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6.5 Introduction to Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint
This commentary has been superseded, in part, by State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (2008). It will be updated to conform to that case in the near future.
Revised to December 1, 2007
The meaning of
abduction
"[C]ommon notions regarding the crime of
kidnapping envisage the carrying away of a person under coercion and restraint.
Although this type of movement undoubtedly can serve as the basis for
kidnapping, our kidnapping statute does not require such movement. Rather, all
that is required under the statute is that the defendant have abducted the
victim and restrained her with the requisite intent." State v. Luurtsema,
262 Conn. 179, 201 (2002). "Abduct," as defined in General Statutes § 53a-91
(2), means to restrain with the intent to prevent a person's liberation.
"Restrain," as defined in General Statutes § 53a-91 (1), means to restrict a
person's movements so as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty.
These statutory definitions include various ways and means by which a person's
liberty may be interfered with, but include no requirements as to time or asportation. State v. Luurtsema, supra, 262 Conn. 201-202; State v.
Niemeyer, 258 Conn. 510, 520-23 (2001) (evidence, which established that
defendant forced victim into master bedroom and, through repeated physical and
verbal abuse and intimidation, frightened her into remaining there for several
hours, was sufficient to warrant jury's findings that defendant had restrained
and abducted victim). In addition, a threat is sufficient to interfere
substantially with a person's liberty. State v. Drake, 19 Conn. App.
396, 401 (1989); see generally State v. Luster, 48 Conn. App. 872,
880-81, cert. denied, 246 Conn. 901 (1998) (discussing the meaning of
restraint).
Incidental to
another crime
Connecticut has not adopted the merger
doctrine, under which kidnapping statutes do not apply to unlawful confinements
or movements that are incidental to the commission of other felonies. State
v. DeJesus, 91 Conn. App. 47, 87-88 (2005), cert. granted on other grounds,
279 Conn. 912 (2006). "[T]he legislature of this state has seen fit not to
merge the offense of kidnapping with sexual assault or with any other felony."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 88; see also State v. Vass, 191
Conn. 604, 615 (1983). The Court in State v. DeJesus, supra, discussed
prior cases in which the courts had rejected defendant's constitutional claims
that the statute as applied was void for vagueness, recognizing that factual
scenarios could exist "in which charging a defendant with kidnapping on the
basis of the most minuscule restraint would produce an absurd and unconscionable
result." Id., 89-90. The Court concluded that the minimal amount of restraint
in DeJesus could not support the defendant's conviction, distinguishing
it from all previous challenges. "[T]o allow such a conviction to remain would
result in the encouragement of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
kidnapping statute by overzealous prosecutors." Id., 97; State v. Winot,
95 Conn. App. 332, 343, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 905 (2006) (taking the victim's
arm and pulling on it for a few seconds too minuscule). See also State v.
Sanseverino, 98 Conn. App. 198, 213, cert. granted, 280 Conn. 945-46 (2006)
(defendant restrained victim prior to and during sexual assault); State v.
Wilcox, 254 Conn. 441, 465 (2000) (restraint incidental to a sexual assault
was sufficient to support conviction of kidnapping); State v. Green, 55
Conn. App. 706, 714-16 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 920, cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 2019, 146 L.Ed.2d 966 (2000) (same).
Intent
Unlawful restraint is a specific intent
crime. State v. Phu Dinh Le, 17 Conn. App. 339, 343-44 (1989); see also
State v. Davis, 13 Conn. App. 667, 672 (1988).