Connecticut
Judicial Branch Law Libraries
Copyright ©2000-2008, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved.
Legal Separation
in Connecticut
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
· “A decree of legal separation shall have the effect of a decree dissolving marriage except that neither party shall be free to marry.” Conn. Gen. Stats. §46b‑67(b) (2008).
· Civil Union: “Wherever in the general statutes the terms ‘spouse’, ‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent’, ‘next of kin’ or any other term that denotes the spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes, except sections 7-45 and 17b-137a, subdivision (4) of section 45a-727a, and sections 46b-20 to 46b-34, inclusive, 46b-38nn and 46b-150d, the term ‘marriage’ is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or definition. Wherever in the general statutes, except sections 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-64c and 46a-66, the term ‘marital status’ is used or defined, civil union status shall be included in such use or definition.” (Effective October 1, 2005) (Emphasis added)
· “Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman.” 2005 Conn. Acts 10 § 14 (EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2005).
· “The plaintiff filed for legal separation on May 11, 2001, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. The defendant filed a cross complaint for dissolution of the parties' marriage. On October 15, 2002, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage.” Raso v. Raso, 92 Conn. App. 678, 679, 886 A.2d 863 (2005) (Emphasis added).
· “In Szot v. Szot, 41 Conn. App. 238, 674 A.2d 1384 (1996), we reversed the trial court's judgment that converted a legal separation into a marital dissolution on the ground that the court had violated the plaintiff's right to due process by terminating a hearing prematurely and, thus, denying her a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues involved. Id., 238-39. Our recitation of the facts in Szot is instructive.” Eilers v. Eilers, 89 Conn. App. 210, 216, 873 A.2d 185 (2005). (Emphasis added)
· “Before the court can address financial issues when converting a legal separation to a decree of dissolution, it must first examine the relationship of the parties. If it determines that the parties have resumed marital relations, it must reexamine the final order entered at the time of the legal separation in a full hearing. If the parties’ relationship is unchanged, the court plays a minor role and merely converts the de facto dissolution to a de jure dissolution. Gilbert v. Gilbert, No. FA 04-0485657 (Conn. Super. New Haven, May 13, 2008), 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 553 (July 21, 2008) (Emphasis added).
Contents of this chapter
§ 1. Effect, definition and history
§ 2. Grounds for legal separation
§ 2.2g. Imprisonment/Infamous crime
§ 2.2h. Confinement/Mental illness
§ 6.0. Conversion to dissolution of marriage
Tables in this chapter
Table 2 Fault and Financial Awards
Table 3 Constructive desertion
Figures in this chapter
Figure 1 Petition for decree dissolving marriage after legal separation
Effect, Definition and History
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
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SCOPE: |
· Bibliographic resources relating to distinction between legal separation and a dissolution of marriage.
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DEFINITION:
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· EFFECT OF DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION: “A decree of legal separation shall have the effect of a decree dissolving marriage except that neither party shall be free to marry.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-67(b) (2008)
· “ . . . a decree of separation does not affect the married status of the separated persons.” Viglione v. Viglione, 22 Conn. Supp. 65, 68, 160 A.2d 501 (1960). · |
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STATUTES:
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· Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008). § 46b-65. Filing of declaration of resumption of marital relations; dissolution of marriage after legal separation decree when no declaration filed. (a) If the parties to a decree of legal separation at any time resume marital relations and file their written declaration of resumption, signed, acknowledged and witnessed, with the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the separation was decreed, the declaration shall be entered upon the docket, under the entries relating to the complaint, and the decree shall be vacated and the complaint shall be deemed dismissed.
(b) If no declaration has been filed under subsection (a) of this section, then at any time after the entry of a decree of legal separation, either party may petition the superior court for the judicial district in which the decree was entered for a decree dissolving the marriage and the court shall enter the decree in the presence of the party seeking the dissolution.
