



Michael P. Bowler
Statewide Bar Counsel

Frances Mickelson-Dera
Christopher L. Slack
First Assistant Bar Counsel

Tel: (860) 568-5157

Fax: (860) 568-4953

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

www.jud.ct.gov/sgc/
Second Floor - Suite Two
287 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06118-1885

06/18/2012

OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY C
100 WASHINGTON STREET
HARTFORD CT 06106

JOHN T NUGENT
LAW OFFICES OF
JOHN T. NUGENT
184 HOBART STREET
SOUTHINGTON CT 06489

RE: GRIEVANCE COMPLAINT #10-0744
MANZO vs. NUGENT

Dear Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel:

Enclosed herewith is the decision of the reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee concerning the above referenced matter. In accordance with the Practice Book Sections 2-35, 2-36 and 2-38(a), the Respondent may, within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice, submit to the Statewide Grievance Committee a request for review of the decision.

A request for review must be sent to the Statewide Grievance Committee at the address listed above.

Sincerely,

Michael P. Bowler

Encl.

cc: Attorney Richard T. Florentine
HOWARD KOHN SPRAGUE & FITZGERA
Samuel Manzo

NOTICE REGARDING DECISION
SANCTIONS OR CONDITIONS

GRIEVANCE COMPLAINT # 10-0744

THE ATTACHED DECISION IS PRESENTLY STAYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRACTICE BOOK §§2-35 AND 2-38.

SECTION 2-35 STATES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:

(e) ... Enforcement of the final decision ... shall be stayed for thirty days from the date of the issuance to the parties of the final decision. In the event the respondent timely submits to the Statewide Grievance Committee a request for review of the final decision of the reviewing committee, such stay shall remain in full force and effect pursuant to Section 2-38(b).

SECTION 2-38 STATES, IN PART, AS FOLLOWS:

(b) ... Enforcement of a decision by a reviewing committee imposing sanctions or conditions against the respondent ... shall be stayed for thirty days from the issuance to the parties of the final decision of the reviewing committee pursuant to Section 2-35(g). If within that period the respondent files with the Statewide Grievance Committee a request for review of the reviewing committee's decision, the stay shall remain in effect for thirty days from the issuance by the Statewide Grievance Committee of its final decision pursuant to Section 2-36. If the respondent timely commences an appeal [of the sanctions or conditions to the Superior Court] pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, such stay shall remain in full force and effect until the conclusion of all proceedings, including all appeals, relating to the decision imposing sanctions or conditions against the respondent. If at the conclusion of all proceedings, the decision imposing sanctions or conditions against the respondent is rescinded, the complaint shall be deemed dismissed as of the date of the decision imposing sanctions or conditions against the respondent.

DECISION DATE: 6/18/12

STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE

Samuel Manzo :
Complainant :
vs. : Grievance Complaint #10-0744
John T. Nugent :
Respondent :

DECISION

Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-35, the undersigned, duly-appointed reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, conducted hearings in connection with the above referenced matter on the following dates and at the following locations: September 7, 2011 at the Superior Court, 1061 Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut; December 1, 2011 and February 16, 2012 at the Superior Court, 1 Lafayette Circle, Bridgeport, Connecticut. The hearings addressed the record of the complaint filed on August 30, 2010, and the probable cause determination filed by the New Britain Judicial District and the Judicial District of Hartford for Geographical Area 12 and the towns of Avon, Bloomfield, Canton, Farmington and West Hartford Grievance Panel on December 8, 2010, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.14 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearings also addressed the additional probable cause determination issued by the reviewing committee of Attorney David I. Channing and Attorney Nancy E. Fraser ("Channing reviewing committee") on March 24, 2011, finding that there existed probable cause that the Respondent violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(3) & (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

