at trial to demonstrate that the defendant’s substantive rights are not prejudiced. See *State v. Tanzella*, supra, [226 Conn.] 614–15. On *appeal*, the defendant ‘must provide a specific showing of prejudice in order to establish that he was denied the right of due process of law as a result of the state’s delay in modifying the date alleged in the information.’ *State v. Ramos*, 176 Conn. 275, 279–80, 407 A.2d 952 (1978).” (Emphasis in original.) *State v. Wilson F.*, supra, 77 Conn. App. 413 n.6.⁹

⁹ We disagree with the defendant that our decision in *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 571, supports his argument that the burden, on appeal, rests with the state to demonstrate that the defendant’s substantive rights were not

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As we have explained, “it is entirely proper for a court to permit an amendment or a substitute information . . . to correct the time of the commission of the offense when time is not a material ingredient of the crime charged.” *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 277; see also, e.g., *id.* (trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing state to amend time frame in information when time was neither material element of crimes charged nor material factor in defendant’s case). “For purposes of [Practice Book § 36-18], the decisive question is whether the defendant was informed of the charges with sufficient precision to be able to prepare an adequate defense.” *State v. Tanzella*, supra, 226 Conn. 608. Ultimately, if the late amendment has no effect on the defendant’s asserted defense, there is no prejudice. See, e.g., *id.*, 616 (amendments’ effect was “logically distinct” from asserted defense).

In this case, the defendant does not dispute that the timing of the abuse was not a “material ingredient” of

prejudiced by the state’s late amendment to its information. In *Ayala*, we concluded that the state did not demonstrate good cause to amend its information and that the state impermissibly charged additional offenses. *Id.*, 574–75. We went on to explain that, when the state amends its information after the start of trial to charge an additional or different offense, it is a matter of constitutional magnitude, namely, a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to fair notice of the charges against him, and, thus, the state must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See *id.*, 598–99. Although confusion may have emanated from the interchangeable use of the terms “prejudice” and “harmless error” in *Ayala*, it is clear from the full context of the decision that this court went on to conduct a harmless error analysis, not a prejudice analysis. See, e.g., *Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc.*, 298 Conn. 414, 424–25, 3 A.3d 919 (2010) (“an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding”). Although regrettable, our use of these terms interchangeably in *Ayala* was not without reasonable basis; the determinations as to whether the amendment prejudiced the defendant’s substantive rights and whether the error was harmless involve similar considerations. It was made clear, earlier in our decision in *Ayala*, that, in light of our conclusion that Practice Book § 36-18 is violated without a showing of prejudice, we did not consider whether the defendant’s substantive rights were prejudiced by the late amendment. *State v. Ayala*, supra, 584 n.5.

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the charged offenses. *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 277. Nevertheless, he argues that he was prejudiced by the state's late amendment because his entire *defense* was predicated on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011, the time frame alleged in the state's original information and, indeed, in its long form information filed on the first day of jury selection, more than fifteen months later.¹⁰ We agree and conclude that, because the timing of the alleged abuse was a "material factor in the defendant's case"; *id.*; namely, his defense, the defendant was prejudiced by the state's late amendment. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to file a late amendment to its information.

At the outset, we pause to emphasize that the defendant's claim of prejudice is bolstered by the fact that he may have won an acquittal as a matter of law had the state not amended its information and, instead, brought its long form information to judgment, alleging an inaccurate time frame of "on or about" 2010 or 2011. *Cf. United States v. Charley*, 189 F.3d 1251, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1999) (when state's information alleged that sexual abuse occurred " 'on or about' " October, 1995,

¹⁰ The defendant further argues that, when the state moves to amend the time frame in its information in child sexual assault cases, defendants should be entitled to a presumptive four week continuance to undertake "an investigation [into] the child's life to determine whether there are grounds to believe that the child may be confabulating various events from earlier in their childhood." He further contends that, "[when] a continuance is required to ensure that the state can satisfy its burden under [Practice Book] § 36-18, it should be the state that retains the burden [of] rebutting the presumption that the presumptive four week continuance is not reasonable." We agree with the Appellate Court that a presumptive four week continuance "would be an unworkable constraint on the inherent discretion of the trial court" because it would create "a presumptively reasonable continuance period that would not account for the unique factual and procedural circumstances that may arise in a given case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Peluso*, supra, 187 Conn. App. 510 n.9.

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but, at trial, there was no evidence of even any contact between defendant and minor victim during entire year of 1995, court concluded that government had not satisfied its burden of proof and reversed defendant's conviction), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1098, 120 S. Ct. 842, 145 L. Ed. 2d 707 (2000); *United States v. Gilliam*, Docket No. ARMY 20180209, 2020 WL 4013847, *4–5 (A. Crim. App. July 15, 2020) (when evidence revealed distinct possibility that certain acts of sexual assault could have happened approximately eleven months outside of time frame alleged by government, court found that evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish defendant's guilt and, accordingly, dismissed charges). This court has previously explained that, “ [when an information] alleges that an offense . . . occurred “on or about” a certain date, the defendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not limited to a specific date. . . . The courts agree that when the [information] uses the “on or about” designation, proof of a date *reasonably near* to the specified date is sufficient.’ ” (Emphasis added.) *State v. Bergin*, 214 Conn. 657, 674, 574 A.2d 164 (1990). Nevertheless, we have never concluded that a date as much as ten months¹¹ outside the time frame alleged in the state's information, as in this case, was “reasonably near” that which it actually alleged at trial. In fact, case law from this state illuminating the concept has only gone so far as to hold that a less significant time differential, namely, days or, at most, a couple of months, can be “reasonably near” the date alleged. See, e.g., *State v. John B.*, 102 Conn. App. 453, 475–76, 925

¹¹ We note that the evidence, including the testimony of the defendant and his girlfriend, established that the defendant moved out of the condominium complex in February, 2009. The earliest time frame alleged in the state's original and long form informations was 2010. Affording the greatest amount of latitude to the state, this would result in a time differential of at least ten months. According to S's trial testimony, the alleged abuse could have occurred any time during her third grade school year, before the defendant moved out in 2009, and, therefore, an even greater time differential was possible.

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A.2d 1235 (date alleged in information, May 8, 2001, was reasonably near date that state later argued, at trial, was when charged offenses occurred, May 9, 2001), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 267 (2007); *State v. Carneiro*, 76 Conn. App. 425, 437–38, 820 A.2d 1053 (court determined that date in late April or early May, 1998, fell within charged time frame in information, which alleged that sexual assault occurred “on a date in approximately June, 1998” (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909, 826 A.2d 180, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 915, 124 S. Ct. 304, 157 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2003); *State v. Clark*, 69 Conn. App. 41, 49–50, 794 A.2d 541 (2002) (date alleged in information, “on or about June 12, 1999,” was within reasonable limits of date that state later argued, at trial, was when charged offense occurred, June 11, 1999 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., *United States v. Charley*, supra, 1272 (“[when] ‘the phrase “on or about” is used in an indictment in connection with a specific date . . . if the prosecution proves that the offense was committed *within a few weeks* of the date, the proof will be deemed sufficient to hold [the] defendant responsible for the charge’ ” (emphasis added)). Thus, in this case, the defendant was not on notice with sufficiently adequate precision that the specific years of 2008 and 2009 were at issue. As a result, the charge was not sufficiently precise to allow the defendant to prepare an adequate defense, and, thus, the late amendment necessarily affected his asserted defense.

Turning now to our prejudice analysis, we look, first, to our decisions in *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 275, and *State v. Tanzella*, supra, 226 Conn. 601, for guidance. In *Ramos*,¹² this court rejected the defen-

¹² Although, in *Ramos*, the state was granted permission to amend its information before trial began, the defendant contended that the amendment constituted a due process violation, which required him to make a specific showing of prejudice. See *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 276. Accordingly, we find *Ramos* instructive insofar as it informs our prejudice inquiry.