§ 46b‑67. Waiting period. Effect of decree. (a) Following the expiration of ninety days after the day on which a complaint for dissolution or legal separation is made returnable, or after the expiration of six months, where proceedings have been stayed under section 46b-53, the court may proceed on the complaint, or whenever dissolution is claimed under cross complaint, amended complaint or amended cross complaint, the case may be heard and a decree granted thereon after the expiration of the ninety days and twenty days after the cross complaint, amended complaint or amended cross complaint has been filed with the court, provided the requirement of the twenty-day delay shall not apply (1) whenever opposing counsel, having appeared, consents to the cross complaint, amended complaint or amended cross complaint, or (2) where the defendant has not appeared and the amendment does not set forth either a cause of action or a claim for relief not in the original complaint. Nothing in this section shall prevent any interlocutory proceedings within the ninety-day period.
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HISTORY:
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1955 (Supp. 1955, vol. 2) § 3006d. First Legislation.
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COURT RULES :
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· Conn. Practice Book (2008). § 25-36. Motion for decree finally dissolving marriage after decree of legal separation § 25-37. —Notice and hearing.
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FORMS:
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· 2 Conn. Practice Book (1997). Form 504.1. Complaint for legal separation Form 504.2. Petition for decree dissolving marriage after legal separation · Mary Ellen Wynn and Ellen B. Lubell, Handbook of Forms for the Connecticut Family Lawyer (1991). Form II-A-2. Complaint, p. 6. Form XVIII‑A‑1a. Petition for decree dissolving marriage after legal separation, p. 261 Form XVIII‑A‑2. Declaration of resumption of marital relationship, p. 264
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CASES:
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· Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, No. FA00 0178810S, 2001 Ct. Sup. 10444, 10444, 2001 WL 985061 (Aug. 1, 2001). “By amended complaint the plaintiff has requested a decree of legal separation because the marriage has irretrievably broken down. The defendant has filed a cross-complaint alleging the same ground but has asked that the marriage be dissolved. The evidence clearly indicates this marriage has broken down irretrievably with no hope of reconciliation. Judgment may enter dissolving the marriage on the defendant’s cross-complaint.”
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WEST KEY NUMBERS: |
· Husband and Wife # 277-301. Separation and separate maintenance |
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ENCYCLOPEDIAS: |
· 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce & Separation (1998). § 397. —Converting limited divorce into absolute divorce · 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife (1991). §§ 220-241. Separation agreements and separate maintenance
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TEXTS & TREATISES:
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· 7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice Series, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999). Chapter 10. Legal separation § 10.1. In general § 10.2. Basis for legal separation § 10.6 Distinction from dissolution § 10.9. Reconciliation § 10.10. Conversion to dissolution—Procedure § 10.11. —Legal considerations · 2 Renee Bevacqua Bollier and Susan V. Busby, Stephenson’s Connecticut Civil Procedure (3rd ed. 2002). Chapter 20. Family law procedures § 241. History of Connecticut’s divorce law § 262. Legal Separation · 1A Wesley Horton and Kimberly A. Knox, Connecticut Practice Series, Practice Book Annotated, Superior Court Civil Rules (4th ed. 1998). Authors’ Comments following § 25-36 · Mary Ellen Wynn and Ellen B. Lubell, Handbook of Forms for the Connecticut Family Lawyer (1991). Chapter XVIII. Legal separation Notes & Comments, p. 206.
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LAW REVIEWS:
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· Arthur E. Balbirer and Gaetano Ferro, Survey of 1991 Developments In Connecticut Family Law, 66 Conn. B.J. 40 (1992). Conversion of legal separation to dissolution, p. 62-63.
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COMPILER: |
Lawrence Cheeseman, Connecticut Judicial Branch, Law Library at Middletown, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06457. (860) 343‑6560. Email
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Grounds for Legal Separation
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
“A decree of dissolution of a marriage or a decree of legal separation shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred:
(1) The marriage has broken down irretrievably;
(2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled;
(3) adultery;
(4) fraudulent contract;
(5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty;
(6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from;
(7) habitual intemperance;
(8) intolerable cruelty;
(9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year;
(10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c) (2008).