This matter was originally scheduled for a hearing before the reviewing committee of Attorney Howard Gould, Attorney Hugh Cuthbertson, and Mr. Peter Jenkins ("Gould reviewing committee") on February 10, 2011. Notice of the February 10, 2011 hearing was mailed to the Complainant, to the Respondent and to the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel on January 4, 2011. Pursuant to Practice Book § 2-35(d), Chief Disciplinary Counsel Mark Dubois appeared at the hearing. The Complainant and the Respondent did not appear at the hearing. Attorney James Sullivan appeared on behalf of the Respondent. At the hearing, Attorney Dubois and Attorney Sullivan requested a continuance in order to discuss a possible resolution of the matter by agreement. The Gould reviewing committee granted the continuance. Thereafter, the matter was assigned to the Channing reviewing committee for a hearing on April 14, 2011. Prior to the hearing, the Channing reviewing committee reviewed the record and issued an additional finding of probable cause on March 24, 2011. The April 14, 2011 hearing was subsequently postponed and the matter was assigned to this reviewing committee for a hearing on July 6, 2011. The July 6, 2011 hearing was continued at the request of the Respondent on the basis that the Respondent was considering resigning from the bar. Since the Respondent never pursued the resignation, a hearing was scheduled for September 7, 2011 before this reviewing committee.

Notice of the September 7, 2011 hearing was mailed to the Complainant, to the Respondent and to the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel on July 27, 2011. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(d), Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Suzanne Sutton pursued the matter before this reviewing committee. The Complainant appeared at the hearing. The Respondent appeared at the hearing and testified. The Respondent was represented at the hearing by Attorney Sullivan. At the hearing, this reviewing committee heard argument on the Respondent's February 1, 2011 Motion to Dismiss and August 31, 2011 Supplement. The Respondent argued that the probable cause findings should be dismissed because the Respondent, as conservator, did not have an attorney/client relationship with his ward and because his actions as conservator were immune from disciplinary review. This reviewing committee granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.14 probable cause findings issued by the grievance panel due to a lack of an attorney/client relationship between the Respondent and his ward. We denied, however, the Respondent's motion to dismiss the Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(3) and (4) additional probable cause findings issued by the Channing reviewing committee, finding that the Respondent's actions as conservator were not immune from disciplinary review. Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 543 (2005); Shaughnessey v. Statewide Grievance Committee, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. HHD-CV-09-4045136S (Oct. 14, 2009) (48 Conn. L. Rptr. 649) (Sheldon, J.); Grievance Complaint #10-0461; Katzenberg v. Goldstein.

The matter was scheduled for an additional hearing on November 3, 2011 because the hearing did not conclude on September 7, 2011. The November 3, 2011 hearing was cancelled due to weather related issues. The matter was, thereafter, rescheduled for hearings on December 1, 2011 and February 16, 2012. Notice of the hearings was mailed to the Complainant, to the Respondent and to the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel on November 10, 2011 and January 11, 2012, respectively. Pursuant to Practice Book §2-35(d), Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Suzanne Sutton pursued the matter before this reviewing committee. The Complainant and the Respondent appeared at the hearings and testified. The Respondent was represented by Attorney Sullivan.

At the December 1, 2011 hearing, this reviewing committee heard argument on the Respondent's November 25, 2011 Motion to Dismiss Rules 8.4(3) and (4) additional findings of probable cause on the basis that Rule 8.4(4) is unconstitutionally vague and because the findings failed to provide the Respondent with adequate notice of the charges. We denied the motion on the record.

This reviewing committee also heard the testimony of Attorney Valerie DePaolo, Attorney Bryan Meccariello and Attorney Matthew LeFevre. Twenty-five exhibits were admitted into evidence. We also considered the post hearing briefs filed by Disciplinary Counsel and the Respondent on April 16, 2011.

This reviewing committee finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

On April 22, 2004, Josephine Smoron executed a will leaving a minor bequest to Kathleen Scirpo and the remainder of her estate to the Complainant. The will was prepared by the law firm of Elliott, Stanek and Taylor. Ms. Smoron never married and had no children. She and her brother, Stanley, owned considerable farmland in Southington which had been cared for by the Complainant since 1985. In April of 2007, the Complainant was appointed as conservator for the person and estate of Ms. Smoron and Attorney Valerie DePaolo was appointed as her attorney. On January 15, 2008, Probate Court Judge Bryan Meccariello removed the Complainant as conservator and appointed the Respondent as successor conservator. Ms. Smoron was approximately ninety-one years old at the time, suffering from dementia, in poor health, and had been placed in a nursing home.

