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6.5 Introduction to Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint
Revised to November 1, 2008
In State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 (2008), the Supreme Court announced a reinterpretation of the statute defining second degree kidnapping, General Statutes § 53a-94. The Court's new view of the meaning of "abduct," embodied in that statute, eliminates from the scope of kidnapping restraints that are incidental to the commission of other crimes. Distinguishing the statutory definitions of "abduct" and "restrain" by the inclusion in the former of an "intent to prevent a person's liberation," the Court concluded that in order to establish an abduction in conjunction with another crime, the state must prove that a defendant intended "to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime." Id., 542.
The Court emphasized that this holding did not alter the basic underpinnings of its prior kidnapping jurisprudence. "First, in order to establish a kidnapping, the state is not required to establish any minimum period of confinement or degree of movement. When that confinement or movement is merely incidental to the commission of another crime, however, the confinement or movement must have exceeded that which was necessary to commit the other crime." Id., 546. "Second, we do not retreat from the general principle that an accused may be charged with and convicted of more than one crime arising out of the same act or acts, as long as all of the elements of each crime are proven. Indeed, because the confinement or movement of a victim that occurs simultaneously with or incidental to the commission of another crime ordinarily will constitute a substantial interference with that victim's liberty, such restraints still may be prosecuted under the unlawful restraint statutes." Id., 548.
See
also State v. Sanseverino, 287 Conn. 608 (2008), and State v. DeJesus,
288 Conn. 418 (2008).