· Incorporation by reference: “Wherever in the general statutes the terms ‘spouse’, ‘family’, ‘immediate family’, ‘dependent’, ‘next of kin’ or any other term that denotes the spousal relationship are used or defined, a party to a civil union shall be included in such use or definition, and wherever in the general statutes, except sections 7-45 [Preparation of certificates] and 17b-137a [Social Security number to be recorded on license applications, certain documents and death certificate. Confidentiality.] of the general statutes, as amended by this act, subdivision (4) of section 45a-727a [State policy re best interest of the child; public policy re marriage.], sections 46b-20 to 46b-34[Marriage], inclusive, section 46b-150d[Emancipation under common law] of the general statutes, as amended by this act, and section 14 of this act, the term ‘marriage’ is used or defined, a civil union shall be included in such use or definition. CONN. GRN. STATS. § 46b-38oo (2008) (EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2005). (emphasis added).
A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
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SCOPE: |
· Bibliographic resources relating to a no fault dissolution of marriage (divorce) commenced after October 1, 1997
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DEFINITIONS:
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· No fault divorce: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred: (1) the marriage has broken down irretrievably; (2) the parties have lived apart by reason of incompatibility for a continuous period of at least the eighteen months immediately prior to the service of the complaint and that there is no reasonable prospect that they will be reconciled . . . .” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(c) (2008).
· “Incompatibility of personalities is not and has never been a ground for divorce in Connecticut. Under our law, married persons are expected to accept the ordinary vicissitudes of marriage caused by unwise mating, unhappy situations, unruly tempers and common quarrels or marital wranglings.” Nowak v. Nowak, 23 Conn. Sup. 495, 497, 185 A.2d 83 (1962).
· Irretrievable breakdown: “In 1973, by No. 73-373 of the 1973 Public Acts (P.A. 73-373), the legislature effected an historic revision of our marital dissolution statutes. That legislation introduced certain new concepts to our family law, such as the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as a ground for dissolution.” Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 433, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998).
· “The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.” Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985).
· “The absence of objective guidelines does not mean an abdication of judicial function, nor does it signal, as the defendant argues, that a court determining whether a marriage has in fact irretrievably broken down is acting purely ministerially or is granting a divorce ‘upon demand.’ It does, however, sustain the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s decision to rearrange his business ventures after the initiation of divorce proceedings does not necessarily repair the rupture in the marital relationship that had previously occurred.” Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979).
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STATUTES:
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· Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008). § 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation § 46b‑51. Stipulation of parties and finding of irretrievable breakdown
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COURT RULES:
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· Conn. Practice Book (2008). Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters § 25-2. Complaints for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment § 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to complaint or application § 25-8. —Amendment; New grounds for dissolution of marriage § 25-9. —Answer, cross complaint, claims for relief by defendant § 25-10. —Answer to cross complaint |
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CASES:
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· Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 48, 844 A.2d 855 (2004). “The defendant failed to demonstrate that the court improperly found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. The record clearly demonstrates the breakdown in the parties’ marriage. The fact that the defendant claims to maintain hope for reconciliation will not support a finding that there are prospects for reconciliation. The allegations raised by the plaintiff concerning the difficulties in the marriage were serious and spanned almost the entire length of the marriage. The court was within its discretion to credit the plaintiff’s version of the facts that the pattern of litigation was the result of the defendant’s attempt to thwart the dissolution proceedings, not the plaintiff’s lack of intent to end the marriage. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not improperly find that the marriage had broken down irretrievably.”
· Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 115, 786 A.2d 525 (2001). “On the basis of the record, we conclude that the court could reasonably have found that the defendant had failed to establish her claim of intolerable cruelty, and therefore it was not clearly erroneous for the court to reject intolerable cruelty as a ground for dissolution and instead grant the dissolution of the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown.”
· Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 659, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983). “Section 46b-51 allows the court to avoid specifying fault for the breakdown of the marriage and allows the parties to avoid calling friends or relatives to testify as to the reasons for the breakdown.”
· Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210 (1985). “The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court . . . . The fact that the defendant maintains hope for reconciliation will not support a finding that there are prospects for a reconciliation . . . . A difference, to be irreconcilable, need not necessarily be so viewed by both parties.”
· Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 659-670, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983). “Section 46b-51 allows the court to avoid specifying fault for the breakdown of the marriage. . . . In contrast with 46b-51, under the statutes governing the assignment of the property of the parties or the award of alimony in a contested proceeding, the court is required to consider the causes for the dissolution of the marriage.”
· Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572, 427 A.2d 406 (1980). “No-fault divorce does not mean that the causes of a marital breakup are always irrelevant, but it does mean that determining cause is not crucial to the judicial administration of matrimonial matters.”