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dant's claim that the state's amendment to its information prejudiced his ability to present his defense. *State v. Ramos*, supra, 279–80. The state's information in *Ramos*, filed in the Court of Common Pleas, alleged that the offenses occurred in May, 1975. *Id.*, 278. When the case was transferred to the Superior Court, the information alleged that the offenses occurred on April 15, 1975. *Id.* Subsequently, the state prepared a substitute information, changing the date of the alleged offenses back to May, 1975, but failed to inform the defendant of the change until approximately eight months later, on the day before trial began. *Id.*, 278–79. This court concluded that, because the date of the offenses was not “an essential element of the crimes with which the defendant was charged,” and because the date was not “an otherwise material factor in the defendant's case,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to file the substitute information. *Id.*, 277. Specifically, this court cited the defendant's lack of an alibi defense to the April 15, 1975 allegations as evidence that “he was not prejudiced in making his defense on the basis of the amended date.” *Id.*, 279.

In *Tanzella*, this court considered whether the trial court had abused its discretion when it allowed the state to amend its information after the commencement of trial. *State v. Tanzella*, supra, 226 Conn. 602. In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant's substantive rights were not prejudiced by the amendments to the information, we looked specifically to whether the defendant's theory of the case was “logically distinct from the difference between the original and amended charges.” *Id.*, 617. The defendant's defense to the charges brought against him in that case was that the encounter with the alleged victim was voluntary and consensual. See *id.*, 615. The state's amendments, which “changed the

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mental states and types of harm for the charges of assault and threatening”; *id.*; were irrelevant to the defendant’s defense and, therefore, “did not prejudice the defense because the effect of the amendments was logically distinct from the defense asserted.” *Id.*, 616. In addition, we noted that there was nothing in the record to suggest “that the defendant would have presented a different defense if the amended offenses had been alleged at the outset, or that the defendant suffered any unfair surprise that deprived him of substantive rights.” *Id.*

Guided by this precedent, we conclude that, under the prejudice component of our inquiry, the operative question is whether the defendant’s “theory of defense was logically distinct from the difference between the original and amended charges.” *Id.*, 617; see also, e.g., 42 C.J.S., Indictments § 273 (2022) (“if an amendment to an information does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate [the] rights [to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge]”). When the amendment is *not* logically distinct from the defendant’s theory of defense, the state’s late amendment almost certainly will cause prejudice to the defendant’s substantive rights, as the defendant has been deprived of timely notice of the charges “with sufficient precision to be able to prepare an adequate defense.” *State v. Tanzella*, *supra*, 226 Conn. 608; see also, e.g., *Fisher v. People*, 471 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Colo. 2020) (factors relevant to prejudice inquiry include “(1) the theory of the defense . . . (2) the timing of the amendment . . . and (3) whether the amendment requires a different defense strategy” (citations omitted)); *Erkins v. State*, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405–406 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that, for purposes of determining whether defendant suffered prejudice as result of state’s late amendment, “the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportu-

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nity to prepare for and defend against the charges,” and, “if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties,” defendant’s substantive rights are not violated (internal quotation marks omitted). When the late amendment at issue concerns the timing of the alleged offenses, as in the present case, our focus is on whether the timing alleged in the information was a material component of the defendant’s theory of the case. When the timing is an essential element of the crime charged, or when the date of the alleged offense is a “material factor in the defendant’s case”; *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 277; the state’s late amendment to the time frame alleged in the information will serve to prejudice the defendant’s substantive rights.

Although it is true that the timing of an alleged offense is most often a material factor in a defense when alibi is the asserted theory, the date or time of the offense can be significant to a defense in other contexts as well. We therefore reject the Appellate Court’s categorical rule stating that, “[i]f the defendant has not asserted an alibi defense and time is not an element of the crime, then there is no prejudice when the state amends the information to amplify or to correct the time of the commission of the offense” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Peluso*, supra, 187 Conn. App. 508, quoting *State v. Enrique F.*, supra, 146 Conn. App. 826. This rule, originally articulated by the Appellate Court in *Enrique F.*, is derived from what is, in our view, too narrow a reading of *State v. Ramos*, supra, 176 Conn. 276–77. We observed, in *Ramos*, that the timing of the alleged offenses was not a central component of the defendant’s defense because he did not raise an alibi defense, but we never stated that a defense of alibi was the *only* avenue through which a defendant could claim that the timing of an alleged offense was a “material factor in the defendant’s case” (Foot-

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note omitted.) *Id.*, 277. Accordingly, we reject the Appellate Court’s cramped understanding of prejudice in this context.

In this case, although the defendant did not assert an alibi defense,¹³ he argued that his entire theory of the case was predicated on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex during the time alleged in the state’s information. At trial, defense counsel argued: “[O]ur defense is completely based on [the 2010 to 2011] time frame. . . . [O]ur defense is [that] we knew [that the defendant] didn’t live [in the condominium complex] in 2010 or 2011. And, therefore, our entire defense was based on [the] fact that it was impossible for him to be there at that time. . . . [W]e questioned every single witness about the timing, and . . . the crux of our defense here was that it didn’t happen during those time frames.” A review of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the state’s witnesses confirms that this was the defendant’s theory of the case. For example, after S testified, but before the state moved to amend its information, among other witnesses, the state called S’s friend, I. The focal point of defense counsel’s cross-examination of I was the timing of the allegations. He asked: “Did you tell the police that, when [S] told you [about the alleged instances of sexual assault], she said [they] happened when she was ten years old?” I responded, “[y]es.” I confirmed that she relayed this

¹³ An “alibi” is “a claim by the defendant that he or she was in a place different from the scene of the crime at the time of the alleged offense.” *State v. Tutson*, 278 Conn. 715, 733, 899 A.2d 598 (2006). On appeal, the defendant does not argue that he raised such a defense at trial, which would have required him, upon written demand of the state, to file a written notice of his intention to offer an alibi defense. See Practice Book § 40-21. The defendant, in this case, was not alleging that he was not present when the crime was committed but, instead, that the alleged events could not have occurred during the period that S originally told the police. Although different, both theories are intended to create reasonable doubt by attacking the time frame alleged in the information.

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information to the school psychologist, G. During his subsequent cross-examination of G, defense counsel asked: “[W]hen you filed [the] form [reporting the alleged abuse] with [the Department of Children and Families], you . . . put that [S] was [eleven] years old, correct?” G responded: “Mm-hmm.”

It is therefore not the case here, as it was in *Tanzella*, that “[t]he defendant could not have been prejudiced because his theory of defense was logically distinct from the difference between the original and amended charges.” *State v. Tanzella*, supra, 226 Conn. 617; see also id., 615 (when amendments to information changed mental states and types of harm for charges of assault and threatening, there was no impact on defense that incident had involved voluntary, consensual encounter). Instead, the defendant claimed that his entire theory of defense was derailed by the changes made between the original and long form informations, and the subsequent amended information. This claim was reasonable given that, because of the change in the amended information to a time not reasonably near 2010 or 2011, the defendant was effectively precluded from making the argument that, contrary to what S said and the state alleged in its information, he did not live in the condominium complex in 2010 or 2011. Cf. *State v. McKnight*, 191 Conn. 564, 587, 469 A.2d 397 (1983) (substitute information alleging that different participant in robbery, not defendant, threatened to use firearm did not prejudice defendant who asserted alibi defense); *State v. Enrique F.*, supra, 146 Conn. App. 827 (expanding time frame in information by six months did not have effect on defense to intimate contact charge when defense was centered on attacking victim’s credibility); *State v. Victor C.*, supra, 145 Conn. App. 67 (expanding time frame in information did not impact defendant’s theory of defense, as defendant did not present alibi defense, and, instead, his theory was that

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victim had fabricated story because she did not like him). Moreover, we cannot say that there was nothing in the record to suggest “that the defendant would have presented a different defense if the amended offenses had been alleged at the outset, or that the defendant suffered any unfair surprise that deprived him of substantive rights.” *State v. Tanzella*, supra, 616. To the contrary, at trial, defense counsel stated that, “had [he] known about the different dates,” the defense “would have gone about things differently”

The state nevertheless argues that the defendant’s theory of defense was that S was lying, and, because the defendant was fully able to explore this defense regardless of the dates alleged in the information, he was not prejudiced by the state’s late amendment. We disagree.