At the time of the Respondent's appointment, Ms. Smoron's farmland was subject to Stanley Smoron's estate. Following Stanley's death, Ms. Smoron became involved in a will contest with the three Catholic churches named as beneficiaries in Stanley's will. Ms. Smoron had executed a will in March of 1984 which also left her estate to these three Catholic churches. However, in December of 1996, following the will contest, Ms. Smoron executed a new will, indicating that she did not want any of her estate going to these churches. Ms. Smoron eventually prevailed in the will contest. In January of 2001, Ms. Smoron entered into an option to purchase a portion of the farmland with Calco Construction and Development, Inc. ("Calco"). In 2006, the Complainant, as executor of Stanley Smoron's estate, opposed the option. When the Respondent replaced the Complainant as conservator of Ms. Smoron's estate, he accepted Calco's option to purchase the property for \$550,000. The Respondent used approximately \$137,000 of these funds to satisfy an existing mortgage on a parcel of the farmland.

On January 17, 2008, at the request of the probate court, a copy of Ms. Smoron's 2004 will was faxed to the probate court by the firm that prepared the will. On January 31, 2008, Attorney John Grasso sent the Respondent a copy of a pleading filed in connection with the Estate of Stanley Smoron. The pleading states the following: "Mr. Manzo, is upon information and belief founded upon his admission, either the sole or principal heir and beneficiary according to a testamentary instrument made by Josephine Smoron." Thereafter, on March 6, 2008, the Respondent and the Complainant's attorney, Joseph DiMauro, appeared at a probate court hearing before Judge Meccariello. At the hearing, the terms of Ms. Smoron's will were discussed, including the fact that the Complainant was named as the primary beneficiary. The March 6, 2008 transcript states the following: "Also recognizing the fact that Sam Manzo... was, he is a nonrelative of the Smorons, although he may have been working for them for fifteen years plus. As you mentioned, he is the only beneficiary in the will. He stands to inherit the entire estate of Josephine Smoron, which will include her brother, Stanley, Stanley's estate." It also states that, ". . . and you need to, you need to be careful, because there's a will that was reported to be signed by Josephine Smoron leaving Sam Manzo everything."

On or about September 19, 2008, the Respondent entered into a contract with Central Connecticut Contracting to sell Ms. Smoron's real estate for \$2,071,000. The sale price was subsequently amended on February 11, 2009 to \$1,572,300. On January 29, 2009, the Respondent filed a periodic accounting in Ms. Smoron's estate showing \$280,395 in liquid assets and total assets of \$1,172,395. Thereafter, the Respondent retained Attorney Matthew LeFevre for assistance in handling Ms. Smoron's assets. On April 21, 2009, Attorney LeFevre, on behalf of the Respondent, filed an application with the probate court "... for the approval of the creation and funding of The Josephine Smoron Revocable Trust and The Josephine Smoron Irrevocable Trust." The Respondent was named as trustee for both trusts. The irrevocable trust document indicated that the trust would be funded by real property. It did not state, however, which property or properties would fund the trust. The revocable trust document indicated that the trust would be funded with liquid assets. It also did not state what liquid assets would fund the trust. Article III of both trusts provided that upon Ms. Smoron's death, the assets of the trusts would be distributed, on an equal basis to Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church, Holy Cross Roman Catholic Church, and Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church, the three churches named as beneficiaries in Stanley Smoron's will and expressly denounced in Ms. Smoron's 1996 will.

On May 1, 2009, the probate court issued a notice scheduling a hearing for May 12, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. to consider the application to create and fund the trusts. The notice was sent to the Respondent, Attorney LeFevre, Ms. Smoron and Attorney DePaolo. The notice was not sent to the Complainant or his counsel. The hearing went forward on May 12, 2009 before Judge Meccariello. No one else was present at the hearing which began at 9:30 a.m., as recorded in the transcript. The transcript of the hearing indicates that the court was aware of the existence of Ms. Smoron's will which left her estate to the Complainant. The court issued a decree on May 12, 2009 ordering that "The application to establish and fund two trusts for the benefit of the conserved person, Josephine Smoron, is hereby approved and allowed." During this time, Ms. Smoron was in the hospital and refusing to eat.