· Gluck v. Gluck, 181 Conn. 225, 227, 435 A.2d 35 (1980). “Next, the defendant asserts that General Statutes 46b-40 (c), to the extent that it authorizes the dissolution of a marriage if the marriage has broken down irretrievably, is vague, nullifies the other grounds for dissolution, prevents defenses and impairs the obligation of contracts, all in violation of constitutional strictures. The vagueness issue was resolved in Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 255-56, 423 A.2d 895 (1979); what was said there need not be repeated here. The gravamen of the unparticularized claim that irretrievable breakdown nullifies the other grounds for dissolution set forth in 46b-40 (c) and prevents defenses appears to be that the legislature has sanctioned divorce on demand. This claim too was rejected in Joy v. Joy, supra. The notion that allowing marital dissolutions based on irretrievable breakdown impairs the obligation of contracts within the meaning of article one, 10 of the United States constitution is bankrupt. Marriage is not a contract within the meaning of this clause of the constitution. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888).”
· Joy v. Joy, 178 Conn. 254, 256, 423 A.2d 895 (1979). “The defendant claims that 46-32 (c) is unconstitutional unless this court imposes judicial standards or guidelines to limit discretionary fact-finding by the trial courts of this state. We disagree. At least since Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-14, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888), it has been clear that the legislature has plenary power to determine the circumstances under which a marital relationship is created and terminated . . . . The legislature could rationally conclude that public policy requires an accommodation to the unfortunate reality that a marital relationship may terminate in fact without regard to the fault of either marital partner, and that such a relationship should therefore be dissoluble in law upon a judicial determination of irretrievable breakdown. Courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes have unanimously upheld the constitutionality of no-fault divorce.”
· McEvoy v. McEvoy, 99 Conn. 427, 421, 122 A. 100 (1923). “But there are trials causing much weariness and suffering, which parties to the marriage contract must bear; the policy of the State, as well as the sacred nature of the marriage covenant, requires patient endurance.”
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WEST KEY NUMBERS: |
· Divorce #12. Causes for divorce in general · Divorce #34. Inability to live together · Divorce #36. Voluntary separation |
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DIGESTS:
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· Connecticut Family Law Citations: Irretrievable breakdown · Dowling’s Digest: Dissolution of marriage § 7
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ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
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· 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998). §§ 22-24. No-Fault grounds §§ 25-34. Voluntary separation · 27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986). §§ 13-70. Grounds; No-Fault divorce · Dissolution Of Marriage On Statutory Ground Of Incompatibility, 19 POF2d 221(1979). · James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, What Constitutes “Incompatibility” Within Statute Specifying It As Substantial Ground for Divorce, 97 ALR3d 989 (1980). · Jack W. Short, Jr., Annotation, Validity, construction, and effect of ‘no-fault’ divorce statute providing for dissolution of marriage upon finding that relationship is no longer viable, 55 ALR3d 581 (1974).
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TEXTS & TREATISES: |
· 7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999). Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general § 15.2 Breakdown of marriage relationship § 15.3 Constitutionality of no-fault law § 15.4 Other grounds for dissolution § 15.5 Separation for eighteen months
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LAW REVIEWS:
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· Robert M. McAnernery and Samuel V. Schoommaker III, Connecticut’s New Approach To Marriage Dissolution, 47 Connecticut Bar Journal 375 (1973).
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COMPILER: |
· Lawrence Cheeseman, Supervising Law Librarian, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at Middletown, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06424. (860) 343-6560. Email
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Grimm v. Grimm 82 Conn. App. 41, 844 A.2d 855 (2004)
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“In this appeal, the defendant, Robert L. Grimm, claims that (1) General Statutes § 46b-40 (c)(1) violates the free exercise of religion clauses of the federal and state constitutions,(2) the trial court improperly concluded that the parties’ marriage had irretrievably broken down and precluded expert testimony on the subject, (3) the court improperly determined the financial orders, (4) the court improperly denied his motion to open the evidence prior to judgment for the purpose of offering certain evidence and (5) the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss or to transfer the matter to another judicial district. We reverse the judgment as to the award of counsel fees only and affirm the judgment in all other respects.” p. 43.