Although, before the trial court, defense counsel conceded that he did “attack the credibility of [S] a little bit,” he claimed that this was not the defendant’s “main theory.” Consistent with this representation, although defense counsel pointed out some inconsistencies between S’s direct examination testimony and the statement she gave to the police, most of his questioning centered on S’s conflicting accounts of the timing of the alleged abuse.

The state further contends that the defendant was not prejudiced by its late amendment because, regardless of the time frame alleged in the state’s original and long form informations, the defendant was on notice that the alleged abuse occurred at the time that he lived at the condominium, before he moved out in February, 2009. As we have explained, however, “[f]or purposes of [Practice Book § 36-18], the decisive question is whether the defendant was informed of the charges *with sufficient precision to be able to prepare an adequate defense.*” (Emphasis added.) *State v. Tanzella*,

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supra, 226 Conn. 608. Regardless of whether the defendant knew that S’s allegations of abuse centered on the time in which he lived in the condominium complex, his *defense* was predicated on the time frame S initially reported to the police and the state alleged in its information. For purposes of the prejudice inquiry, we must consider whether the late amendment to the state’s information impaired the defendant’s right to fair notice insofar as it hindered his ability to prepare an adequate defense. In this case, as we explained, the defendant’s theory of defense—predicated on the fact that he did not live in the condominium complex during the time alleged in the state’s information—was effectively precluded by the state’s late amendment, and he, therefore, suffered prejudice.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to amend its information after the start of trial, as the defendant’s substantive rights were prejudiced as a result of the late amendment. Indeed, the state’s late amendment vitiated the very purpose of the information, namely, to “apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Russell v. United States*, 369 U.S. 749, 764, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962). “[B]ecause this error affected the fairness of the trial proceedings and impairs the reliability of [the] conviction, this abuse of discretion constitutes reversible error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Fisher v. People*, supra, 471 P.3d 1089; see, e.g., *State v. Ayala*, supra, 324 Conn. 598 (acknowledging that defendant is entitled to new trial if defect caused by state’s late amendment “impair[ed] his ability to prepare for trial or [to] present his defense”); see also, e.g., *State v. Artis*, 314 Conn. 131, 151, 101 A.3d 915 (2014) (“[S]tructural defect cases contain a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. . . . Such errors

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infect the entire trial process . . . and necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair” (Internal quotation marks omitted.); cf. *Howard v. State*, 122 N.E.3d 1007, 1017 (Ind. App.) (reversing defendant’s conviction under amended counts because defendant’s strategy was impaired by timing of state’s amendment, and his substantial rights were therefore prejudiced), transfer denied, 137 N.E.3d 919 (Ind. 2019).

Because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state’s late amendment to its information, and the defendant’s conviction must be reversed on the basis of that error, we need not reach the defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in granting him a one week continuance, as opposed to the five weeks defense counsel initially requested. We do, however, pause to provide one point of clarification regarding the defendant’s contention that the trial court granted him a continuance in an effort to help the state defeat any claim that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the state’s amendment of the information.

The defendant’s argument emanates from a misapprehension regarding the relatedness of the prejudice and continuance inquiries. The question as to whether the state may permissibly amend its information after the commencement of trial pursuant to Practice Book § 36-18 is *separate* from the inquiry as to whether the defendant should be afforded a continuance. Cf. *State v. Victor C.*, supra, 145 Conn. App. 69 (this court commented that, in arguing for continuance, “[d]efense counsel advanced no separate argument in favor of a continuance, but rather conflated that initial request with his argument in support of his objection to the proffered substitute information”).¹⁴

¹⁴ We therefore explicitly reject the defendant’s characterization of the circumstances surrounding the trial court’s offer to grant the defendant a continuance. Although the discussion surrounding the continuance was made in the context of discussing the prejudice component of Practice Book

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The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to that court for a new trial.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.* ANASTASIA
SCHIMANSKI
(SC 20550)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins,
Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1)), the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend, for a period of forty-five days, the motor vehicle operator's license of a person against whom a decision was issued concerning, inter alia, a refusal to submit to a blood, breath or urine test to determine sobriety, and, as a condition for the restoration of that license, "such person shall be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device" for a specified period of time.

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license in violation of the applicable

§ 36-18, this does not support an inference that the trial court offered the defendant a continuance to help the state prove that its amendment would not prejudice the defendant's substantive rights. Here, the trial court determined that the state had good cause to amend its information and that no additional or different offense was charged. Although the trial court did not make an explicit finding that the amendment would not prejudice the defendant's substantive rights, we presume that it made this finding by virtue of the fact that it allowed the state to amend its information and a conclusion that the amendment would not prejudice the defendant's substantive rights is essential to permitting the state to amend its information. See, e.g., *DiBerardino v. DiBerardino*, 213 Conn. 373, 385, 568 A.2d 431 (1990). Although the trial court offered the defendant a continuance—in the midst of its consideration of the requirements set forth in § 36-18—its decision to grant the defendant a continuance was separate from the trial court's distinct inquiry as to whether the state could amend its information after the start of trial.

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statute (§ 14-215 (c) (1)), the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. The defendant had been arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and her license was suspended for forty-five days pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) as a result of her refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. Two days after the forty-five day license suspension period lapsed, the defendant allegedly struck another vehicle while operating a motor vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device installed in it. As a result of that incident, the defendant was charged in the present case with, inter alia, operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. The defendant moved to dismiss that charge on the ground that she could not have violated § 14-215 (c) (1) because the forty-five day license suspension period ended two days before the incident. The trial court disagreed, concluding that the installation of an ignition interlock device is a mandatory statutory requirement for the restoration of a license that has been suspended under § 14-227b and that the defendant's suspended license was not restored until she had an ignition interlock device installed in her vehicle approximately one month after the incident. On appeal to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, that court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding, on the basis of its interpretation of the relevant statutes, that the defendant's license remained suspended following the forty-five day statutory period until she installed the ignition interlock device because § 14-227b (i) (1) mandates the installation of such a device in any motor vehicle operated by a person whose license has been suspended under the statute before the restoration of her license and does not contemplate an interim period during which such person may lawfully operate a motor vehicle without installing such a device. In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court determined that *State v. Jacobson* (31 Conn. App. 797), and *State v. Cook* (36 Conn. App. 710), on which the defendant relied, were not applicable to the present case because they were decided prior to certain amendments to the relevant statutes that rendered the analysis in those cases inapposite. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. *Held* that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 14-227b (i) (1) extends the suspension of a person's license beyond the specified forty-five day period until the motor vehicle operator subject to the suspension has installed an ignition interlock device, and, accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed insofar as that court upheld the defendant's conviction of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and the case was remanded with direction to reverse the judgment of conviction and to render judgment dismissing the information: this court concluded, after a review of the text of § 14-227b (i) (1) and its relationship to other relevant statutes, that the statute clearly and unambiguously imposes a forty-five day license suspension period, after which the operator's license is no longer "under suspension" for purposes of § 14-215 (c) (1), the plain language of § 14-227b (i) (1)

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having indicating that the legislature made the installation of an ignition interlock device a prerequisite for the restoration of the operator's license but not for the expiration of the suspension period; moreover, this court, in reading the statute (§ 14-215b) setting forth the penalties for operating a motor vehicle after the expiration of a suspension period and without obtaining reinstatement and § 14-227b (i) (1) together, concluded that the completion of the forty-five day suspension period is necessary, but not a condition, for the restoration of an operator's license under § 14-227b (i) (1) and is separate and distinct from the additional restoration precondition that the operator install an ignition interlock device; furthermore, the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that *Jacobson* and *Cook* were inapplicable to, and controlling of, the statutory interpretation issue in the present case on the ground that the versions of the relevant statutes at issue in those cases predated statutory amendments that added an ignition interlock device requirement as a condition for license restoration, as the courts in both of those cases based their decisions on the fixed, unqualified language limiting the duration of the statutory suspension periods and concluded that, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, requirements for license restoration do not concurrently operate as preconditions for the termination of a license suspension period, and the rationale in *Jacobson* and *Cook* was not rendered obsolete by virtue of the statutory amendments, as the versions of the statutes applicable to the present case still provided a fixed, unqualified license suspension period; in addition, contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion that the defendant's interpretation of § 14-227b (i) (1) would yield an absurd result because a person whose license has been suspended pursuant to that statute would have an incentive not to install an ignition interlock device and thereby complete the restoration process in order to avoid harsher penalties, a related statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a)) not only prohibits the exact conduct that the Appellate Court feared would be incentivized, namely, the operation of a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device by an individual who is subject to the provisions of § 14-227b (i) (1), but also imposes the same penalties for a violation of its provisions as § 14-215 (c) (1), and, although certain regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles that implement the provisions of § 14-227b supported the Appellate Court's interpretation of the statute, those regulations were entitled to no deference because the statute unambiguously limits the suspension period to forty-five days, and an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference only when, inter alia, the statute is ambiguous.