On May 12, 2009, the Respondent signed three quit claim deeds as conservator of Ms. Smoron's estate, transferring three parcels of real estate into the irrevocable trust. The deeds were recorded on May 14, 2009. On May 14, 2009, the Respondent also deposited \$218,826, the proceeds from all of Ms. Smoron's bank accounts, into the revocable trust. Ms. Smoron subsequently passed away on June 20, 2009.

On February 5, 2010, Judge Meccariello granted the Complainant's motion to reconsider the May 12, 2009 order regarding the trusts and ordered a rehearing. The Respondent filed a motion in opposition to the motion to reconsider. Thereafter, on February 25, 2010, Judge Meccariello recused himself from the matter because the Complainant had filed a grievance against him with the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct. On March 9, 2010, Judge Walter Clebowicz was appointed to replace Judge Meccariello and rule on the motion to reconsider. On July 20, 2010, Judge Clebowicz held

that the probate court did not have statutory authority to revoke or modify the May 12, 2009 decree. In August of 2010, the three churches disclaimed their interests in the trusts. On September 8, 2010, the Respondent testified before the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct in connection with the complaint filed against Judge Meccariello by the Complainant. At the hearing, the Respondent testified under oath that he did not hear any discussions regarding Ms. Smoron's will at the March 6, 2009 hearing before Judge Meccariello. Thereafter, on September 17, 2010, the Respondent's counsel filed a motion with the probate court challenging the legality of the disclaimers. The matter is pending. On September 20, 2010, the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct publicly sanctioned Judge Meccariello.

This reviewing committee also considered the following:

Attorney Valerie DePaolo, Ms. Smoron's court appointed attorney, testified that the Respondent provided her with a copy of the trusts prior to the May 12, 2009 hearing. Attorney DePaolo questioned the Respondent regarding the designation of the three churches as beneficiaries and was told that Ms. Smoron had a history with these churches. Attorney DePaolo also maintained that the Respondent did not discuss with her what property or funds would be used to fund the trusts. Attorney DePaolo stated that she arrived at the court late for the hearing on May 12, 2009 and was told by the clerk that the hearing had concluded and that the trusts had been approved. Although she had questions regarding the beneficiaries, she believed that another hearing would be scheduled to fund the trusts.

Attorney Matthew LeFevre testified that he was retained by the Respondent to provide a vehicle to protect Ms. Smoron's assets. Attorney LeFevre stated that the revocable trust was created for Ms. Smoron's liquid assets, however, the trust would not protect these funds from creditors. The irrevocable trust allowed Ms. Smoron to live on the property and receive any income generated by the property. If the property were sold, Ms. Smoron could use the interest earned on the funds, but could not use the principal. Attorney LeFevre testified that he did not know that the Respondent had entered into a purchase agreement on Ms. Smoron's property at the time he was consulted to create the trusts. Attorney LeFevre further testified that he spoke with the Respondent regarding how the trusts would be funded prior to the trusts being approved. Attorney LeFevre stated that he arrived at the May 12, 2009 hearing prior to 9:00 a.m. and was told that the hearing had been held earlier and that the trusts had been approved. Attorney LeFevre indicated that the trusts submitted to the probate court did not contain a Schedule A indicating what funds or property would fund the trusts. Attorney LeFevre testified that this was his practice, but this was the only time that he had seen a probate court approve the funding of a trust without a discussion as to how the trust would be funded.

Attorney Bryan Meccariello, the probate court judge handling Ms. Smoron's estate, testified that at the March 6, 2008 hearing at which the Respondent was present, three references were made

regarding the Complainant being named as the beneficiary in Ms. Smoron's will. Attorney Meccariello stated that Ms. Smoron's will was not in her probate court file and that he never saw a copy of the will. He indicated, however, that the will was in the clerk's file and that the Respondent could have seen it had he requested.