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Constitutional issues
Free exercise of religion
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“The defendant first claims that § 46b-40 (c)(1) violates the free exercise of religion clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The defendant argues that, as applied to him, § 46b-40 (c)(1) violates his religious beliefs and liberties because his faith opposes divorce. We disagree.” pp. 44-45 “The United States Supreme Court has ‘consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). General Statutes § 46b-40 (c)(1) is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. The statute does not in any manner infringe on the defendant’s right to exercise his religious beliefs merely because it permits the plaintiff to obtain a divorce from him against his wishes.” p. 45
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Irretrievable breakdown |
“‘The determination of whether a breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.’ Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 614, 496 A.2d 210, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). ‘We decline, as have other courts that have considered the issue . . . to circumscribe this delicate process of fact-finding by imposing the constraint of guidelines on an inquiry that is necessarily individualized and particularized.’ (Citations omitted.) Joy v. Joy, supra, 178 Conn. [254,] 255.” p. 47.
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Financial orders |
“Our Supreme Court and this court ‘have often described financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings as‘entirely interwoven’ and as ‘a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.’ . . . Consequently, when an appellate court reverses a trial court judgment based on an improper alimony, property distribution, or child support award, the appellate court’s remand typically authorizes the trial court to reconsider all of the financial orders.’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 277, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999); Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984). ‘Every improper order, however, does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors.’ Smith v. Smith, supra, [249 Conn. 265,] 277. In determining the appropriate remedy, ‘we focus on the specific language of the trial court’s order as set forth in its [decision].’ Id., 278. As previously discussed, the court made no finding that an award of counsel fees was necessary to avoid undermining its other financial orders. The plaintiff, moreover, has not requested and presumably would not benefit from a remand in this case which comes to us in the context of its ‘’tortured history.’’ Grimm v. Grimm, 74 Conn. App. 407. Because we conclude that the award of counsel fees is severable from the other financial orders, it is not necessary to remand the case for reconsideration of the other financial orders.” pp. 55-56
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A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
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SCOPE: |
· Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon fault grounds.
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DEFINITIONS:
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· Fault grounds: “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred. . .(3) adultery; (4) fraudulent contract; (5) wilful desertion for one year with total neglect of duty; (6) seven years’ absence, during all of which period the absent party has not been heard from; (7) habitual intemperance; (8) intolerable cruelty; (9) sentence to imprisonment for life or the commission of any infamous crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment for a period in excess of one year; (10) legal confinement in a hospital or hospitals or other similar institution or institutions, because of mental illness, for at least an accumulated period totaling five years within the period of six years next preceding the date of the complaint.” Conn. Gen. Stat.§46b-40(c) (2008).
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STATUTES:
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· Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008). §46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation |
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COURT RULES:
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· Conn. Practice Book (2008). Chapter 25. Procedure in Family Matters § 25-2. Complaints for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or annulment § 25-7. Pleadings in general; Amendments to complaint or application § 25-8. —Amendment; New grounds for dissolution of marriage § 25-9. —Answer, cross complaint, claims for relief by defendant § 25-10. —Answer to cross complaint
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CASES:
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· Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 278, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983). “Although, because of their clandestine nature, adulterous acts are usually proved by circumstantial evidence . . . the circumstances must be such as to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just person to the conclusion of guilt.”
· Posado v. Posado, 179 Conn. 568, 573, 427 A.2d 406 (1980). “In the text of the statutes, the criteria relating to the ‘the causes for the . . . dissolution of marriage’ is only one item in an extensive list of criteria that the trial court is directed to take into account.” · Kinsley v. Kinsley, 110 Conn. 695, 695-696 (1929). “The cumulative effect of the defendant’s acts and conduct as recited in the report of the committee may well have been held to have been so cruel as to have destroyed the public and personal objects of matrimony, past rehabilitation, and rendered a continuance of the marriage relation unbearable - beyond reasonable endurance - and therefore intolerable within the meaning we have given it in the ground for divorce, ‘intolerable cruelty.’”
· Alden v. Alden, 21 Conn. Sup. 301, 304, 154 A.2d 522 (1959). “The desertion for three years which constitutes a ground for divorce under our statute involves the coexistence of the following four conditions: (1) cessation from cohabitation, (2) an intention on the part of the absenting party not to resume it, (3) the absence of the other party’s consent, and (4) the absence of justification.”