Argued February 23—officially released August 23, 2022

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of operating a motor vehicle with a sus-

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pendent license, avoidance of an interlock ignition device, and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number twenty-three, where the court, *Spader, J.*, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license and avoidance of an interlock ignition device; thereafter, the state filed a second substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license; subsequently, the defendant was presented to the court on a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, *Elgo, Bright and Moll, Js.*, which dismissed the appeal with respect to the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of avoidance of an interlock ignition device in the state's first substitute information and affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. *Reversed in part; judgment directed.*

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were *Patrick J. Griffin*, chief state's attorney, and *Sean P. McGuinness*, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Anastasia Schimanski, appeals¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court

¹This court granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while her operator's license was under suspension

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upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1).² The defendant claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the forty-five day license suspension period imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1)³ on persons who refuse to submit to a chemical analysis of their blood, breath, or urine, as required by § 14-227b (b), does not terminate upon the expiration of the forty-five days specified in the statute but, rather, continues indefinitely until such time as the persons subject to the suspension install an ignition interlock device (IID) on their vehicles. The defendant contends that, because the conduct underlying her conviction

pursuant to General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1)?” *State v. Schimanski*, 336 Conn. 903, 903–904, 242 A.3d 1009 (2021).

² General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1) provides in relevant part: “Any person who operates any motor vehicle during the period such person’s operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is under suspension . . . pursuant to section 14-227b . . . shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than one year, and, in the absence of any mitigating circumstances as determined by the court, thirty consecutive days of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced in any manner.”

³ General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) provides in relevant part: “*The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license . . . of a person . . . against whom a decision was issued, after a hearing, pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension notice, for a period of forty-five days. As a condition for the restoration of such operator’s license . . . such person shall be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device, as defined in section 14-227j, for the longer of either (A) the period prescribed in subdivision (2) of this subsection for the present arrest and suspension, or (B) the period prescribed in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (g) of section 14-227a or subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (c) of section 14-227m or subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (c) of section 14-227n for the present arrest and conviction, if any.*” (Emphasis added.)

Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227b in this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.

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occurred after the expiration of the forty-five day suspension period authorized by § 14-227b (i) (1), the state could not lawfully charge her pursuant to § 14-215 (c) (1).⁴ We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “On September 18, 2017, the defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence in violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 2017] § 14-227a.⁵ Pursuant to . . . § 14-227b (i), the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) suspended the defendant’s license for a period of forty-five days, beginning on October 18, 2017, and ending on December 2, 2017, as a result of the defendant’s refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. On December 4, 2017, the trial court, *Spader, J.*, granted the defendant’s application for the pretrial alcohol education program. See General Statutes § 54-56g. In connection with its consideration of the application, the court engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:

“The Court: One of the key things about the alcohol education program is if you violate the [department’s] interlock device program, that’s a violation of the alcohol education program. So just—don’t be operating a motor vehicle unless you have the interlock device attached to it.

“[The Defendant]: Yes. Sir—I’m sorry—I don’t own a vehicle.

“The Court: No—yeah, well, the thing is, don’t borrow a vehicle either that doesn’t have an interlock device

⁴ As we explain more fully hereinafter, the defendant’s conduct may have violated other motor vehicle statutes. For reasons unknown, the state failed to charge her pursuant to them.

⁵ Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227a in this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.

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on it—you know—if there’s—once your license is restored, once your privileges are restored, okay?

“ [The Defendant]: Yes, sir.’

“That same day, shortly after leaving the courthouse following the hearing, the defendant operated a motor vehicle, which did not have an IID installed in it, and allegedly struck another motor vehicle. As a result of that incident, the defendant was issued a misdemeanor summons and complaint, giving rise to the present case, charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 On February 23, 2018, the state filed its first substitute information. In count one, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). In count two, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an IID in violation of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2017)] § 14-227k (a) (2).⁶ In count three, the state charged the defendant with evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of [General Statutes] § 14-224 (b) (3).

“On March 5, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two of the first substitute information. With respect to count one, the defendant argued that she could not properly be charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017, because, at such time, her license was not under suspension on account of § 14-227b (i) (1). According to the defendant, the forty-five day suspension of her license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) had expired on December 2, 2017. With respect to count two, the defendant argued that she was not obligated on December 4, 2017, either by direction of the department or by

⁶ Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 14-227k in this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the statute.

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order of the trial court, to operate a motor vehicle with an IID installed, and, thus, she could not properly be charged with having violated § 14-227k (a) (2) on that date.⁷

“On March 19, 2018, after having heard argument on March 9, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. As to count one charging the defendant with a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), the court determined that, pursuant to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b, the installation of an IID is a ‘mandatory statutory requirement implemented by the state legislature that must be fulfilled to “unsuspend” a suspended license.’ The court further determined that the defendant did not have an IID installed on December 4, 2017, and that the department did not lift her suspension and restore her privilege to operate a motor vehicle until January 2, 2018, by which time the defendant had installed an IID. . . . In light of the foregoing, with respect to count one, the court concluded that the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). With respect to count two, the court determined that, during the hearing held on December 4, 2017, it unequivocally and directly had ordered the defendant not to operate any motor vehicle without an IID installed. Thus, the court concluded, the state could prosecute the defendant for a violation of § 14-227k (a) (2).

“On May 9, 2018, the state filed a second substitute information charging the defendant solely with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of § 14-215 (c) (1). On May 25, 2018, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, the defendant

⁷ “Notwithstanding the language in the suspension notice, during oral argument before the trial court, the state conceded that the defendant was not restricted by the department to operate a motor vehicle with an IID installed.” *State v. Schimanski*, 201 Conn. App. 164, 168 n.1, 242 A.3d 119 (2020).

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entered a plea of nolo contendere to that charge, conditioned on her right to take an appeal from her conviction on the basis of the court's denial of her motion to dismiss. After a canvass, the court accepted the conditional plea, entered a finding of guilty, and sentenced the defendant to a term of one year of incarceration, execution suspended, with one year of probation." (Footnote added; footnote in original.) *State v. Schimanski*, 201 Conn. App. 164, 167–70, 242 A.3d 119 (2020). "The thirty day mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was suspended in light of mitigating circumstances determined by the court. See General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1)." *State v. Schimanski*, supra, 170 n.2.⁸

⁸ As the Appellate Court noted, it is unclear, but irrelevant to our analysis, why the state did not argue before the trial court that the defendant could also be charged under § 14-215 (c) (1) on the alternative theory that she had violated "a restriction or limitation placed on [her] license or right to operate a motor vehicle . . . pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of section 14-227j . . ." General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1); see *State v. Schimanski*, supra, 201 Conn. App. 172 n.4. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227j (b) provides in relevant part: "Any person who has been arrested for a violation of section 14-227a . . . may be ordered by the court not to operate any motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock device. Any such order may be made . . . as a condition of granting such person's application for participation in the pre-trial alcohol education program under section 54-56g . . ." However, General Statutes § 54-94a provides in relevant part: "When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court's denial of the defendant's . . . motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a trial court has determined that a ruling on such . . . motion to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied . . . the motion to dismiss. . . ." Moreover, "in the absence of a showing of good cause, an appellate court should decline to review an issue that has not been raised in accordance with the provisions of § 54-94a." *State v. Revelo*, 256 Conn. 494, 503, 775 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052, 122 S. Ct. 639, 151 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2001).

