STATE v. FRANK M. JENKINS, SC 18018

Judicial District of Ansonia-Milford 

      Criminal; Final Judgment; Mental Competency; Whether Maximum Period of Placement Under General Statutes § 54-56d (i) was Exceeded.  The defendant was charged with kidnapping, sexual assault and risk of injury to a minor in connection with an incident that occurred in 2002.  Pursuant to § 54-56d, he was evaluated for his competency to stand trial.  On nine occasions between December, 2002, and May, 2006, the court found that the defendant was not competent but that he was restorable to competency.  The defendant received inpatient treatment for three periods that totaled twenty-one months.  Subsequently, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming, among other things, that his twenty-one month placement for treatment exceeded the maximum period that he could be confined pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d (i), which provides that "[t]he period of placement under the order or combination of orders shall not exceed the period of the maximum sentence which the defendant could receive on conviction of the charges against him, or eighteen months, whichever is less. . . . "  The court disagreed, concluding that the period of placement referred to in the statute is not a cumulative period, as the defendant argued, but rather a consecutive period that ends when there has been a finding that a defendant has regained competency.  It thus concluded that the defendant's placement period did not exceed the statutory limit and denied the motion, noting that the provisions of § 54-56d (m), which govern the release or placement of a defendant who has not attained competency within the period provided, were not applicable.  Thereafter, the defendant filed this appeal.  As an initial matter, the defendant asserts that this court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear his appeal.  He maintains that the trial court's interlocutory ruling denying his motion to dismiss constituted an appealable final judgment under State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 34 (1983), because it "so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them."  The defendant contends that he is being deprived of his right to liberty under the fourteenth amendment, as embodied in subsections (i) and (m) of § 54-56d, and that this right cannot be vindicated after trial.  The defendant's claim on appeal is that the court improperly interpreted § 54-56d (i).