Attorney Meccariello testified that if land is transferred out of a conservatorship estate it needs to be approved by the probate court. Attorney Meccariello maintained that pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §45a-656b(a), the conservator cannot sell property unless the probate court approves the sale after a hearing and the conservator must show that the sale is necessary, or that the conserved person agrees. Attorney Meccariello maintained that this was not done by the Respondent. Attorney Meccariello indicated that the order sent stating that he approved the creation and funding of the trusts was not accurate. Attorney Meccariello referred to the transcript of the May 12, 2009 hearing in which he states that, "The court hereby approves the trust and my decree will be signed and sent out forth with." When he issued his order, Attorney Meccariello anticipated that the Respondent would file another pleading indicating how the trusts would be funded. Attorney Meccariello testified that the Complainant was not given notice of the May 12, 2009 hearing because he had been removed as conservator and the clerk had taken him off of the list of people to receive notice.

The Respondent testified that Attorney LeFevre suggested creating a revocable and an irrevocable trust for Ms. Smoron. The revocable trust would be used to pay Ms. Smoron's bills which amounted to approximately \$15,000 a month since Ms. Smoron was not on Medicare or Social Security. The irrevocable trust was established to protect the land from liens should Ms. Smoron have to go on Title 19 if her liquid funds were depleted. The Respondent acknowledged that the look back period for Title 19 was five years and that Ms. Smoron's liquid funds would probably have been depleted before the five year look back period. The Respondent maintained that he and Attorney LeFevre did not discuss how the trusts would be funded until after the trusts were approved by the probate court.

The Respondent maintained that Attorney LeFevre requested beneficiaries for the irrevocable trust. The Respondent obtained the two wills from Stanley Smoron's Estate and used the three Catholic churches named in the wills as beneficiaries of Ms. Smoron's irrevocable trust. The Respondent testified that he believed that Ms. Smoron's will would mirror her brother's will. The Respondent acknowledged, however, that he made no attempt to determine if Ms. Smoron had a will. The Respondent never spoke with Ms. Smoron or the Complainant about a will. The Respondent maintained that he did not speak with Ms. Smoron because she was suffering from dementia. The Respondent never searched Ms. Smoron's house for a will. The Respondent did not review Ms. Smoron's probate court file or ask the probate court clerk if they had a copy of Ms. Smoron's will. After obtaining Stanley's will, the Respondent did not attempt to contact the lawyer who prepared his will to determine if they also prepared a will for Ms. Smoron. The Respondent testified that the

only action he took to find Ms. Smoron's will was to ask Attorney DiMauro verbally for any "important documents" the Complainant may have in his possession.

The Respondent testified that he has difficulty hearing as a result of his service in the Navy. The Respondent maintained that, because of this, he did not hear any of the conversation concerning the Complainant's claims to Ms. Smoron's estate during the March 6, 2008 hearing and also because he was busy reviewing the final accounting submitted by the Complainant. The Respondent acknowledged receiving the January 31, 2008 letter from Attorney Grasso enclosing motions that made reference to the Complainant being the beneficiary of a "testamentary instrument" made by Ms. Smoron. The Respondent maintained that he did not, thereafter, look for a will because, in his opinion, the reference to a "testamentary instrument" did not necessarily refer to a will.

This reviewing committee concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent engaged in unethical conduct. As conservator of Ms. Smoron's estate and person, the Respondent transferred the assets of her estate into two trusts naming himself as trustee and three Catholic churches as beneficiaries. In doing so, the Respondent gave himself control over Ms. Smoron's estate after her death, when his conservatorship would have ended. In addition, his actions were in direct contravention of Ms. Smoron's 1996 will in which she expressly denounced her prior bequests to these churches and her 2004 will in which she left her estate to the Complainant.