The parties' arguments concerning the defendant's motion to dismiss are entirely centered on whether the defendant's license was suspended for refusing a chemical blood alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) at the

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On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that, under *State v. Jacobson*, 31 Conn. App. 797, 627 A.2d 474 (1993), *aff'd*, 229 Conn. 824, 644 A.2d 331 (1994), and *State v. Cook*, 36 Conn. App. 710, 653 A.2d 829 (1995), “her failure to have installed an IID did not extend the suspension of her license under § 14-227b (i) (1) beyond the forty-five day period, which expired on December 2, 2017, and, as a result, she could not have been charged with having committed a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1) on December 4, 2017.” *State v. Schimanski*, *supra*, 201 Conn. App. 170. The Appellate Court disagreed, concluding that “the legislature clearly and unambiguously created a statutorily mandated condition—i.e., the installation of an IID . . . that must be satisfied before an individual may have his or her license restored and thereupon legally operate a motor vehicle. Stated differently, § 14-227b (i) (1) does not contemplate an interim period between suspension and restoration, whereby an individual whose license or operating privilege has been suspended thereunder could operate a motor vehicle, while escaping the responsibility of installing an IID . . . and avoiding exposure to criminal liability under, *inter alia*, § 14-215 (c).” *Id.*, 174. To conclude otherwise, the court reasoned, “would incentivize an individual, whose license or operating privilege has been suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1), *not* to install an IID and complete the restoration process”; (emphasis in original) *id.*, 174–75; leading to “an absurd result and not one intended by the legislature.” *Id.*, 175.

In reaching its determination, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant’s contention that *Jacobson* and

time she operated a motor vehicle, as this was the only charge on which the state pursued its prosecution. Therefore, the narrow issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the state’s charge under § 14-215 (c) (1) based on a theory that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension, not whether the state was at liberty to charge the defendant under § 14-215 (c) (1) generally.

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Cook, which held that the license suspension periods imposed for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (*Jacobson*) and for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test (*Cook*) do not continue beyond the fixed time periods specified by statute until the person whose license was suspended completes the administrative steps required for restoration of the license, supported her claim. *Id.*, 175–77. The court reasoned that, “[i]n deciding *Jacobson* and *Cook*, [it] analyzed prior revisions of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b.⁹ As the trial court in the present case observed in its memorandum of decision, although *Jacobson* and *Cook* have not been overruled, §§ 14-227a and 14-227b have been amended since those decisions were published. The [1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue in *Jacobson* specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue in *Cook* contained a fixed six month license suspension, also without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a and 14-227b were amended in 2014, effective in 2015, to shorten the mandatory license suspension period to forty-five days *and* to add the IID requirement in connection with restoration. [See Public Acts 2014, No. 14-228, §§ 5 and 6.] Accordingly, *Jacobson* and *Cook* are inapplicable to the present case.” (Emphasis in original;

⁹ General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a (h), at issue in *Jacobson*, provides in relevant part: “Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have his motor vehicle operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year”

General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b (h), at issue in *Cook*, provides in relevant part: “The commissioner [of motor vehicles] shall suspend the operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege . . . of a person who did not contact the department to schedule a hearing, who failed to appear at a hearing or against whom, after a hearing, the commissioner held pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension notice or the date the commissioner renders his decision, whichever is later, for a period of . . . six months if such person refused to submit to such test or analysis”

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footnote added; footnote omitted.) *State v. Schimanski*, supra, 201 Conn. App. 177.

On appeal to this court following our grant of certification, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court erred in interpreting § 14-227b (i) (1) as extending the suspension of a person’s license beyond the specified forty-five days until the motor vehicle operator subject to the suspension has installed an IID.¹⁰ The defendant contends that the Appellate Court’s decision is contrary to the plain language of the statute, controlling case law—specifically, *Jacobson* and *Cook*, which the defendant argues are fully applicable to the present case—and the legislative history. More specifically, the defendant argues that the text of § 14-227b sets forth a suspension period that is strictly limited to forty-five days and that the operation of the statute within the entire statutory framework unambiguously indicates that preconditions for restoring an individual’s license do not concurrently operate as preconditions for terminating a license suspension period. We agree.

¹⁰ In her brief to this court, the defendant also claims that the Appellate Court’s interpretation of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b violates the equal protection clause of the United States constitution and the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Connecticut constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that interpreting the statutes as requiring installation of an IID as a prerequisite for ending the suspension periods imposed under those statutes would have a disparate impact along socioeconomic lines, resulting in shorter suspension periods for individuals with the economic means to pay the fees associated with installing and maintaining the IID, and longer suspension periods for indigent persons unable to pay for such fees. In light of our determination that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the suspension periods specified in §§ 14-227a and 14-227b continue until an IID is installed, it is unnecessary for us to address this claim. We note, however, that General Statutes § 14-227o, which was enacted subsequent to the defendant’s conviction; see Public Acts 2018, No. 18-30, § 1; provides in relevant part that “any provider of ignition interlock device services . . . may include in a lease agreement with a person required to install such device . . . a reduction to or an elimination of the charge for such services if such person is indigent. . . .” As a result of its permissive character, § 14-227o potentially mitigates the issue raised by the defendant but, without more, does not go so far as to render the claim moot.

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We begin our analysis by setting forth the standard of review and legal principles governing our resolution of this appeal. “Because a motion to dismiss effectively challenges the jurisdiction of the court, asserting that the state, as a matter of law and fact, cannot state a proper cause of action against the defendant, our review of the court’s legal conclusions and resulting denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss is de novo. . . . Factual findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Kallberg*, 326 Conn. 1, 12, 160 A.3d 1034 (2017).

The defendant’s appeal also requires us to interpret various provisions of our state’s motor vehicle statutes. “Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Pond*, 315 Conn. 451, 466, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015). “In seeking to determine the meaning of a statute, [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to the broader statutory scheme. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z. The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Dudley*, 332 Conn. 639, 645, 212 A.3d 1268 (2019).

The defendant was charged and convicted pursuant to § 14-215 (c) (1), which provides in relevant part that

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“[a]ny person who operates any motor vehicle during the period such person’s operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state is *under suspension . . . on account of a violation of section 14-227a . . . or pursuant to section 14-227b*, or in violation of a restriction or limitation placed on such person’s operator’s license or right to operate a motor vehicle in this state by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to subsection (i) of section 14-227a or pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of section 14-227j” (Emphasis added.)

Whether the defendant’s license was “under suspension” within the meaning of § 14-215 (c) (1) turns on our interpretation of § 14-227b (i) (1), which provides in relevant part: “The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license . . . of a person . . . against whom a decision was issued, after a hearing, pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension notice, *for a period of forty-five days. As a condition for the restoration of such operator’s license . . . such person shall be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device*, as defined in section 14-227j”¹¹ (Emphasis added.)

¹¹ Although the defendant’s license was suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1), we note that § 14-227a (g) also requires suspension of an operator’s license for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a), using very similar statutory language. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a (g) provides: “Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . *have such person’s motor vehicle operator’s license . . . suspended for forty-five days and, as a condition for the restoration of such license, be required to install an ignition interlock device on each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and, upon such restoration, be prohibited for the one-year period following such restoration from operating a motor vehicle unless such motor vehicle is equipped with a functioning, approved ignition interlock device*, as defined in section 14-227j” (Emphasis added.)

