ARMEL WASHINGTON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, SC 18057

Judicial District of Tolland at Somers

 Habeas; Due Process; Double Jeopardy; Application of Presentence Confinement Credits Under General Statutes § 18-98d. On October 31, 2001, the petitioner was sentenced on two dockets to concurrent sentences, resulting in a three year term to serve (New Haven sentence).  His presentence jail credit included 532 days that he had accrued simultaneously on those dockets as well as on two other dockets in Waterbury.  The respondent applied this credit pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98d (a) (1), which authorizes a reduction in a person's sentence for each day spent in such confinement, provided that "each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement. . . ."  The petitioner's release date was scheduled for April 25, 2003.  Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to the Waterbury charges and was sentenced on April 14, 2003, to two concurrent seven year terms, to be served concurrently with the New Haven sentence (Waterbury sentence).  The respondent, in accordance with its policy at the time, moved the 532 days of credit to the Waterbury sentence, resulting in a release date of October 7, 2008, and a new release date on the New Haven sentence of October 8, 2004.  Then, in November, 2004, the Supreme Court issued three decisions interpreting § 18-98d (a) (1), with the lead case being Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808 (2004).  In Harris, the court concluded that where a defendant simultaneously has accrued presentence credit on separate dockets and where concurrent sentences are then imposed on different dates, once the credit has been applied to the first of the sentences, it may not be applied again to advance the discharge date for the second sentence.  In February, 2005, the respondent, after reviewing the petitioner's sentences for compliance with these decisions, returned the credit to the New Haven sentence, thereby extending his release date to March 23, 2010.  Thereafter, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, among other things, that his right to presentence credit under § 18-98d (a) (1) was violated because  neither his Waterbury sentence nor his New Haven sentence was reduced by the 532 days of credit.  He claimed that his New Haven sentence was not reduced because that sentence had been served and discharged while he was serving the Waterbury sentence and before the Harris cases were decided.  He also argued that his due process rights were violated because, in recalculating his discharge date, the respondent retroactively applied the construction of § 18-98d enunciated in the Harris cases, and this lengthened his term of incarceration.  Further, he contended that the lengthening of his discharged sentence violated the double jeopardy clause.  The court rejected these claims.  Among other things, the court determined that when the 532 days were originally posted to the New Haven sentence, those days were fully utilized and applied to that docket.  Hence, it concluded that the petitioner was not deprived of the presentence credits.  The petitioner now appeals.