The Respondent maintained that he had no knowledge of Ms. Smoron's prior wills and that his actions, although contrary to her testamentary wishes, were in Ms. Smoron's best interests. The record, however, does not support a finding that the Respondent's actions were in Ms. Smoron's best interests. The Respondent contended that he needed money to pay Ms. Smoron's on-going medical expenses, yet he used \$136,000 from the option to purchase proceeds to pay-off a mortgage on the property, unencumbering the property and allowing him to enter into a contract to sell Ms. Smoron's real estate. Thereafter, the Respondent placed this property in an irrevocable trust, which prohibited Ms. Smoron access to the principal received from the sale of the property. The Respondent maintained that he placed the land in an irrevocable trust to protect the land from liens should Ms. Smoron have to go on Title 19. However, the look-back period for Title 19 is five years and Ms. Smoron's liquid funds would have been depleted prior to the five year period.

In addition to concluding that the Respondent's actions were not in Ms. Smoron's best interests; we conclude that the Respondent's statements regarding his knowledge of Ms. Smoron's testamentary wishes are not credible. The record reflects that the Respondent was expressly made aware of Ms. Smoron's testamentary bequest to the Complainant on two occasions. The Respondent acknowledged receiving a pleading from attorney John Grasso in January of 2008, which stated that the Complainant was believed to be "either the sole or principal heir and beneficiary according to a testamentary instrument made by Josephine Smoron." Despite this representation, the Respondent

made no effort to locate Ms. Smoron's will and confirm this information. Instead, he obtained Stanley Smoron's will and assumed that Ms. Smoron's wishes would be the same as that of her brother. The Respondent made no effort to contact the law firm that prepared Stanley's will to determine if they also prepared a will for Ms. Smoron. In addition, the Respondent never searched Ms. Smoron's house or belongings for a will, nor did he ever speak to Ms. Smoron or the Complainant, her long-time care taker and former conservator, about a will. Although the Respondent reviewed Stanley's probate court file, he never reviewed Ms. Smoron's file and never inquired about a will for Ms. Smoron with the probate court. The most the Respondent did to locate a will was to verbally ask the Complainant's attorney, Joseph DiMauro, to provide him with any "important documents" upon his appointment as successor conservator to the Complainant.

In addition to receiving the pleading from Attorney Grasso regarding Ms. Smoron's will, the Respondent also appeared at a probate court hearing on March 6, 2008 where her will was mentioned on at least three occasions. Furthermore, the discussions regarding Ms. Smoron's will specifically concerned the fact that the Complainant was named as the primary beneficiary. Although the Respondent was present at this hearing, he maintained that he did not hear these discussions regarding the will because he was reviewing the final accounting submitted by the Complainant and because he has difficulty hearing. This reviewing committee does not find the Respondent's testimony to be credible. We conclude that the Respondent knew that Ms. Smoron had a will that left her estate to the Complainant. Rather than actively search for this will and confirm Ms. Smoron's testamentary wishes, however, the Respondent chose to ignore the information presented to him and develop a mechanism that would give him control over Ms. Smoron's estate after her death and allow him to determine who would inherit her estate. Accordingly, we conclude that the Respondent violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) & 8.4(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by falsely testifying before the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct that he had no knowledge of Ms. Smoron's will naming the Complainant as the beneficiary of her estate when he created the trusts.

Since this reviewing committee concludes that the Respondent knew that Ms. Smoron had a will leaving her estate to the Complainant, we are compelled to conclude that the Respondent's actions in transferring the assets of Ms. Smoron's estate into two trusts that left her estate to the three Catholic churches was also unethical. The fact that the probate court approved the creation and funding of these trusts does not exonerate the Respondent. We find that the Respondent's actions in knowingly contravening Ms. Smoron's testamentary wishes support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent sought to intentionally deceive and defraud Ms. Smoron in violation of Rule 8.4(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We further conclude that the Respondent's actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

This reviewing committee orders that the Respondent be reprimanded for his violations of Rules 3.3(a)(1) & 8.4(3) & (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Grievance Complaint #10-0744
Decision
Page 9

DECISION DATE: 6/10/12

(3)
pr

Grievance Complaint #10-0744


Decision

Page 10



Attorney Frank J. Riccio, II

Grievance Complaint #10-0744
Decision
Page 11


A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Howard C. Eckenrode", written over a horizontal line.

Attorney Howard C. Eckenrode

Grievance Complaint #10-0744

Decision

Page 12



Rev. Simon Castillo