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The state argues that the phrase “[a]s a condition for the restoration,” as used in § 14-227b (i) (1), indicates the legislature’s intent that the license suspension period last a *minimum* of forty-five days and continue until such time as the individual installs an IID. This reading, however, cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the text. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “condition” as “a circumstance that is essential to the appearance or occurrence of something else: prerequisite” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) p. 473; see also *Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission*, 144 Conn. 516, 522, 134 A.2d 351 (1957) (defining “condition” as “[t]hat which limits or modifies the existence or character of something . . . a restriction or qualification” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the legislature made the installation of an IID a prerequisite “for the restoration” of the operator’s license, *not* for terminating the operator’s suspension. Under well established rules of statutory construction, we must assume that, if the legislature had intended the latter, it would have indicated such intent expressly. See, e.g., *In re Jusstice W.*, 308 Conn. 652, 673, 65 A.3d 487 (2012) (“it is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly . . . or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to do so” (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)) “[W]e are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *State v. Josephs*, 328 Conn. 21, 27, 176 A.3d 542 (2018).

Similarly, if the forty-five day suspension period mandated by the statute was intended to operate as a baseline *minimum* suspension period, the legislature would have unambiguously indicated that intent as well, just

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as it has done in numerous other statutes. See, e.g., General Statutes § 14-44f (“[i]f the [C]ommissioner [of Motor Vehicles] finds that . . . the holder of [a commercial driver’s] license has supplied false information in order to obtain the license, he shall withhold the issuance of the license or suspend the license for sixty days, and thereafter until the true and correct information is submitted”); General Statutes § 14-223 (b) (“Any person who violates this subsection . . . [and] causes the death or serious physical injury . . . of another person, such person . . . shall have [his or her] motor vehicle operator’s license suspended for one year for the first offense For any subsequent offense . . . if any prior offense by such person under this subsection caused, and such subsequent offense causes, the death or serious physical injury . . . of another person, such person shall . . . have [his or her] motor vehicle operator’s license suspended for not less than eighteen months nor more than two years”); General Statutes § 20-233 (“[a]ny person . . . who violates any provision of [specified statutes] shall . . . for the second offense . . . [have] his license . . . suspended for such period, not less than six months, as the [B]oard [of Examiners] determines”); General Statutes § 26-61 (b) (“the [C]ommissioner [of Energy and Environmental Protection] may suspend any such . . . license . . . for not more than three years, except that for a third violation . . . the suspension period shall be not less than five years and may be indefinite”).¹² These statutes plainly demonstrate that,

¹² The state points to the language in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-36 (g) (7), which provides that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may restrict a person’s license by requiring an IID if “such person’s operator’s license [was] suspended under [§ 14-227b (i)] and [he or she] has served *not less than forty-five days of the prescribed period of such suspension*,” to support its assertion that § 14-227b (i) (1) provides for a forty-five day suspension period, plus the time it takes to install an IID. (Emphasis added.) We are not persuaded. The statutory language refers to the minimum period of time a person must *serve* on suspension before he or she may be subject to an IID requirement, not a minimum suspension period that may be *imposed*.

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when the legislature chooses to do so, it is perfectly capable of suspending a license for a minimum period of time and, thereafter, extending the suspension until such time as the occurrence of a specific event.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, it is apparent that the Appellate Court failed to take into account several related statutes governing license suspension, restoration, and the IID requirement that, when read together with § 14-227b (i) (1), make clear that license restoration does not automatically occur upon the expiration of the suspension period. See, e.g., *Maghfour v. Waterbury*, 340 Conn. 41, 46, 262 A.3d 692 (2021) (“§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself *and its relationship to other statutes*” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). Two such statutes, General Statutes §§ 14-215b and 14-227k, are particularly instructive in this regard.

Section 14-215b provides in relevant part: “Any person whose motor vehicle operator’s license *has been suspended* who operates a motor vehicle *after the expiration of such period of suspension without obtaining the reinstatement* of such license shall (1) during the first sixty days after such expiration, be deemed to have failed to renew such license and be subject to the penalty for failure to renew a motor vehicle operator’s license under subsection (c) of section 14-41 *Any operator so charged shall not be prosecuted under section 14-215 for the same act constituting a violation under this section.*” (Emphasis added.) Section 14-215b indicates that the conditions for restoration are unrelated to the period of suspension and that the legislature clearly contemplated an interim period postsuspension during which, although the person’s operator’s license

Moreover, the use of the language, “the prescribed period,” undermines the state’s position by referring to the forty-five days in relatively definitive terms.

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is no longer suspended, the person's driving privileges have yet to be restored.¹³ Our conclusion that the statutory scheme contemplates a postsuspension, prerestoration interim period accords with the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 14-215b in *State v. Vlahos*, 138 Conn. App. 379, 51 A.3d 1173 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 913, 61 A.3d 1101 (2013). In *Vlahos*, the court stated: "The overall legislative scheme is quite plain and unambiguous. [General Statutes §] 14-36 (a) provides that no person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public high-

¹³ Although §§ 14-227b and 14-215b do not define the words "restoration" and "reinstatement," as used in those statutes, their plain meaning and application in their corresponding statutory contexts indicate that they are intended to be applied synonymously. See 13 Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed. 1998) pp. 539, 754 (defining "reinstatement" as a synonym for "restoration" and defining "restoration" as "the fact of being restored or *reinstated*" (emphasis added)); Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002) pp. 1915, 1936 (defining "reinstatement" as "the action of replacing or *restoring* the effectiveness of (as something damaged, worn out, or *lapsed*)," and defining "restoration" as "a bringing back to or putting back into a former position or condition: *reinstatement*, renewal, reestablishment" (emphasis added)). Moreover, the legislature appears to employ the terms interchangeably throughout the statutory scheme, and there is no language in the statutes that would suggest otherwise. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (h) ("reinstatement of such license or operating privilege"); General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) ("restoration of such operator's license or operating privilege"); see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a (g) ("restoration of such license"); General Statutes § 14-227l ("reinstatement of the operator's license or nonresident operating privilege").

It should be noted that the words "restoration" and "reinstated" are both included in § 14-227b. Although we previously have stated that "[t]he use of . . . different terms . . . within the same statute suggests that the legislature acted with complete awareness of their different meanings . . . and that it intended the terms to have different meanings"; (internal quotation marks omitted) *1st Alliance Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking*, 342 Conn. 273, 285 n.3, 269 A.3d 764 (2022); when, as in the present case, we conclude that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous under the plain meaning analysis set forth in § 1-2z, we are restrained from making such presumptions in determining legislative intent. See *Achillion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Law*, 291 Conn. 525, 532 n.8, 970 A.2d 57 (2009) ("[Legal] presumptions are rules of construction and, accordingly, are to be used only after we have determined that a statute is ambiguous pursuant to § 1-2z. If we determine that no such ambiguity exists, these presumptions are inapplicable.").

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way until such person has obtained an operator's license. *If one then loses driving privileges, through either suspension or inadvertence, one may not operate again until he or she has obtained a license. Sections 14-215b and 14-41 provide exceptions, but functionally one's status reverts to that of an unlicensed driver until one becomes licensed again.*" (Emphasis added.) *State v. Vlahos*, supra, 138 Conn. App. 389.

Consequently, reading §§ 14-227b (i) (1) and 14-215b together indicates that completion of the forty-five day suspension period is necessary, but not a condition, for restoration of one's operator's license under § 14-227b (i) (1) and is separate and distinct from the additional restoration precondition that the operator install an IID. Thus, an operator's suspension period could expire without the person's installation of an IID, which would make it a violation of other statutes if the person were to operate a motor vehicle,¹⁴ but not a violation of § 14-215 (c) (1), i.e., operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license. Accordingly, after considering the language of § 14-227b (i) (1) and its relationship to other relevant statutes, we conclude that the statute clearly and unambiguously imposes a forty-five day license suspension period, after which, although the person is prohibited from operating a motor vehicle without an IID and is subject to the supplementary requirement of installing an IID as a condition for restoring his or her license, the license is no longer "suspended" for purposes of § 14-215 (c) (1).

Indeed, were we to adopt the Appellate Court's reading of the statute and conclude that termination of the

¹⁴ See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-215b (operation after expiration of period of suspension and without obtaining reinstatement of license); General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a) (avoidance of or tampering with IID). In this case, the defendant was initially charged with a violation of § 14-227k (a) for avoidance of an IID, a charge the trial court specifically held the state could pursue. For reasons unknown, the state chose not to do so.