· Vendetto v. Vendetto, 115 Conn. 303, 305, 161 A. 392 (1932). “The plaintiff’s ground of divorce was the fraud of the defendant in entering into the marriage contract knowing her epileptic condition, and yet, in order to induce marriage, concealing the fact from the plaintiff.”
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WEST KEY NUMBERS:
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· Divorce # 12-38. Grounds |
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DIGESTS:
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· Connecticut Family Law Citations: Fault · Dowling’s Digest: Dissolution of Marriage §§ 6-10
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ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
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· 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation (1998). §§ 35-128. Fault grounds · 27A C.J.S. Divorce (1986). §§ 22-40. Cruelty §§ 41-52. Desertion §§ 53-59. Personal indignities §§ 60-70. Other particular grounds
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TEXTS & TREATISES: |
· 7 Arnold H. Rutkin and Kathleen A. Hogan, Connecticut Practice, Family Law and Practice with Forms (1999). Chapter 15. Dissolution of marriage in general § 15.6 Adultery § 15.7. Fraudulent contract § 15.8. Wilful desertion for one year § 15.9. Continuous absence for seven years § 15.10. Habitual intemperance § 15.11. Intolerable cruelty § 15.12. Imprisonment; life sentence or commission of infamous crime § 15.13. Five-year confinement for mental illness § 15.14. Defenses
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COMPILER: |
· Lawrence Cheeseman, Supervising Law Librarian, Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Library at Middletown, One Court Street, Middletown, CT 06424. (860) 343-6560. Email
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Table 2 Fault and Financial Awards
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Assignment of property |
“As stated in Christoni v. Christoni, 156 Conn. 628, 629, 239 A.2d 533, on the issue of choosing alternative grounds for granting a divorce: ‘Where more than one ground for a divorce is claimed and one alleged ground is proved, it is immaterial whether or not the additional statutory ground or grounds may also exist.’ The fault of the parties in causing a marital dissolution is material, however, to the issue of an assignment of property ancillary to the marital dissolution.” Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 180 Conn. 212, 214 fn. 2, 429 A.2d 463 (1980).
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Irretrievable breakdown |
“The contention . . . that a determination of irretrievable breakdown precludes the court from considering the causes of the dissolution in making financial awards is erroneous.” Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031(1983).
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Factors |
“In the text of the statutes, the criteria relating to the ‘the causes for the . . . dissolution of marriage’ is only one item in an extensive list of criteria that the trial court is directed to take into account.” Posado v. Posado, 179 Conn. 568, 573, 427 A.2d 406 (1980).
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Contribution |
“We disagree with the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court, in making its award of alimony and its assignment of property, gave inordinate weight to the cause of the breakdown. There is no provision in the governing statutes requiring that awards of alimony be distributed equally between the parties . . . . The trial court structured the division of property in a way which returned to the defendant his contribution to the marriage.” Carter v. Carter, 8 Conn. App., 356, 359, 512 A.2d 979 (1986).
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Misconduct |
“While alimony, in whatever form, or an assignment of property is not to be considered either as a reward for virtue or as a punishment for wrongdoing, a spouse whose conduct has contributed substantially to the breakdown of the marriage should not expect to receive financial kudos for his or her misconduct. Moreover, in considering the gravity of such misconduct it is entirely proper for the court to assess the impact of the errant spouse’s conduct on the other spouse. Because in making its assignment of property the trial court had a reasonable basis for it disposition we see no reason for disturbing the result.” Robinson v. Robinson, 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982).
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A Guide to Resources in the Law Library
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SCOPE: |
· Bibliographic resources relating to dissolution of marriage (divorce) based upon the grounds of adultery.
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DEFINITIONS:
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· Adultery “means voluntary sexual intercourse between a married person and a person other than such person’s spouse.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-40(f) (2008).
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STATUTES:
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· Conn. Gen. Stat. (2008) § 46b‑40(c). Fault and no fault grounds for divorce or legal separation. “A decree of dissolution of a marriage . . . shall be granted upon a finding that one of the following causes has occurred . . .(3) adultery . . . .”
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