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suspension period is conditioned on the installation of an IID, we would have to conclude that all restoration requirements, not just the IID requirement, similarly operate as conditions that must be satisfied before the license suspension period expires. This would render all other conditions necessary for restoration, such as restoration fees; see General Statutes § 14-50b (b) (“[a]ny person whose motor vehicle registration or right of operation of a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked . . . shall pay a restoration fee . . . prior to . . . the restoration of such registration or such right of operation”); or proof of insurance coverage; see General Statutes § 14-213b (c) (“[n]o operator’s license which has been suspended pursuant to this subsection shall be restored until the owner has provided evidence to the commissioner that he maintains the security required by section 38a-371 or any other security requirements imposed by law for each motor vehicle registered in his name”); to functionally extend suspension periods until those prerequisites for restoration are met, which is inconsistent with prior Appellate Court case law. See *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 803–804 (holding that administrative requirement of providing proof of financial responsibility to restore license pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-112 may not indefinitely extend one year suspension imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a); see also *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 714–15 (holding that categorical statutory six month suspension period pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b may not be extended).

We disagree with the Appellate Court that *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 797, and *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 710, are inapplicable in light of subsequent revisions to the statutory scheme. The defendant relies on these cases for the proposition that, when a statute provides a strict, unqualified, and spe-

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cific license suspension period, that period may not be extended beyond the specified term, and the expiration of such term is not contingent on fulfillment of any statutory condition required for license restoration. We conclude that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that *Jacobson* and *Cook* are not controlling because the versions of §§ 14-227a and 14-227b at issue in those cases predate the 2014 amendments to those statutes, which added the IID requirement as a condition for license restoration. See *State v. Schimanski*, supra, 201 Conn. App. 177.¹⁵

In *Jacobson*, the defendant's operator's license was suspended for one year after he was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a.¹⁶ *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 799. After the one year suspension period ended, the defen-

¹⁵ The state makes the additional argument that *Jacobson* and *Cook* are distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were not operating under operating under the influence based suspensions but were operating under suspensions imposed by a failure to complete administrative steps required for restoration. The state also argues that the cases are distinguishable because the defendants in *Jacobson* and *Cook* were "eligible" for restoration at the time of their arrests, whereas the defendant in the present case was not eligible until she installed an IID. We find no merit to either of these arguments. First, the courts in *Jacobson* and *Cook* both held that the licenses of the defendants in those cases were not under suspension; *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 715; *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 804; and it would be nonsensical to differentiate between different kinds of suspensions for purposes of § 14-215 (c). Second, the defendants in those cases and the defendant in the present were all subject to conditions for restoration that they failed to complete prior to operating a motor vehicle. See *State v. Cook*, supra, 711–12; *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 799; Contrary to the state's arguments, there is nothing in the statutory framework that distinguishes one condition for restoration from another for purposes of determining who may be considered "eligible" for restoring his or her license.

¹⁶ General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a (h) provides in relevant part: "Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have his motor vehicle operator's license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for one year"

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dant was required to provide proof of financial responsibility to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in order to have his license restored pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-112.¹⁷ *Id.* Subsequent to the expiration of the defendant's suspension, but prior to his presenting the proof of financial responsibility required for restoring his license, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under suspension in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-215 (c). *Id.* On appeal, he claimed that the state improperly had charged him with operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension because the one year suspension period imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-227a had already expired at the time of the commission of the charged offense. *Id.*, 800. The Appellate Court agreed. *Id.*, 803–804. In doing so, the court explained that “[the] legislature has set out a comprehensive scheme for punishing violators of our operating while intoxicated statutes. That scheme unambiguously mandates a one year suspension of a violator’s operator’s license under § 14-227a and provides that a license shall be restored upon proof of financial responsibility in another section, § 14-112.

¹⁷ General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 14-112 (a) provides in relevant part: “To entitle any person to receive or retain a motor vehicle operator’s license or certificate of registration of any motor vehicle when, in the opinion of the commissioner, such person has violated . . . subsection (a) of section 14-227a . . . the commissioner shall require from such person proof of financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, any one person, of twenty thousand dollars, or by reason of personal injury to, or the death of, more than one person on account of any accident, of at least forty thousand dollars, and for damage to property of at least ten thousand dollars If any person fails to furnish such proof, the commissioner shall, until such proof is furnished, suspend or revoke the license of such person to operate a motor vehicle or refuse to return any license which has been suspended or revoked in accordance with the provisions of section 14-111 Prior to such suspension, revocation or withdrawal, notice thereof shall be given by the commissioner by a notice forwarded by bulk certified mail to the address of such person as shown by the records of the commissioner. . . .”

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Nothing in the statutory scheme, however, indefinitely extends the period of suspension, pursuant to § 14-227a, past one year. *If the legislature chooses to amend § 14-215 (c) to extend the period of suspension of a license beyond one year, and until the defendant has complied with § [14-112], it may do so. Meanwhile, we are bound by the present language of § 14-215 (c).* The defendant . . . was not charged with a violation of a statute regarding failure to show financial responsibility or of a statute relating to the administrative steps necessary to restore a license.”¹⁸ (Emphasis added.) Id.

In *Cook*, the defendant’s nonresident operator’s privileges were suspended for six months pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b¹⁹ after the defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test mandated by the statute. *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 711.

¹⁸ On appeal, we adopted the Appellate Court’s reasoning in *Jacobson* and forwent further explication on the matter, stating that “[t]he issue on which we granted certification was properly resolved in the Appellate Court’s thoughtful and thorough unanimous opinion. It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussion contained therein.” *State v. Jacobson*, 229 Conn. 824, 828, 644 A.2d 331 (1994).

The original text of the Appellate Court’s decision in *Jacobson* stated: “If the legislature chooses to amend § 14-215 (c) to extend the period of suspension of a license beyond one year, and until the defendant has complied with § 14-211, it may do so.” *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 804. We believe that the Appellate Court’s reference to § 14-211 was a scrivener’s error and that the court intended to reference § 14-112, which makes more sense in context because § 14-112 was central to the court’s analysis.

¹⁹ General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b (h) provides in relevant part: “The commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege, and revoke the temporary operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege issued pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, of a person who did not contact the department to schedule a hearing, who failed to appear at a hearing or against whom, after a hearing, the commissioner held pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, as of the effective date contained in the suspension notice or the date the commissioner renders his decision, whichever is later, for a period of . . . *six months if such person refused to submit to [a blood alcohol] test or analysis*” (Emphasis added.)

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After the six month suspension period expired, the defendant was charged with and subsequently convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-215 (c). *Id.*, 712. On appeal, the Appellate Court relied on its reasoning in *Jacobson* in concluding that General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 14-227b “is unambiguous in its provision that the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test subjects a driver to the suspension of his license or operating privileges for a period of six months. *It does not require that the suspension continue beyond that six month period until such time that the driver’s privileges are formally restored.* Therefore, upon completion of the six month period, a driver’s license or operating privileges are no longer suspended on account of a violation of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)] § 14-227b and the driver may not be subjected to the enhanced penalties of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)] § 14-215 (c).” (Emphasis added.) *Id.*, 714–15.

As we indicated, in the present case, the Appellate Court concluded that *Jacobson* and *Cook* were inapplicable because “[t]he [1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue in *Jacobson* specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue in *Cook* contained a fixed six month license suspension, also without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a and 14-227b were amended in 2014, effective in 2015, to shorten the mandatory license suspension period to forty-five days *and* to add the IID requirement in connection with restoration.” (Emphasis in original.) *State v. Schimanski*, *supra*, 201 Conn. App. 177. Contrary to the Appellate Court’s reasoning, the courts in *Jacobson* and *Cook* based their decisions on the fixed, unqualified language limiting the duration of the respective suspension periods in the relevant

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statutes. See *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 803–804 (“Th[e] [statutory] scheme unambiguously mandates a one year suspension of a violator’s operator’s license under [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 14-227a, and provides that a license shall be restored upon proof of financial responsibility in another section, [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 14-112. Nothing in the statutory scheme, however, indefinitely extends the period of suspension, pursuant to [General Statutes (Rev. to 1989)] § 14-227a, past one year.”); *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 714 (“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)] § 14-227b is unambiguous in its provision that the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test subjects a driver to the suspension of his license or operating privileges for a period of six months. It does not require that the suspension continue beyond that six month period . . .”).

In both *Jacobson* and *Cook*, the Appellate Court concluded that, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, requirements for license restoration do not concurrently operate as preconditions for terminating a license suspension period. See *State v. Jacobson*, supra, 31 Conn. App. 804 (“If the legislature chooses to amend [General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)] § 14-215 (c) to extend the period of suspension of a license beyond one year, and until the defendant has complied with [a condition for restoration], it may do so. Meanwhile, we are bound by the present language of [the statute.]”); see also *State v. Cook*, supra, 36 Conn. App. 714 (“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1991)] § 14-227b] does not require that the suspension continue beyond that six month period until such time that the driver’s privileges are formally restored”). Contrary to the Appellate Court’s reasoning in the present case, neither of these rationales was rendered obsolete by the 2014 amendments to §§ 14-227a and 14-227b. Both statutes still provided a fixed, unqualified license suspension

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period. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227a (g) (“[a]ny person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall: (1) For conviction of a first violation . . . have such person’s motor vehicle operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege suspended for forty-five days”); General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227b (i) (1) (“[t]he commissioner shall suspend the operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege . . . for a period of forty-five days”). Although the 2014 amendments added a new requirement—i.e., installation of an IID—that requirement expressly qualifies license restoration, not expiration of the license suspension period. See Public Acts 2014, No. 14-228, §§ 5 and 6. Accordingly, we conclude that *Jacobson* and *Cook* are fully applicable to and controlling of the issue of statutory interpretation presented in this case.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Appellate Court distinguished *Jacobson* on the ground that the IID requirement for restoration is incorporated *within* § 14-227b, whereas the proof of financial responsibility requirement for restoration in *Jacobson* was imposed by a separate statute. See *State v. Schimanski*, *supra*, 201 Conn. App. 177 (“The [1989] revision of § 14-227a at issue in *Jacobson* specified a fixed one year license suspension without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration, and the 1991 revision of § 14-227b at issue in *Cook* contained a fixed six month license suspension, also without statutorily mandated conditions for restoration. Sections 14-227a and 14-227b were amended in 2014, effective in 2015, to shorten the mandatory license suspension period to forty-five days *and* to add the IID requirement in connection with restoration.” (Emphasis in original.)) However, the distinction drawn by the Appellate Court is irrelevant, as both the IID requirement and the proof of financial responsibility requirement are understood to operate as preconditions *for*

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restoration, which is the salient similarity for purposes of our analysis. Thus, regardless of where the legislature elected to incorporate the requirement within the statutory framework, the court in *Jacobson* confronted an identical issue to the one now before us—specifically, whether a statutory precondition for restoration extends an expressly defined suspension period.

In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court further reasoned that the defendant’s interpretation of § 14-227b (i) (1) would “yield an absurd result” by “incentiviz[ing] an individual, whose license or operating privilege has been suspended pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1), *not* to install an IID and complete the restoration process” because, then, they would only be subject to lesser penalties.²⁰ (Emphasis in original.) *State v. Schimanski*, supra, 201 Conn. App. 174–75. The Appellate Court’s reasoning failed to take into account General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (a), as amended by Public Acts 2017, No. 17-79, § 13, which provides that “[n]o person whose right to operate a motor vehicle has been restricted pursuant to an order of the court under subsection (b) of section 14-227j, by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles or by any provision of law that requires the use of an ignition interlock device, shall (1) request or solicit another person to blow into an ignition interlock device or to start a motor vehicle equipped with an ignition interlock device for the purpose of providing such person with an operable motor vehicle, or (2) operate any motor vehicle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device or any motor vehicle that a court has ordered such person not to operate.”

²⁰ Although the Appellate Court did not expressly state what lesser penalties it is referring to, one such penalty may be the aforementioned § 14-215b, which would have imposed a maximum penalty of a \$25 late fee. See General Statutes § 14-41 (c) (“[a]ny previously licensed operator who fails to renew a motor vehicle operator’s license in accordance with subsection (a) of this section shall be charged a late fee of twenty-five dollars upon renewal of such operator’s license”).

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(Emphasis added.) Contrary to the Appellate Court’s reasoning, therefore, § 14-227k (a) not only penalizes the *exact* conduct the Appellate Court fears will be incentivized under the defendant’s interpretation, but the statute imposes the same penalties for a violation of its provisions as § 14-215 (c) (1). See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-227k (c) (2) (“[a]ny person who violates any provision of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsection (c) of section 14-215”); General Statutes § 14-215 (c) (1) (providing that person who violates section “shall be fined not less than five hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than one year, and, in the absence of any mitigating circumstances as determined by the court, thirty consecutive days of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced in any manner”).

We disagree with the state that § 14-227k is applicable only after a person has restored his or her license. Section 14-227k does not distinguish between restored and unrestored status. Moreover, an individual may not lawfully operate a motor vehicle in the absence of a restored license; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 14-36 (a) (“no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state or private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with subsection (a) of section 14-218a until such person has obtained a motor vehicle operator’s license”); and § 14-227b (i) (1) requires installation of an IID before an individual’s license may be restored. Therefore, § 14-227b (i) (1) places a restriction on a person’s right to operate a motor vehicle that requires the use of an IID for purposes of § 14-227k (a). Consequently, an individual who is subject to the provisions of § 14-227b (i) (1) and who operates a motor vehicle without an IID, prior to having his or her license restored, is in violation of § 14-227k (a).

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Finally, the state argues that the regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to implement the provisions of § 14-227b support the Appellate Court's interpretation of the statute. See General Statutes § 14-227b (o) (“[t]he Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this section”). Specifically, the state points to §§ 14-227b-12 and 14-227b-13 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.²¹ Although the cited regulations support the Appellate Court's interpretation, they are entitled to no deference because, as we explained, the statute unambiguously limits the suspension period to forty-five days, and an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference only when the statute is *ambiguous* and has previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny, and when the agency's interpretation has been time tested. See, e.g., *Vincent v. New Haven*, 285 Conn. 778, 784 n.8, 941 A.2d 932 (2008).

In sum, the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to § 14-227b (i) (1) does not continue

²¹ Section 14-227b-12 (b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part that the “Connecticut operator's license or privilege” of a person who refuses a chemical test associated with an arrest for operating under the influence “shall be suspended automatically on the effective date for the period of time prescribed in subsection (i) of section 14-227b of the Connecticut General Statutes and *shall remain suspended thereafter until such person has installed an ignition interlock device in accordance with subsection (i) of section 14-227b* of the Connecticut General Statutes and sections 14-227a-11a through 14-227a-28a, inclusive, of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Section 14-227b-13 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides that an operator who received a suspension notice, but failed to request a hearing on their suspension, shall receive an additional notice affirming their suspension that must state that “(1) as a condition of reinstatement of such person's Connecticut operator's license or privilege, such person shall install an ignition interlock device in each motor vehicle owned or operated by such person and maintain such device for the period of time required in subsection (i) of section 14-227b of the Connecticut General Statutes and specified in the suspension notice; and (2) *such person's operator's license or privilege shall remain suspended until such person has installed an ignition interlock device.*” (Emphasis added.)

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until the operator has installed an IID but, rather, is strictly limited to the forty-five days specified in the statute. Because the defendant's license suspension period expired on December 2, 2017, she was not operating a motor vehicle while her operator's license was under suspension on December 4, 2017.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed insofar as that court dismissed the defendant's appeal with respect to her motion to dismiss the second count of the state's first substitute information; the judgment of the Appellate Court is otherwise reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with direction to reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the case to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the state's second substitute information.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.
